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It is my pleasure to introduce this new thematic volume of International 
 Development Policy (idp). The journal’s seventh annual issue focuses exclu-
sively, and for the first time, on the Middle East and North Africa (mena), a 
region beset by armed conflict, social and economic turmoil and set against 
the backdrop of lower oil prices and political uncertainty.
The volume explores the economic implications of democratic transition 
efforts in the region since the start of the so-called Arab Spring in December 
2010. It analyses the challenges facing governments in addressing the underly-
ing economic problems that have led to widening national and regional in-
equality and contributed to the initial unrest, while questioning the complex 
relationships with Europe, the usa and the rest of the world. Importantly, the 
volume highlights the value of short-term policy measures that may offer the 
potential for quick and visible economic wins to help consolidate democratic 
processes and strengthen institutional governance at critical junctures.
The volume consists of eleven chapters including an introduction by the 
guest editor, prof. Giacomo Luciani. As he underscores, this collection of ar-
ticles pursues specific objectives while complementing the existing literature 
on economic and political developments in the mena region. While acknowl-
edging policy priorities aimed at producing positive results in the long run, 
such as public sector reform and economic diversification, there is a sense of 
urgency when it comes to offering new opportunities to respond to the chal-
lenge of rising labour market demand, with a projected North African work-
force expected to grow by more than 80 million between 2010 and 2050.1 The 
authors further insist on the imperative of seeking out and implementing in-
novative policies ‘that will allow for rapid improvement in the living condi-
tions of a majority of people and sustain consensus around the consolidation 
of  democracy’. These include measures such as the abolition of fuel subsidies 
combined with a targeted system of unconditional cash transfers, and policies 
that favour currency devaluation and reform of the banking sector to support 
small-scale enterprises.
I commend Giacomo Luciani for pulling together a timely and thought-
provoking volume that brings together authors displaying a wide breadth of 
expertise not only with regard to the highly complex challenges and problems 
facing the region, but also with regard to potential economic policy measures 
in support of inclusive development and democratisation. The volume thus 
1 AfDB, oecd, undp (2015), African Economic Outlook, pp. xii–xiii.
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contributes to filling gaps in our understanding of how economic and political 
development processes may support democratic transition in spite of adverse 
political-economy dynamics. It also illustrates the broader intent that lies at 
the heart of our journal which seeks to serve as a bridge between academic 
research and policy making.
I extend special thanks to the Kuwait Foundation for the Advancement of 
Sciences (kfas) and the Kuwait Program at Sciences Po, as the sponsors of the 
conference that provided financial support and material for this publication. 
I also underline my appreciation to Ghassan Salamé, the founding Dean of the 
Paris School of International Affairs at Sciences Po (psia), as well as to two 
anonymous peer reviewers for their insightful remarks and suggestions.
While I hope this collection will have particular appeal to new readers in 
the mena region, I am confident that the volume will raise interest among 
our regular readership of scholars and practioners elsewhere thanks to the rel-
evance and diversity of contributions on a region whose future bears central 
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Democratic transitions in the Middle East and North Africa have mostly failed to con-
solidate and have been hindered by the difficult economic heritage of previous au-
thoritarian governments. Yet newly established democratic governments must deliver 
on the expectations of their people, especially the poorer strata, otherwise disillusion-
ment may open the door to restoration of authoritarian rule. The introductory chapter 
reviews existing literature on the topic and presents the contributions of the collective 
volume to this crucially important discussion. Can democracy succeed? Various ideas 
for economic policies that may help consolidate the democratisation process are pro-
posed, while major obstacles on the way to democratic success are also highlighted.
1 Introduction
With the solitary exception of Tunisia, where a still fragile process of demo-
cratic consolidation appears to be making progress in the face of multiple 
 challenges, the Arab Spring has led to either a restoration of authoritarian 
rule (in Egypt, and in Bahrain and the other members of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (gcc)) or civil war (in Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen).
This state of affairs is obviously unsettling. For decades the political econo-
my debate about the Middle East and North Africa (mena) has focused on the 
causes and negative consequences of authoritarianism, and has preached dem-
ocratic good governance, promising instantaneous and almost unconditional-
ly improved growth and integration into the globalisation process ( Acemoglu 
et al., 2014; World Bank 2016). Then an opportunity for transition to democracy 
arises—largely unexpected and certainly unpredicted—and  almost univer-
sally fails. Unavoidable questions then confront us: is democracy possible? Is it 
desirable? How can we increase the chances for newly  established democratic 
governments to deliver and consolidate?
The Arab Spring has encouraged a broad debate concerning its causes; less 
so about how it might develop. Much of the literature has focused on ideology, 
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identity and longing for human dignity (Achcar, 2013; Hanieh, 2013; Kamrava, 
2014; Selvik and Utvik, 2016). The analysis has mostly been conducted at the 
level of individual countries; the regional dimension of the phenomenon has 
generally not been recognised and explained. Economic causes of discontent 
are frequently mentioned, but are rarely supported by empirical data (notable 
exceptions are Alvaredo and Piketty, 2014; Azmeh, 2014; Beinin, 2016;  Hakimian, 
2013a and 2013b; Luciani, 2016; Nugent, 2012; and Verme et al., 2014).
It is of course necessary to form a better understanding of the causes and 
meaning of the Arab Spring in order to meaningfully discuss its eventual failure. 
That said, the focus of this collection is not on the causes, but on the dilemmas 
that governments in power, whether incumbent or issuing from a democratic 
transition, must face in addressing the unresolved underlying  issues that led 
to the revolt. Important recent contributions that have addressed in a similar 
manner the issue of post-revolution economic policies include, notably, works 
of Magdi Amin et al. (2012), Hafez Ghanem (2016a), Schiffbauer et al. (2015), 
and the World Bank (2014).
What needs to be done to deliver the minimum improvement in living con-
ditions that will convince the people that indeed things are changing for the 
better? Can a democratic government implement the measures necessary? Or 
do we still need a degree of authoritarianism before a successful democratic 
transition is conceivable? What can the democratic world do to support the 
consolidation of democratic transitions? Or should democratic countries ac-
cept that an authoritarian parenthesis is inevitable and keep searching for the 
oxymoron: a democratising authoritarian government?
For Europe at least, these are not just academic questions. The civil wars, 
restorations of authoritarian rule, and developmental failures in the Middle 
East and North Africa have led to an unprecedented wave of refugees and 
economic migrants that the European Union and other European countries 
are unable to deal with. Faced with a humanitarian crisis of biblical propor-
tions, Europe is falling apart, turning into not one, but multiple fortresses. It 
is a political return to the Middle Ages, where localism and defence against 
encroachment from outside are the leading values.
If democracy is to be saved, it has to be saved everywhere. In a globalised 
world, it is simply impossible to be indifferent to the fate of neighbouring 
countries. The European Union (eu) has long had a concept of its ‘neighbour-
hood’ and formulated policies—on paper at least—to support the respect of 
human rights, and good governance and democracy. The fact is that policies 
adopted so far have accomplished nothing, and have almost exclusively been 
disasters. In its latest revision the European Neighbourhood Policy appears to 
have abandoned any ambition to foster democratisation (Schuhmacher, 2016). 
Is there anything that could be done better? Are we following the right recipes? 
3Introduction
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We badly need to engage in this debate, and academics have a moral duty to 
put their minds to it.
2 The Economic Heritage of Authoritarianism
At least since the turn of the millennium, if not earlier, Arab authoritar-
ian governments have come to terms with the ‘Washington Consensus’, with 
variable degrees of enthusiasm. They have pursued policies of fiscal stabi-
lisation, which progressively allowed typical features of the past—such as 
high  inflation,  capital controls, trade protectionism and multiple exchange 
rates—to be overcome. Economies were opened and active participation in 
the  globalisation process was sought. International specialisation in goods 
and services for which the countries could claim comparative advantage was 
accepted, which resulted in less emphasis on industry and subsistence agri-
culture, more on  export agriculture (Woertz, this volume) and export services 
such as,  principally, tourism.
Generally, these developments were lauded by international financial or-
ganisations. It was expected that the Arab economies would be able to attract 
increased foreign direct investment, which would have led to accelerated 
growth, improved productivity and competitiveness, and the creation of jobs 
in line with population growth and the youth bulge (Fargues, this volume). The 
outcome of these policies was partially, yet not entirely disappointing.
Things have also been problematic from the point of view of democratic 
transition. Capital-intensive investment in mining and industry displays strong 
resistance to political disturbances, because the large amount of sunk capital 
encourages resilience, plus generally projects are remote from densely inhab-
ited centres and are not as vulnerable as sometimes believed. It is therefore 
 generally the case that such investment may be slowed down but not  reversed; 
nor is production interrupted should political instability occur, except in 
 extreme cases where the security of company personnel is directly threatened. 
In contrast, financial investment and tourism are extremely vulnerable to po-
litical instability, and this is the other side of the democratic transition coin. As 
soon as the incumbent authoritarian regime collapses, foreign investment will 
stop coming in, domestic and foreign money will tend to flow out, and interna-
tional rating agencies will revise the country’s rating downwards. This immedi-
ately creates a negative spiral, which a newly elected democratic government 
(or, more likely, a provisional government lacking full democratic legitimation 
and with a very uncertain life expectancy) will find difficult to reverse.
Tourism is also extremely vulnerable to political disturbances and uncer-
tainty. The vast majority of potential tourists are not interested in witnessing 
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a revolution. In the time that popular uprisings will take to provoke the fall of 
the authoritarian regime, the tourist trade will quickly dry up. Once a demo-
cratic transition is underway, tourists will still normally want to be reassured 
that conditions are stable and security is guaranteed; recovery will be gradual. 
This means that a newly elected democratic government is likely to be con-
fronted with rapidly deteriorating economic conditions in the tourism sector, 
depending on the importance of that sector in the national economy. Fur-
thermore, even once the democratic transition is well underway, it is not dif-
ficult for opponents or extremists to stage terrorist attacks targeting tourists, 
which will have the immediate effect of precipitating a new crisis or extending 
the  existing one. The damaging economic impact of terrorism is evident and 
feared even in Europe or the United States, but much more so in mena, includ-
ing in such primary tourist destinations as Egypt, Tunisia or Morocco.1
Tourism is also a labour-intensive sector, which supports local agriculture, 
handicrafts and small-scale commercial activities. A sudden downturn in tour-
ist activity is likely to be immediately felt by a significant share of the popula-
tion, mostly from relatively low-income or poorer strata.
With respect to fiscal policy, authoritarian regimes have pursued balanced 
budgets primarily by cutting down on social services (generally by simply not 
increasing expenditure in line with population growth, and letting quality 
 progressively deteriorate). Such regimes have, however, tended to maintain 
and in some cases even expand entitlements in the form of subsidised or ex-
ceedingly low prices for selected necessities (primarily basic food items) and 
energy products (oil products, gas and electricity). The latter have mainly a 
regressive impact on income distribution (as documented by El-Katiri and 
Fattouh, and Hertog—both in this volume) while the former are more benign 
(as explained by Woertz and, in the case of Egypt, by Springborg, both in this 
volume). Nevertheless, it is energy subsidies that have come to absorb an ex-
ceedingly important share of government budgets, in part because the price 
of oil increased rapidly between 2003 and 2008 and remained very high subse-
quently. Newly empowered democratic governments were therefore immedi-
ately confronted with the challenge of announcing unpopular measures while 
their legitimacy and hold on power was still quite shaky.
Notwithstanding evident weaknesses, the economic growth record of the 
authoritarian regimes over the 2000–10 decade was not altogether negative 
1 In Egypt, international tourism revenue in 2015 totalled usd 6.1 billion, while in 2010 it had 
stood at usd 12.5 billion. In Tunisia tourist revenue peaked in 2008, was down by roughly 
one-third by 2013, and further declined in 2015 following terrorist attacks on tourist facilities. 
See also World Bank (2016).
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(Amin et al., 2012; Ghanem, 2016a; Hakimian, 2013a and 2013b; Devarajan and 
Mottaghi, 2014). Arab countries, and not just the major oil exporters, experi-
enced a decade (or more) of rapid growth up to 2010; growth suffered subse-
quently because of the negative impact of the Spring, especially on  certain 
sectors. However, this growth did not benefit all equally: although most mea-
surements of income distribution do not show increasing concentration 
( Hakimian, 2013b), employment opportunities for young people (especially if 
educated) worsened significantly. Ghanem (2016a) also points to unemploy-
ment among educated young entrants to the job market, but also to the wors-
ening or stagnating conditions in marginalised regions (e.g. Upper Egypt) or 
sectors (e.g. agriculture). Finally, Alvaredo and Piketty (2014) convincingly ar-
gue that data sources that are currently available at the national level in Egypt 
or other mena countries are insufficient to derive reliable estimates of top 
income shares, and that income inequality is extremely large at the level of 
the Middle East region taken as whole. It is the perception of such growing in-
equality, further fuelled by the growing role of regional media and the constant 
image of Dubai-style success that they project, that ignited the resentment and 
revolt against incumbent authoritarian regimes. The widening gap in incomes 
and wealth at the regional level is the key target of popular revolt: democracy 
must succeed in bringing about a reversal of this trend.2
3 Well-Established Recipes Do Not Support Democratic Transitions
Faced with a declining economy, falling government revenues and excessive 
expenditure on subsidies, governments issuing from the demise of authori-
tarian regimes were encouraged to persist in the policies of the Washington 
Consensus—that is, primarily cutting outlays by reducing subsidies and other 
expenditure, privatising government-owned enterprises, and improving tax 
collection.
Such policies promise immediate political costs but deferred advantages—
hardly the ideal path for a democratic government in need of consensus and 
consolidation. True, democratic legitimation is necessary if one is to pursue 
controversial or unpopular policies, but democracy needs to be well rooted for 
that. A country undergoing democratic transition needs both a high degree of 
consensus to establish a national pact that will underpin a new constitution, 
2 After the revolt, the Arab Barometer conducted a survey asking Tunisians what was the main 
reason for their revolt. More than 60 per cent of respondents indicated a ‘weak economy’ was 
their main motivation. (Cited in Ghanem, 2016a).
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and compromises among a broad spectrum of political forces. This does not 
bode well for potentially unpopular measures.
Revolt against incumbent authoritarian regimes certainly is motivated 
largely by a desire for freedom, for respect for human rights, and for dignity; 
but the poorer strata of the population also expect an improvement in their 
material conditions—at least some sign that income distribution may be mov-
ing in the right direction. Traditional macroeconomic stabilisation policies go 
in the opposite direction.
In fact, evidence of growing income inequality everywhere in the world, in 
advanced as well as in emerging countries, points to the conclusion that the 
globalisation process has supported a greater concentration of income and 
wealth rather than the opposite. Thus, while reverting to greater isolation from 
the global economic environment is not an option for any country, and cer-
tainly not for a country pursuing democratisation, the rules of globalisation 
are not helpful (Springborg 2016).
The debate on income inequality has greatly intensified among economists 
since the turn of the century with reference to all countries, not just to the 
mena region (Piketty, 2013; Atkinson, 2015). It has become evident that the 
process of globalisation has had profound consequences for the distribution 
of income in industrial and in emerging countries, leading to a greater con-
centration of income and wealth at the global level. In mature democracies, 
this trend is viewed as a potential threat to the satisfactory functioning and 
stability of institutions, but little attention has been paid to the consequenc-
es that it might have on democratisation processes. The standard line is that 
concentration of income and wealth may lead to growing dissatisfaction and 
eventually revolt: but in the initial stages of democratic transition, the limited 
opportunities to implement redistributive policies may endanger the process 
itself.
At the heart of the problem is increased international competition, which 
has led to deindustrialisation and the weakening of labour movements in all 
countries where industry and trade unions used to be important players.3 
The liberalisation of international trade and capital movements has brought 
about a radical change in the labour/capital bargaining balance. While some 
minority voices advocate a reversal of the globalisation process and a return 
3 Beinin (2016) insists on the importance of the role of trade unions and labour activism in 
Egypt and Tunisia. In the case of the latter country, trade unions also plaid a significant politi-
cal role in the transition process in the context of the so-called Quartet. Nevertheless, formal 
employment in both countries remains limited, and in the rest of the region trade unions are 
hardly a significant force.
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to greater national control over the economy to protect a broad range of 
welfare and rights-related legislation, it is unlikely that the world will go back 
to protectionism.
The more sophisticated discussion of inequality in a globalised context 
seeks ways of mitigating the trend towards growing concentrations of income 
and wealth by considering measures that are compatible with freedom of 
trade and capital movements. In this context, the role of education and of pro-
gressive taxation on income and wealth are frequently cited as the appropriate 
solutions—although fiscal competition constitutes a grave threat to the ability 
of individual states, even in the European context, to manage or tighten their 
taxation systems.
Almost all redistributive policies are administratively complex and require 
time to implement and even more time to show their effects. This means that 
they are not adapted to conditions prevailing in countries that are undergoing 
a democratic transition. We therefore face a potential vicious circle: if strong 
and accountable institutions are needed for successful participation in the glo-
balisation process, but the latter worsens income and wealth inequality, which 
constitutes a powerful obstacle to democratic transitions, then countries with 
weak/unaccountable institutions are condemned to economic marginalisa-
tion and to having inferior institutions.
4 The Quest for Alternatives
It is this critical nexus that the chapters in this book explore from different 
angles. The broad question is: what economic policies and development prior-
ities should be pursued by governments in the early phases of democratic tran-
sition processes? As mentioned already, the literature addressing this question 
so far has been limited.
Both of the major contributions to the literature originate from collective 
efforts undertaken under the aegis of the Brookings Institution. The first proj-
ect took place in 2011 and led to the publication of a volume by Magdi Amin 
et al. (2012). The second took place five years after the eruption of the Spring 
(as is self-evident from the title The Arab Spring Five Years Later) and led to the 
 publication of two volumes, one entirely written by Hafez Ghanem (2016a) and 
the other edited by the same (2016b).
The first book sets off from premises that are very similar to our own: ‘Most 
successful transitions involve simultaneous political and economic reform, 
and this is likely to be the case for Arab countries as well’ (Amin et al., 2012, 2). 
The importance of the regional dimension for both understanding the Arab 
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Spring and defining policies for democratic transitions is also underlined.4 The 
book’s main message is that ‘four main economic transitions are required’:
First, more opportunities for young people need to be created. There are 
large intergenerational inequities in the distribution of the benefits of 
economic growth, in favor of a group of public sector employees, elites, 
and other rent seekers to the disadvantage of the large youth population 
in the region. (…)
Second, the Arab economies need to modernize their public sectors. 
There is still a strong demand for a developmental state role in Arab 
economies and a significant suspicion over the impact of liberal eco-
nomic reforms that, under the old regimes, served to benefit only a few 
well-connected private groups. (…)
The third transition is in the private sector. Today, large elements of 
the private sector are seen as synonymous with corruption. Yet there is no 
sustainable economic model for the region that does not have the private 
sector playing a leading role. (…)
The fourth economic transition is in the approach to the rest of the 
world.
amin et al., 2012, 6–7, 9
These are all well-identified priorities, but mostly for pursuing in the longer 
term. Will weak governments engaged in transitioning to democracy have the 
time to pursue them? Is it not necessary to focus on some more immediate 
benefits? It is possible that, given that the book was the outcome of brain-
storming that took place while the Spring was still unfolding, the urgency of 
stabilising the transition was not yet acutely felt.
Writing five years later, Ghanem (2016a) seems resigned to the inevitability 
of a neo-authoritarian parenthesis to put in place policies that, in due course, 
will facilitate transitioning to democracy. Thus he writes: ‘…can a country with 
no democratic tradition and with weak institutions become a well-functioning 
democracy and improve the lives of its citizens overnight? The answer is ob-
viously no. Democratic transitions take years, even decades to succeed, and 
there are many twists and turns along the way. Moreover, they can be costly 
4 ‘… there is a commonality to Arab history, language, and culture so it is reasonable to 
 suppose  that there is a regional identity that should not be ignored. Such a view is rein-
forced by the contagion demonstrated during the Arab Spring and the close links of people, 




and require heavy human and economic sacrifices. Ask any Arab today if he 
or she feels that the region is better off than before the Arab Spring. What do 
you think the answer will be?’ (Ghanem, 2016a, 2). He continues, telling us 
about a conversation with a Cairo taxi driver who is happy about President 
al-Sissi and proud of having overthrown two presidents before him (Mubarak 
and Morsi): he says that if al-Sissi does not perform, the people will get rid of 
him as well. Ghanem believes this has established some basic accountability of 
power; therefore, ‘the Arab world appears to be moving toward more open and 
inclusive governance’ (Ghanem, 2016a, 2). Clearly the author believes that the 
neo-authoritarian regime of al-Sissi may deliver where Mubarak failed: provid-
ing for more inclusive growth.
Ghanem’s proposed cocktail of policies for achieving more inclusive growth 
is composed of four priorities: ‘institutional reforms to improve implementa-
tion of policies and programs; reforms of the business environment, with a 
special emphasis on developing small and medium-sized enterprises (smes); 
rural development and support to lagging regions; and improving the quality 
of education’. None of these is objectionable, and clearly these are all priorities 
that can only be pursued in the longer run, as improvements will be slow to 
materialise. But none of these is new either: why were previous authoritarian 
regimes unable to pursue these priorities (they did in the 1950s and early 1960s, 
but progressively steered away and towards elite integration in regional oil rent 
circulation)? How can we expect that newly established authoritarian regimes, 
whose repressive inclination is only too evident, will behave differently to their 
predecessors?
The essays in this volume continue this debate, in many ways confirming 
the difficulty of proposing a cocktail of policies that will allow for rapid im-
provement in the living conditions of a majority of people and sustain consen-
sus around the consolidation of democracy.
In Chapter 2, Samir Makdisi summarises the main conclusions of research 
on the historical entrenchment of Arab autocracies and of their subsequent 
unravelling in a few countries. He concludes that notwithstanding the unprec-
edented wave of popular revolt, ‘the region’s democratic prospects remain 
highly uncertain’. His key message concerning policies for the consolidation of 
democratic transitions is clear:
At the socio-economic level what would be required is the design and 
implementation of a broad based and what has come to be referred to as 
inclusive strategy, one that should create expectations that growth, ex-
panding employment opportunities, and equity will play a major role in 




In Chapter 3, Adeel Malik revisits the rentier state theory and argues that its 
scope should be greatly enlarged to encompass numerous other sources of rent 
besides mineral extraction. He believes that rent formation and circulation is 
the key explanatory variable of unsatisfactory growth results and the stability of 
autocratic regimes in the region. He points specifically to the way in which non-
tariff barriers, bank lending and freedom of capital movements have been used 
to favour the formation and enrichment of elites close to the incumbent auto-
cratic regimes. As he writes, ‘it is easier to remove regime leaders than to elimi-
nate the rentier structures that feed the associated elite coalitions’, thus pointing 
to the difficulty of moving from one set of economic structures to another that 
would be more inclusive. This also points to the crucial importance of disman-
tling existing mechanisms for rent circulation and the very sources of internal 
rents if the door to more inclusive economic development is to be opened.
El-Katiri and Fattouh (Chapter 4) focus on energy subsidies as a very im-
portant form of rent circulation, documenting the extraordinary and crippling 
burden of these subsidies on the budgets of states that are not major exporters, 
such as Egypt, Tunisia and Yemen. For oil exporting countries the burden is 
‘virtual’, in the sense that it translates into forfeited earnings rather than actual 
expenditure; but for all net importers of petroleum products the subsidies en-
tail actual expenditure, which accounts, depending on the year and the aver-
age price of crude oil, for a very substantial share of government expenditure 
(in 2013–14 upward of 30 per cent in the case of Yemen, close to 20 per cent in 
the case of Egypt). It is clear that the opportunity cost of such outlays—that 
is to say, the possible alternative ways in which this money could be spent, is 
extremely significant.
El-Katiri and Fattouh underline that a reform of energy subsidies needs to 
be well prepared and compensated by some balancing measure in order to 
be successful. Thus subsidy reform succeeded in both Morocco and Jordan 
(which, not by chance, are the two ‘democratising monarchies’ in the region, 
notwithstanding limitations to their democratic progress), but failed in Yemen. 
Energy subsidy reform also succeeded in Egypt, but was implemented only af-
ter the restoration of authoritarianism and in the context of strong repressive 
measures. Finally, energy subsidy reform succeeded in Iran, whose case is es-
pecially interesting because the increase in energy prices was offset by cash 
payments to all citizens; 50 per cent of the sums saved were allocated to cover 
these payments. The burden of energy subsidies in Iran was even higher than 
in the Arab countries concerned, but compensation with universal cash pay-
ments was undoubtedly a success. The programme later ran into difficulties, 
including due to international sanctions; but the experience demonstrated 
that a bold, if ‘populist’, move can send a signal of radical change—although in 
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the case of the Ahmadinejad Administration the political context was  certainly 
not one of democratisation.
In Chapter 5, Steffen Hertog argues strongly in favour of universal cash 
transfers.5 He analyses the two main distribution mechanisms in use in the 
region—public sector employment and subsidies—and concludes that both 
have perverse effects. He stresses how ‘apart from public employment and sub-
sidies, Arab governments offer little by the way of social security policies’ and 
traces the reasons for this to the priorities of authoritarian regimes. This cre-
ates a vicious circle whereby new redistribution policies cannot be initiated 
until the burden of excess employment and subsidies is lifted—yet abandon-
ing the old policies without adequate compensation will be perceived as being 
profoundly unpopular. More modern social security policies are not created 
and put in place overnight, so a deterioration of living conditions may be un-
avoidable and politically unaffordable.
Hertog therefore clearly distinguishes between an agenda for the long run 
(‘In the long run, Arab countries should build up conventional social security 
mechanisms such as means-tested income support, unemployment assistance, 
unemployment insurance, and active labour market policies such as retraining 
and job placement services’) and one for the short run: ‘direct, unconditional 
cash grants for all adult citizens’.6 Hertog offers an articulate defence of the 
advantages of this solution in the mena environment. He argues that such a 
policy would be beneficial for labour markets because it may be tailored to 
encourage private sector employment (excluding government employees from 
receiving the grants) and in this way equilibrate at least in part the attraction 
of public vs private sector jobs. It would also, I wish to add, constitute an in-
centive to remain in the home country, rather than adding to the relentless 
5 The idea is found also in both Amin et al. (2012) and Ghanem (2016a). Amin et al. (2012, 89) 
write: ‘A system that replaces the current energy and food subsidies with direct income trans-
fers to the poor will be fairer and more efficient. However, Arab regimes have so far been un-
able to make such a change. (…) It remains to be seen whether the new governments result-
ing from the Arab Spring will be able to build the necessary consensus to bring about such a 
major policy change’. Ghanem (2016a, 33–34) writes: ‘The idea of putting in place a social pro-
tection system based on targeted cash transfers has been studied in the Arab world for sev-
eral years and could be quickly implemented. Experience from around the world indicates 
that such a system is much less expensive, more efficient, and fairer that price subsidies’.
6 The debate on the widening inequalities with regards to income and wealth taking place 
in practically all countries, whether attributed to globalisation or other causes, has greatly 
intensified in recent years. Various proposals for a ‘citizens’ income’ have been put forward, 
especially in advanced countries. For a recent proposal focusing on the uk, see Painter and 
Thoung (2015). The approach is discussed also in Atkinson (2015, Chapter 8).
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stream of refugees and economic migrants that flows towards Europe—a good 
reason for European countries to provide financial and administrative sup-
port, at least in an initial phase, under the banner of facilitating democratic 
 consolidation and easing immigration pressures.
There may be multiple ways of refining this approach and improve  targeting. 
Restricting cash grants to the poorer strata is difficult because of the uncer-
tainty of available income data and the potential for corruption and  cheating; 
but it might be possible to focus a cash grant scheme on those age groups 
that encompass young entrants into the labour force7—between 14 and 30 or 
35. There might be multiple reasons for this approach: citizens in these age 
groups are the most politically active (and potentially attracted to extremist 
ideologies); in addition, one key component of the unstable political environ-
ment throughout the region is the unprecedented youth bulge, which—as 
 highlighted by Fargues in Chapter 9 (and also by Hakimian, 2013b and Ghanem, 
2016a)—characterises the Arab demography of the past and current decade.
Such a youth bulge is, on the one hand, a ‘demographic blessing’, because it 
temporarily reduces the ratio of dependents to the active population; but, on 
the other hand, it also constitutes an impossible challenge for the governments 
of the region, which are expected to create enough jobs to productively employ 
all new entrants. Migration has been a frequent response to this state of affairs 
among young entrants into the workforce that have found no opportunities at 
home. It is significant that the collapse of authoritarian regimes has led to an 
increased migration push that, as Fargues documents, has not exclusively been 
motivated by economic reasons.8 There is also some evidence that diasporas 
have fed a culture of revolt, either through ‘political remittances’ or by offer-
ing better opportunities for resistance in regions that experienced the highest 
migration rates (successful migrants offering potential support to those left 
behind). Fargues cites the example of positive correlation between regional 
rates of emigration in Tunisia and voting for Ennahda in the first election after 
the fall of Ben Ali. Political and economic mobilisation of diasporas offers a 
potential opportunity for governments aiming at consolidating the democratic 
transition. At the same time, migration also offers a safety valve for letting off 
the steam of political discontent (exit rather than voice); and the very high 
share of expatriates in the major Gulf oil producing countries is an objective 
7 Child benefits are a frequently advocated component of redistribution policies: see e.g. 
 Atkinson (2015, Chapter 8). Child poverty obviously deserves to be targeted, but in the 
 regional context it may be feared that child benefits may end up supporting high fertility 
rates in countries where this is still a problem.
8 Christian and other religious minorities have felt threatened by political developments and 
have manifested an even stronger desire to migrate.
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obstacle to democratisation (Khalaf and Luciani, 2006; Luciani, Chapter 11 in 
this volume; Mehlum, Moene and Ostenstadt, 2016). This may also have the 
effect of weakening, at least temporarily, resistance to an authoritarian come-
back—with people reverting to focusing on individual efforts at exit rather 
than collective voice.
Can migration become a tool for the consolidation of democracy rather 
than being just a phenomenon ignored in the sending countries, and resisted 
in the receiving ones? Could one think of policies to encourage return migra-
tion, in particular with incentives to repatriate know-how and establish new 
micro and small enterprises—a phenomenon that has played such an impor-
tant role in the economic success of Turkey in the last three decades? Or could 
one establish policies to encourage remittances and investment in the country 
of origin?9 Could receiving countries tie conditions for access and progress in 
the direction of democracy together (and not just to protracted civil war: in 
other words, create an incentive for a positive, not just a negative, outcome of 
the transition)?10 Currently, Europe ends up paying the price for various ca-
tastrophes on humanitarian grounds, but does precious little to support the 
consolidation of democratic transitions.
Migration patterns are a sore point in relations with Europe, but also in 
inter-Arab economic relations, a point stressed by Luciani in Chapter 11. In the 
immediate aftermath of the first wave of increases in oil prices (1970–1985) 
some of the major oil exporters opened their doors to workers from other Arab 
countries quite wide: Iraq formally had a policy of encouraging migrants from 
the region, Yemenis could travel to Saudi Arabia without a visa, Kuwait hosted 
a large Palestinian population, a large number of Lebanese and Jordanians 
moved to the Gulf, and Libya took in a significant number of Egyptians and Tu-
nisians. This pattern was brutally reversed in 1990, following the Iraqi invasion 
of Kuwait, because Palestine, Jordan and Yemen supported or did not condemn 
the Iraqi action, thus leading to mass expulsions from the gcc countries. Iraq 
suffered first from the impact of the war with Iran, and soon thereafter from 
the defeat that followed the invasion of Kuwait, so that it ceased being an at-
tractive destination. Libya remained an important destination, especially for 
9 Receiving European countries could establish facilities to provide credit to migrants wish-
ing to return and set up businesses, or simply invest in their country of origin. Inadequate 
access to credit is a key obstacle to the development of small enterprises in mena.
10 As I write these lines, Germany has announced that it is putting Tunisia, Algeria and 
Morocco on a list of ‘safe countries’, thus making immigration from these countries more 
difficult, while keeping the doors open to immigration from Syria and other countries in 
the throes of civil war (the Guardian, 2016). One can readily understand the logic, but 
democratic consolidation is thus not made any easier.
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Egyptian workers, until the country plunged into civil war. In the end, the role 
of inter-Arab migration as a potential equaliser of regional incomes deteriorat-
ed drastically. According to figures presented by Fargues (Chapter 9), the total 
number of Arab migrants in 2012 was just above 17 million, of which 8.6 million 
went to other Arab countries, 5.6 million to Europe and just 3  million to the 
rest of the world:11 inter-Arab migration therefore represents only 50 per cent 
of the total, and—in fact—probably less.
Agriculture is another key area with an influence on the outcome of demo-
cratic transitions, but is mostly neglected by newly elected governments and 
by external actors interested in their success. In Chapter 8, Eckart Woertz 
 highlights how agriculture, while contributing relatively little to total gdp, 
consumes the bulk of scarce water resources and still employs a large share 
of the workforce in many countries in mena (close to 50 per cent in Sudan, 
South Sudan and Mauritania; 35 per cent in Yemen; 27 per cent in Oman; 23 
per cent in Egypt and Morocco…). Insufficient attention has been paid by 
new democratic governments to living conditions in the countryside: in the 
context of policies of opening to international trade and investment, previous 
policies in support of the peasantry have been reversed, leading to continuing 
migration from rural to urban areas, and to a ‘ruralisation of cities’—that is 
to say, an increase in the number of poor and marginalised inhabitants of the 
major urban areas. The transition towards capitalist agriculture has not led to 
significantly increased productivity and lower prices: ‘People in many mena 
countries including Egypt, Algeria and Morocco, spend more than a third of 
their disposable income on food’. Hence, food subsidies are difficult to elimi-
nate and ‘have great significance with regard to political legitimacy. This could 
be seen during the Arab Spring when Egyptian protesters strapped loaves of 
bread to their heads’. Relative to fuel subsidies, ‘Food clearly commands a 
greater emotional appeal and—because of their self-targeting nature—the 
abolition of subsidies on staple foods would disproportionately hurt the poor’. 
But containing the cost of food for the urban dweller contrasts with improving 
the lot of people living off agriculture. The matter is made more difficult by 
widespread agricultural protectionism in industrial countries: the eu surplus 
in trade of  agricultural products with mena has been growing, for example.12 
11 This includes Syrian refugees, which cluster in neighbouring countries. Civil wars and the 
ensuing wave of refugees swelled the ranks of regional migrants.
12 As discussed in Chapter 11, empirical research has demonstrated that the agreements 
 concluded under the European Neighbourhood Policy have led to an increase in Europe-




It is clear that improving the income and living conditions of the rural popula-
tion in mena would contribute to relieving migratory pressures, both internal-
ly towards urban  areas that are overcrowded and incapable of accommodating 
new arrivals, and internationally—that is to say, towards Europe.
Eventually, however, whether policies to promote the significant potential 
of agriculture are successful or not, employment in the sector will need to 
decline both absolutely and as a share of the total. Inevitably, it is growth in 
industry and export-oriented services that will have to provide the jobs and 
opportunities required to accommodate the growing number of new entrants 
into the workforce. But services are vulnerable—we have already commented, 
in particular, on tourism in this respect. It is unrealistic to envision that the 
mena  region may simply bypass the industrial phase of development and 
directly pass from agriculture to services. Industry remains an essential com-
ponent of any diversified economy, and so-called post-industrial societies are 
having growing misgivings about having too easily liquidated large parts of 
their industrial systems in the context of globalisation.
But when it comes to industry, mena countries suffer from the weakness 
of their private sectors, in terms of both financial and industrial capabilities. 
‘While it is now widely accepted that private sector-led growth is necessary if 
structural unemployment in the region is to be addressed, state-led develop-
ment remains a pervasive characteristic of the Arab world’, writes Alissa Amico 
in Chapter 6 of this volume. ‘(…) question marks surround private sector’s ca-
pacity to act as a locomotive of economic growth in the Arab world’, and in 
practice the only alternative to continuing reliance on state-owned enterprises 
is privatisation, leading to foreign ownership. But multinational corporations 
will prioritise the elimination of excess employment, which is problematic in 
the short run for recently established democratic governments. Furthermore, 
large-scale sales of state-owned assets to foreign corporations would inevita-
bly run against nationalist feelings and suspicions of corruption.
Improving the governance of state-owned enterprises and restoring them 
to profitability, so that they can contribute to the accumulation of capital 
and economic growth, is therefore an additional challenge for newly elected 
democratic governments. Where authoritarian incumbents failed in most 
cases, democrats must succeed: not an easy challenge in the face of popular 
expectations. In fact, employment in state-owned enterprises has rapidly in-
creased in Tunisia, confirming the populist tendency to use economic assets as 
 distributional rather than developmental tools.
A specific category of state-owned enterprises that deserves special atten-
tion and is in dire need of urgent reform is banks. State-owned banks domi-
nate the banking sector in mena and constitute a key pillar of rentierism and 
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authoritarian control. Through control of the banking sector and selective, 
non-transparent and politically conditioned access to credit, state-owned 
banks facilitated the formation and survival of a non-performing class of crony 
capitalists to support the authoritarian regimes. The flip side of this coin has 
been the exclusion from access to credit of most small-scale and/or politi-
cally unconnected entrepreneurs, whose ability to contribute to growth and 
the  creation of jobs has correspondingly been reduced (Diwan, 2016; Ghanem 
2016a; Schiffbauer et al., 2015).
Restoring the role of banks and other financial institutions as intermedi-
aries that enable entrepreneurs by facilitating their access to finance is an 
essential component of democratisation processes. Bassam Snaije argues in 
Chapter 7 that democratic institutions and governance are contextual with 
the development of financial markets, with special emphasis on the market 
for debt securities. He notes how the structure of financial markets in mena 
differs significantly from that of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (oecd) countries, inasmuch as it is dominated by bank credit, 
predominantly with short maturities; while the market for equity and debt se-
curities is much less important. Furthermore, most banks, in particular those 
in countries outside the gcc, are either state-owned or controlled by families 
that are close to authoritarian power holders. Snaije believes that banking re-
form and enhancing the role of equity and debt securities markets should be 
a priority for democratising governments, in order to allow new participants 
to access finance, foster growth and promote agreements of trust that are not 
based on personal acquaintance and proximity to power.
Faced with the difficulty of formulating economic policies that will help 
consolidate a democratic transition, is the solution a return to ‘modern autoc-
racy’ in the hope that it may eventually evolve in a genuinely democratic direc-
tion? This is where the case of Egypt is crucially important: not only is Egypt 
the most populous and geographically and politically central Arab country, it 
is also the one in which the credibility of the potential ‘authoritarian route to 
democracy’ is the subject of experiment. After the collapse of the democrati-
cally elected Morsi Administration, largely due to its utter inability to govern 
a collapsing economy and manage a transparent and inclusive democratisa-
tion process, the Army is back in power under Marshal al-Sisi: will he deliver 
the economic miracle that Egypt needs? In Chapter 10, Robert Springborg ex-
presses his profound scepticism in this respect. The conclusion of his detailed 
analysis of Egypt’s economic ills and the current regime’s approach to them 
is stark: ‘…al-Sisi’s Egypt is doubling down on what preceding regimes in that 
country and those elsewhere in the world have demonstrated to be a failed 
strategy for economic development’. Indeed, Egypt may eventually become 
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another basket case, like Yemen or the Sudan. Repression will then maintain 
political stability only temporarily.
In the final chapter in this volume, Giacomo Luciani focuses on the region-
al environment of the Arab Spring and Arab economies. He argues that the 
Spring was indeed a regional rather than country-specific phenomenon, and 
all Arab countries are—in one way or another—involved in a regional civil 
war, although that war is currently only being actively fought in four of them 
(Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen). The outcome of the regional civil war will even-
tually determine the political future of all mena countries. Regional economic 
integration has been prevented by multiple political conflicts, yet is essential 
for the success of the very economic policies that might consolidate demo-
cratic transitions—assuming that the outcome of the Arab civil war will point 
in that direction.
5 Conclusion: Does Democratisation Have a Chance?
It is clear from the above discussion and from the remainder of this volume that 
democratic transitions face a serious problem inasmuch as they can  expect to 
face deteriorating economic conditions while expectations of rapid improve-
ment among a majority of the people, especially the poorer strata, are high. 
Our research has pointed to some initiatives that may be undertaken relatively 
quickly and give a strong signal in the direction of greater inclusion. It remains 
difficult to move rapidly and obtain visible results quickly, but newly installed 
democratic governments should be bold.13
The abolition of fuel subsidies that only benefit the middle classes and the 
rich is a case in point: fiscal space gained with this measure might be used, 
as suggested by Hertog, for a programme of unconditional cash transfers to 
either all citizens or some easily verified categories; in any case avoiding com-
plex  bureaucracy that would invite corruption. This would benefit citizens that 
presently derive minimal or no advantage from fuel subsidies.
The merits of a large enough devaluation should be carefully considered. 
The drawbacks of an overvalued exchange rate are frequently mentioned as 
an obstacle to growth as is the fact that such an obstacle may hurt democratic 
13 ‘… it would be a mistake not to take the opportunity afforded by the major political tran-
sition to make significant reforms to the economic structure in each country. Politicians 
often have a short window of opportunity in which to succeed or fail—what was called 
the period of “extraordinary politics” when reforms can be accomplished with an ease 
that will later vanish’. (Amin et al., 2012, 13).
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transitions.14 Devaluations tend to damage all those whose consumption basket 
includes a significant component of imported goods—which is normally not 
the case for the poorer segments and the marginalised. Devaluation is likely to 
shift demand in favour of domestic agricultural products, and in this way shift 
income from cities to the countryside. It also improves the competitiveness 
of all manufactured exports, and of services such as tourism. If government 
income is at least in part linked to revenue from the export of raw materials, 
whose price is fixed internationally in dollars, devaluation also creates further 
fiscal space for the government. Conversely, devaluation is also an advantage 
to all citizens that have wealth or income denominated in foreign currencies: 
migrants’ remittances may be encouraged and become more important, but 
crony capitalists who have piled up wealth in foreign accounts would also ben-
efit. Finally, the government may gain or lose depending on whether public 
debt is denominated in the national or some foreign currency. Thus the net 
impact of using the exchange rate tool is difficult to predict a priori, but a case 
can be made that bold use of this tool in connection with political transition 
might be beneficial.
Reform of the banking sector can also be pursued relatively quickly. Banks 
should be invited to wipe their balance sheet clean of bad loans. Connivance 
between banks and crony capitalists must be broken as a first step in the direc-
tion of the restructuring of the banking sector and the reopening of credit op-
portunities to new, especially small-scale, entrepreneurs. Restructuring banks, 
changing their management especially by tapping the frequently considerable 
pool of national talent available in the diaspora, forcing recapitalisation when 
necessary and isolating non-performing debts in separate ‘bad bank’ structures 
would go a long way to turning a page in the political economy of democratis-
ing countries.
Thus, short-term policy tools are available and should be used boldly, while 
at the same time aiming at the longer-term objectives that the literature has 
very clearly identified. Yet, it will remain difficult to succeed unless the region-
al environment also evolves in the right direction. The dichotomy between 
rich and poor states in the region must be overcome through greater openness, 
and encouragement given to regional movements of capital and labour and 
14 ‘The exchange rate in many countries is out of equilibrium, supported either by capi-
tal controls or by official reserve sales. Unlike other cases of major economic transition, 
Arab economies have not witnessed strong currency depreciations as yet. Without more 
exchange rate adjustments, however, the long-term fundamental reforms to encourage 
the private sector and increasingly open the economy to the rest of the world will not be 
successful’. (Amin et al., 2012, 83–84).
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effective market integration. A degree of political convergence is a prerequisite 
for this, and democratic transitions are unlikely to succeed if they have to swim 
against the tide of regional authoritarianism.
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chapter 2
Reflections on the Arab Uprisings
Samir Makdisi
Abstract
This chapter offers reflections on the Arab uprisings grouped under four headings: (1) 
the entrenchment of autocracy in the region, (2) the unravelling of autocracy, (3) the 
uncertainty of the transition process, and (4) the challenges of sustaining democratic 
transitions.
Among the primary factors underlying the general entrenchment of Arab autoc-
racy, at least prior to the uprisings, are the relative abundance of oil resources and 
the region’s multi-faceted conflicts, along with all their attendant disruptive foreign 
interventions.
Youth unemployment rising to very high levels and the persistence of deep eco-
nomic inequality were important factors contributing to the uprisings. They were also 
reinforced by long frustrated aspirations for greater freedom and political participa-
tion on the part of social groups that have felt largely excluded from the benefits of 
economic development.
As of late 2016 the outcome of the uprisings remains highly uncertain especially 
with the rise to power of strictly fundamentalist groups and the ensuing armed con-
flicts that have come in their wake. The struggle between forces pushing for a move 
towards democracy and those pushing for the maintenance and/or regeneration of 
autocracy is presently in full play.
Transition experiences point to two fundamental challenges facing the consolida-
tion of democratic transitions: firstly that the political victors be able to move in the di-
rection of establishing genuinely representative and accountable political institutions. 
Secondly that they succeed in implementing an inclusive socio-economic strategy that 
not only focuses on growth and expanding employment opportunities but also elimi-
nates ‘elite capture’ of the public sector.
1 Introduction
The Tunisian uprising of December 2010 ushered in what seemed to be a new 
political phase in the Arab world, namely the beginnings of the unravelling of 
Arab autocracy. It was followed by the Egyptian uprising in January 2011 and 
later the same year by uprisings in Syria, Libya and Yemen. However, five years 
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on this trajectory is yet to take hold region-wide and prospects for democratic 
transitions in the foreseeable future remain highly uncertain. Tunisia may be 
forging ahead successfully along a democratic path, but Egypt’s democratic 
course appears hesitant while in the other three countries the uprisings have 
turned into civil wars intertwined with outside military intervention, the case 
of Syria being especially tragic.
In the longer run, the uprisings may yet prove to be the catalyst that opened 
the door to a region-wide process of democratisation. However, as of late 
2016—with a few exceptions, Lebanon and Tunisia among them—autocracy 
continues to reign, though of course in varying forms and to different degrees 
from one country to another.
With the objective of shedding some light on the political economy of po-
tential democratic transitions in the Arab region this paper offers reflections 
on the uprisings grouped under four headings: (1) background—the entrench-
ment of autocracy in the region, (2) the unravelling of autocracy in a few of the 
Arab countries, (3) the uncertainty of the transition process towards democ-
racy, and (4) the economic and political challenges of sustaining democratic 
transitions, once initiated. These reflections draw on published work of the 
author, referred to in the text.
While these reflections focus on the Arab region as a whole, we should re-
main cognisant of the fact that the underlying factors of the uprisings vary 
from one case to another, as does the role of domestic elements in undermin-
ing the autocratic order. These elements seem to have been more dominant 
and decisive in the cases of Tunisia and Egypt than in the other three cases. 
This in turn might have contributed to the apparent democratic success of Tu-
nisia in the wake of its uprising, and the averting of armed domestic conflict in 
Egypt though the democratic process is yet to take hold.
2 On the Entrenchment of Arab Autocracy
A number of democracy indices are employed in the empirical literature. In 
this chapter we refer to two of them: the commonly used Polity iv index, which 
includes data going back many years, and the more recent and comprehensive 
The Economist Intelligence Unit (eiu) Democracy Index, which begins with 
2006 (Tables 2.1 and 2.2 below). They reveal the general entrenchment of au-
tocracy in the Arab region from the end of the Second World War, when most 
of the Arab countries became independent, up to the present time.
The Polity data include information only on the institutions of the central 
government and on political groups acting, or reacting, within the scope of 
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that authority. It does not include a consideration of groups and territories 
that are actively removed from that authority (i.e. separatists or ‘fragments’; 
these are considered to be separate, though not independent, polities) or seg-
ments of the population that are not yet effectively politicised in relation to 
central state politics.
Numerous past and more recent analyses have addressed the question of 
lagging democracy in the Arab region compared to other regions (Table 2.3), 
or what has been termed Arab exceptionalism (see Salameh, 1994). These vary 
from a broad historical viewpoint to more focused analyses of specific underly-
ing factors. Various historical, religious, social, ethnic, political, economic, and 
colonial explanations of this phenomenon have been posited. Space limitations 
Table 2.1 Polity iv scores across Arab countries.
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Libya −7 −7 −7 −7 −7 −77 −77 −77 −77
Bahrain — −10 −10 −9 −5 −8 −10 −10 −10
Qatar — −10 −10 −10 −10 −10 −10 −10 −10
Saudi 
Arabia
−10 −10 −10 −10 −10 −10 −10 −10 −10
Syria −9 −9 −9 −7 −7 −7 −9 −9 −9
Kuwait −9 −10 −66 −7 −7 −7 −7 −7 −7
Egypt −7 −6 −6 −6 −3 −2 −88 −4 −4
Morocco −9 −8 −8 −6 −6 −4 −4 −4 −4
Jordan −9 −10 −4 −2 −3 −3 −3 −3 −3
Algeria −9 −9 −2 −3 2 2 2 2 2
Iraq −7 −9 −9 −9 3 3 3 3 3
Lebanon 5 −77 −66 −66 6 6 6 6 6
Tunisia −8 −9 −5 −3 −4 −88 −88 −88 7
Source: Polity iv data series, version 2014.
Note: The Polity iv scheme consists of six component measures that record the key qualities 
of executive recruitment, constraints on executive authority, and political competition. It also 
records changes in the institutionalised qualities of governing authority. The ‘Polity Score’ 
captures this regime authority spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from −10 (hereditary mon-
archy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). They can also be converted to regime categories, for 
which a three-part categorisation is recommended: ‘autocracies’ (−10 to −6), ‘anocracies’ (−5 to 
+5) and ‘democracies’ (+6 to +10); there are also three special values— −66, −77 and −88—rep-
resenting, respectively, periods of interruption (foreign occupation), interregnum (breakdown 
of central authority) and transition during which new institutions are being set up.
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do not permit me to go into a review of this literature here.1 I would simply like 
to refer to two factors that seem to be of primary importance in explaining the 
persistence of what has been termed the Arab democracy deficit, at least until 
1 The following references are but a very small sample of writings starting with the early 1980s 
and representing differing viewpoints on this question: Center for Arab Unity Studies, 1983; 
Sharabi, 1988; Hudson, 1991; Kedourie, 1994; Salameh, 1994; Waterbury, 1994; Al Naqeeb, 1996; 
Harik, 2006; Bichara, 2006; Noland, 2008; Diamond, 2010; Amin et al., 2012; Chaney, 2012; Has-
eeb, 2013; Elbadawi and Makdisi., 2011; Aldashev et al., 2013.
Table 2.2 Ranking of Arab countries according to the eiu democracy index, 2010–2014.
2010 Rank 2010 Score 2014 Rank 2014 Score
Tunisia 145 2.79 79 6.31
Lebanon 86 5.82 98 5.12
Iraq 112 4.00 111 4.23
Mauritania 115 3.86 112 4.17
Morocco 116 3.79 116 4.00
Algeria 125 3.44 117 3.83
Libya 158 1.94 119 3.80
Kuwait 114 3.88 120 3.78
Jordan 117 3.74 121 3.76
Qatar 137 3.09 136 3.18
Egypt 138 3.07 138 3.16
Oman 143 2.86 139 3.15
Djibouti 154 2.20 145 2.99
Bahrain 122 3.49 147 2.87
Yemen 147 2.64 149 2.79
uae 148 2.52 152 2.64
Sudan 151 2.42 153 2.54
Saudi Arabia 161 1.84 162 1.82
Syria 153 2.31 163 1.74
Source: eiu Reports, 2011 and 2014.
Note: The eiu index is a weighted average of 60 indicators grouped into five different cat-
egories: electoral process and pluralism, civil liberties, functioning of government, political 
participation, and political culture. In addition to a numeric score and a ranking, the index 
categorises countries as one of four regime types—full democracies (a score of 8–10), flawed 
democracies (6–7.9), hybrid regimes (4–5.9), and authoritarian regimes (0–3.9).
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the outbreak of the recent uprisings—the relative abundance of oil resources 
and the region’s multi-faceted conflicts, including the unresolved Arab–Israeli 
conflict, along with all their attendant disruptive foreign interventions (see 
Elbadawi and Makdisi, 2017).2
The ‘oil curse’ effect—the trade-off, between economic welfare and political 
rights, associated with the relative abundance of oil resources—is well estab-
lished in the literature (for a review, see Ross, 2014) though not necessarily a 
matter of universal agreement (Haber and Menaldo, 2011).3 Nonetheless, at the 
political level its negative political impact on governance specifically in the 
oil rich countries is perhaps generally recognised. But at the economic level 
the influence of abundant oil wealth is more varied. While various beneficial 
2 It is worth noting here that the persistence of autocracy in most Arab countries despite their 
notable socio-economic development since attaining independence after World War ii does 
not seem to conform to the influential modernisation hypothesis that posits a positive cor-
relation between development and democracy (Lipset, 1959 and 1960). By contrast, it appears 
to be generally more pronounced for the other developing regions of the world.
The modernisation hypothesis has its supporters as well as its critics who have advanced 
alternative theories of transition. Among its defenders, see, for example, Barro, 2015; Faria 
et al., 2014; among its critics, see Przeworski et al., 2000; Przeworski, 2004 and 2009; and Ac-
emoglu et al., 2008 and 2009.
3 The authors argue that this oil and mineral reliance does not promote dictatorship over the 
long run even after taking into account a host of conditional effects suggested by the litera-
ture. This, however does not necessarily imply that there are no specific instances in which 
resource rents might have helped to sustain a dictatorship.
Table 2.3 eiu index across regions, 2010–2014.
eui index 
2010






North America 8.63 8.59 8.59 8.59
Western Europe 8.45 8.40 8.41 8.41
Eastern Europe 5.55 5.50 5.53 5.58
Latin America and 
Caribbean
6.37 6.35 6.38 6.36
Asia and Australasia 5.53 5.51 5.61 5.70
mena 3.43 3.62 3.68 3.65
Sub-Saharan Africa 4.23 4.32 4.36 4.34
Total 5.46 5.49 5.53 5.55
Source: eiu Reports, 2011 and 2014.
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effects on development can rightly be pointed out (Luciani, 2012), recent em-
pirical work has drawn attention to the required role of fiscal and monetary 
policies in countering its negative impact (e.g. the hindrance of economic di-
versification) thereby ensuring that oil resources are efficiently used for devel-
opmental purposes. This outcome, it is argued, would in large measure hinge 
on the efficacy and accountability of the institutions in place, notably fiscal 
institutions, keeping in mind that Arab fiscal institutions remain wanting in 
this regard (El Anshasy et al., 2015).
Equally important, perhaps more so, is the persistence of a conflictual region-
al environment. According to available data for the period 1990–2013 over 60 per 
cent of all Arab countries experienced at least one conflict, which makes the 
Arab region one of the most conflict-prone regions, accounting for around 17 per 
cent of world conflicts.4 Of course at the centre of the region’s conflictual envi-
ronment is the unsettled but simmering Arab–Israeli conflict, which goes back 
to 1948 and does not have a parallel in other regions, at least in recent history.
Indeed, conflicts are found to have a uniquely negative effect on the de-
mocratisation process in the Arab region (keeping in mind that this effect can 
vary significantly from one country to another) partly because these conflicts 
have been exploited by incumbent autocratic regimes to justify their rule and 
to escape the consequences of their national failures (for a detailed analysis of 
the conflict effect, see Elbadawi and Makdisi, 2017). The Palestinian question 
remains unresolved while the settlement of civil wars in the pre-2010 period 
did not lead to a significant change in the political regimes of the war-torn 
countries involved. The outcome of the post-uprising civil conflicts is yet to be 
determined.
By contrast, in other regions of the contemporary world civil conflicts have 
mostly been followed by a move towards democracy, noted reversals notwith-
standing (Jai Kwan, 2008), a contrast that appears to support the argument for 
the Arab region’s exceptionalism.
3 On the Unravelling of Autocracy in a Few Arab Countries
Whatever the immediate triggers for the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings, 
a gamut of interacting economic, political and other underlying factors have 
been building up over the years for a push towards a democratic space in the 
4 See Uppsala Conflict Data Program (ucdp) (2016). The ucdp defines conflict as ‘a contested 
incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force 




region, initiated, as it turned out, by the successful overthrow of the Tunisian 
autocracy. However—as noted in the following section—given existing re-
gional realities, how successful additional democratic breakthroughs in the 
region are, at least in the shorter run, remains to be seen.
In the economic domain two important factors underlying the uprisings are 
unemployment, increasing over the years to very high levels especially of youth 
unemployment, and the persistence of deep economic inequality (Hakimian, 
2013; Bibi and Nabli, 2010), especially—as noted below—after the process of 
privatisation of the national economies started to take a strong hold. Accom-
panying these factors are the long frustrated aspirations for greater freedom 
and political participation on the part of social groups that have felt largely 
excluded from the benefits of economic development. Such aspirations have 
been reinforced by greater openness, both within the Arab region and towards 
the outside world—a result of the technological advances in information, and 
in consequence by a growing awareness of the attractions of democracy.
In the period following the break-up of the Soviet Union, the gradual shift 
in the development paradigm, from a nationalist developmental strategy 
based on a public sector oriented economy to a market economy, had major 
consequences. For all the economic benefits of this shift the private sector 
failed to generate the sufficient number of employment opportunities that 
state and public sector institutions had previously provided (no matter how 
inefficiently), especially for young people. Analysts attribute this failure pri-
marily to misguided policies—often uneven, hesitant and incomplete—and 
to weak institutional performance characterised by cronyism and corruption 
(Ansani and Daniele, 2012).5
Whatever the causes of faltering Arab growth, in the period 2005–2010 Arab 
youth unemployment reached high levels averaging more than 25 per cent and 
it continued to rise in both 2011 and 2012 (the highest rate among various de-
veloping regions. See International Labor Organization (ilo), 2013). This grow-
ing unemployment rate tended to weaken regimes’ hold on power and their 
authoritarian bargain—that is to say, their ability to trade off public goods 
and other economic benefits for political rights and participation—more so 
in non-oil-producing than in oil-rich counties. As some writers have put it, the 
Arab social contract started to unravel (Amin et al., 2012).
Furthermore, the declining economic role of the state has helped promote 
the growth and empowerment of independent civil society organisations that 
traditionally press for economic and political reforms. The Arab ruling classes 
5 Institutional performance, it has been argued, plays a determining role in explaining differ-
ences in outcomes with regard to per capita income (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008).
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have attempted to counter this trend by co-opting both business and intel-
lectual elites and by forging partnerships between highly placed government 
officials and business tycoons, who basically engage in rent seeking activities. 
In practice, this has meant that a few groups have been favoured, receiving the 
larger part of the benefits of growth to the relative exclusion of the majority of 
the populace; this phenomenon, in turn, has bred growing resentment. While 
the trend in income inequality may not have changed significantly in recent 
decades (Hakimian, 2013),6 disillusionment with economic prospects has led 
to what has been termed ‘unhappy growth’ (Amin et al., 2012).
The impact of greater openness, both within the Arab region and with the 
outside world, on the weakening of the authoritarian bargain is perhaps self-
evident. It helps civil society organisations, including those run by students, 
women and other social groups, to press harder for political reform. And, as 
amply demonstrated by the recent uprisings, deep-seated ambitions—not 
only with regards to socio-economic advancement but also to greater free-
dom and political participation—exist in large segments of the populace that 
have felt disenfranchised and largely excluded from the benefits of economic 
development.
The unexpected success of mass, street mobilisation in both Tunisia and 
Egypt acted as a spark for similar mass movements in other Arab countries: the 
younger generations in particular pressed successfully for the dismantling of 
the autocratic regimes of both countries, via mostly peaceful means including 
intensive use of rapidly spreading social networks.
These uprisings of Arab youth were influenced by two underlying factors. 
Primarily they had lost faith in the role of traditionalist, reformist political par-
ties, which had proved incapable—for whatever reason—of acting as agents 
of political change and therefore had to be left behind. But also, they were 
influenced by the ripple effects of the important democratic changes that have 
taken place in other regions of the developing world.
Nonetheless, the region’s democratic prospects remain highly uncertain, a 
matter to which we now turn.
6 The authors of the work cited point out that data tend to place the mena region’s income 
distribution levels between those of Africa and Asia. Overall, the region has moderately high 
levels of inequality: some countries, such as Egypt, are on the lower end of the scale of in-
equality, with an income distribution closer to the Asian pattern; others, such as Iran, have 
fairly high inequality, closer to African levels. A key finding is that despite huge structural 
changes in these economies, income distribution has not changed by much. Over the last few 
years, there have been indications of a worsening tendency, but the trend is not noticeable 
when compared to worsening income distribution in fast-growing Asian countries.
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4 On the Uncertainty of the Transition towards Democracy
As already noted, of the five Arab countries where uprisings have taken place7 
only one, Tunisia, appears to be moving towards a genuine democracy as at-
tested by the approval of a modern constitution in January 2014, and the free 
parliamentary elections of October 26 and presidential elections on December 
21 of the same year, and by the generally relatively peaceful transfer of power 
among its major political contestants.
In Egypt the army ousted the elected president—Mohamed Morsi, a mem-
ber of the Muslim Brotherhood—on July 3, 2013 after massive demonstrations 
and street confrontations between opponents and supporters of the Brother-
hood. The result of the presidential elections that followed in June 2014, won 
by the head of the army, Abdelfattah al-Sisi, is described by some writers as 
a return to a modified Mubarak type regime. Despite the adoption of a new 
constitution in early 2014 and the parliamentary elections that took place in 
October 2015 (characterised by a relatively low turnout) and were completed in 
December of the same year, authoritarian or exclusionary forms of governance 
continue to exist; the process of overcoming them and moving towards a genu-
ine democracy is yet to take place (See El Mikawy et al., 2017).
The uprisings in the other three countries have turned into civil wars and 
regional conflicts with confessional and/or ethnic overtones that, as of late 
2016, have yet to be settled. In particular, the Syrian civil war has attracted 
armed fundamentalist groups (especially daish (Islamic State in Iraq and the 
Levant—isil) and Al Nusra) that oppose the regime, but also armed parties 
from neighbouring countries that support it, notably Lebanon’s Hizbollah. 
The fundamentalists have come to control large segments not only of Syria 
but also Iraq, in turn widening the scope of the conflict and triggering foreign 
military interventions: firstly, us aerial bombing in support of Kurdish units 
fighting isil in northern Syria, and a year later (end September 2015) wide-
ranging Russian aerial bombing in support of the regime. The Yemen civil war 
that erupted in early 2015 witnessed, in March of that year, the beginning of an 
aerial bombing campaign by a Saudi-led coalition in support of Yemeni parties 
fighting the ‘Houthis’ and their allies, a grouping that has its own regional sup-
porters and that had earlier managed to seize power and establish control over 
the capital and a large part of the country. Libya, after the fall of the Gaddafi 
regime (a collapse that Western aerial bombing helped bring about), failed to 
7 Bahrain has witnessed many popular demonstrations demanding political reform, but so 
far, with the assistance primarily of Saudi Arabia, the regime has succeeded in suppressing 
reform demands while thwarting any potential popular uprising.
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make a stable transition and in 2014 a renewed civil war broke out between 
rival organisations seeking control of the country or parts of it.
Thus, while the uprisings have shaken the foundations of autocracy in parts 
of the Arab world and initially gave rise to a glimmer of hope for regional dem-
ocratic change, the civil conflicts that have subsequently emerged have fur-
ther strengthened the region’s conflictual environment. In consequence, fed 
by emerging sectarian divisiveness, and in particular the rise to power of strict 
fundamentalist groups, the negative impact of conflicts in the region on the 
process of democratisation has further intensified, posing the threat of demo-
cratic reversals in those countries that managed to break out of the grip of 
entrenched autocracies.
What might explain the rise to power of strict fundamentalist groups that—
in brutal fashion—employ religion as an instrument to achieve their political 
goals, lies outside the purview of this paper.8 Unless isil and similar sectarian 
movements are contained and reversed, their ascendancy will represent an 
unprecedented threat to any potential transitions towards democracy. In 
fact, were fundamentalist parties to dominate the political scene in any post- 
uprising phase, it would be difficult to envision such transitions, both in indi-
vidual countries and region-wide.9
Tunisia apart, the failure, so far, of democratic transitions to take hold in the 
wake of the uprisings will hopefully constitute only a passing, albeit a tragic, 
phase that will yet pave the way for a stable democratic change in the Arab 
world—however gradual, hesitant or difficult that change might prove. The 
experience of other regions in this regard, as outlined below, is instructive.
What should be kept in mind is that once the process towards democra-
tisation begins to unfold on a solid basis in the region, it will tend to gain 
added momentum, positively affecting neighbouring countries that are yet 
to democratise. The reason for this is that societies located in democratic 
8 In this regard, a number of questions would need to be addressed: Do these groups repre-
sent a response on the part of poorer segments of the population to political and economic 
exclusion? Are they simply the product of a strict fundamentalist ideology, and/or certain 
fundamentalist regimes and/or foreign powers that initially wished to use them for their own 
ends? Do they constitute a response to past Western colonialism and continued interven-
tions in the affairs of the region? Or can, perhaps, a combination of all these and other factors 
explain their rise to power; a rise that has occurred to such an extent that the us and other 
Western countries, whatever their possible initial roles in fostering these groups, have come 
to consider them a threat to their own national interests.
9 Some writers caution that whereas Islam is compatible with democracy, Islamist fundamen-
talism is not: Islamist movements may embrace election ballots but merely as a political exi-
gency while continuing to reject the concept of political pluralism that underlies democratic 
governance (see Tibi, 2008).
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neighbourhoods become more likely to move towards democratic transitions: 
the significance of resource rents as a constraint to democratic transition in 
democratic regions greatly diminishes, even for highly resource-endowed so-
cieties (Elbadawi and Makdisi, 2017). Hence it can be argued that were the cur-
rent Arab uprisings to eventually swell into a major regional phenomenon, that 
phenomenon might even spread to those societies that are highly resource-
endowed and so far have remained unaffected.10
Moreover, as has been pointed out, for any given region the greater the num-
ber of countries that succeed in moving towards a consolidated democracy the 
less important is the potential threat of reversal (e.g. see Poast and Urpelainen, 
2015).
The region is thus at a point in its post-uprisings phase where the struggle 
between the forces pushing for a move towards democracy and those pushing 
for the maintenance or regeneration of autocracy is in full play.11 Of prima-
ry concern is that once a substantive move towards democratic governance 
is established, as in the case of Tunisia, various political and economic chal-
lenges would need to be successfully addressed in order to ensure a viable 
transition—a matter we will now take up.
5 On the Political and Economic Challenges of Sustaining 
Democratic Transitions
The experiences of other regions teach us that in the wake of democratic break-
throughs the consolidation of a democracy is not necessarily a foregone con-
clusion. Numerous reversals have taken place, though at a decreasing rate over 
the decades since 1960 and with notable variations from one region to another 
10 A number of writers have written on the potential region-wide spread of democracy in 
the wake of the uprisings. For example, Haseeb (2013) points out that the emergence of an 
Arab democracy wave hinges on a set of four factors that, ‘when co-incident are decisive, 
and these are: breaking the “barrier of fear”; non-violent resistance; sufficient national 
cohesion and popular sentiment; and the (positive) stance of the armed forces vis-à-vis 
the uprisings’.
11 It has been argued that the Arab Spring was made possible when the accumulated 
economic and political failures of the Arab political order led to a convergence of visions 
on the part of the Islamist and secular elements in society, notably in Tunisia and Egypt. 
Their failure to maintain consensus on a common platform of a viable social contract 
has contributed to the emergence of an authoritarian counter revolution. (El Affendi, 
2017).
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(Kapstein and Converse, 2008).12 Equally, the transition towards democratic 
governance may not be accomplished quickly but may go through phases of 
various forms of partial democracy as a prelude, over time, to more advanced 
forms of democracy.13
The experience of countries that have successfully consolidated their dem-
ocratic transitions indicates major politico-institutional and socio-economic 
challenges that need to be met for this objective to be achieved.
At the politico-institutional level, a major challenge is the willingness and 
ability of the political victors in countries that mange to break the hold of au-
tocratic rule to establish, or move in the direction of establishing, genuinely 
representative, accountable and transparent political institutions. Ideally 
these would guarantee basic human rights, primarily freedom of expression 
and free choice, and provide an opportunity for citizens to participate in the 
political process, institutionalising their right to make choices and challenge 
public policies, and to hold governments accountable. And therefore the is-
sue of what type of institutions are in place and who is framing and enforcing 
policy decisions become paramount.14
12 According to the authors of the work cited, of the 123 democratisations that took place 
during the period 1960–2004, 67 gave rise to democratic regimes that survived 2004, while 
the remaining 56 episodes had ended in a return to authoritarianism by the end of that 
year. Among those democratisations that were reversed, several later underwent second, 
third, or even fourth episodes of democratisation. Although fewer than half (47%) of the 
first-time democratisations were sustained, the survival rate of second-time democratisa-
tions approaches two-thirds (63%). Four of the six cases of fourth-time democratisation 
survived through to the end of 2004. These trends are closely aligned with the improving 
success rate of all democratisations over time. They point out that political institutions 
play the crucial role in democratic consolidation, especially institutions that place effec-
tive constraints on executive power.
13 The classifications adopted in both Polity iv and the eiu Democracy Index refer to politi-
cal regimes that lie in-between autocracies and democracies. In a recent study by Mu-
kand and Rodrik (2015) on the political economy of the liberal democracy, the authors 
point out it is characterised by three kinds of rights: property (elite interest), political 
(majority interest) and civil (minority interest). They explain why in the West liberal de-
mocracies came to be established while in the developing world most democracies that 
have emerged are electoral democracies that provide property and political but not civil 
rights.
14 Recent research, focusing on oil-rich countries, has drawn attention to the critical role of 
monetary and fiscal institutions in promoting the development desired, and specifically 
in countering the negative economic effects of abundant oil revenues. For analyses of 
this issue see the papers presented at a workshop organised by the Economic Research 
Forum in Kuwait, under the title ‘Monetary and Fiscal Institutions in Resource–Rich 
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The political path to enforcing democratic reform (e.g. constitutional revi-
sions, organisation of elections, etc.) will differ from one country to another 
(see undp, 2011). What matters is that genuine democratic institutions be-
come established and operable and secure, whereby the toppled elite is not 
merely replaced by a new elite with a similar pattern of behaviour. Under 
these circumstances we need not fear an initial electoral success of particular 
politico-religious groups. Their initial success can later be democratically 
contained, if not reversed, especially if they fail at governing.
Developments in Tunisia demonstrate this question in a very encouraging 
way. The successful election of the National Constituent Assembly in October 
2011 was an important step in the country’s transition process. The Islamist 
Ennahda party emerged as the most important single political party, capturing 
around 40 per cent of parliamentary seats. But it agreed to join a coalition gov-
ernment whose main task was to guide the process of moving towards a new 
constitution. Despite ensuing political crises, social unrest and an economic 
slowdown, a successful national dialogue among the competing political 
parties, including Ennahda, eventually led to the adoption of a modern consti-
tution and the transfer of power to an independent technocratic government. 
The peaceful legislative and presidential elections that took place in October–
December 2014 demonstrated that Tunisia had been undergoing a successful 
democratic transition, though major political and economic challenges lie 
ahead (see Boughzala and Ben Romdhane, 2017).
In contrast, in the case of Egypt the move to establish accountable political 
institutions and a space for democratic political competition in the wake of 
the uprising has so far been, at best, only partially successful. As a recent paper 
argues (El Mikawy et al., 2017), while the constitution passed in 2014 respects 
social and economic rights, it continues to sanction an authoritarian bargain 
whereby security precedes freedoms. The fact that certain institutions such as 
the military continue to enjoy an autonomy that shields them from real po-
litical accountability renders uncertain the future of liberal democracy in the 
country.
At the socio-economic level what would be required is the design and 
implementation of a broad based and what has come to be referred to as in-
clusive strategy, one that should create expectations that growth, expanding 
employment opportunities, and equity will play a major role in the transition 
to a new economy (see Makdisi, 2015). This strategy would imply modernising 
the public sector and, importantly, eliminating its ‘elite capture’ with a view to 
ensuring that emerging political and business interests in the transition phase 
Arab Economies’ (November 4–5, 2015), http://erf.org.eg/events/monetary-and-fiscal- 
institutions-in-resource-rich-arab-economies/ (accessed on 7 April 2016).
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are not capable of obstructing the implementation of policies supportive of 
inclusive growth.15 At the same time, developmental experiences teach us that 
the extent to which developmental policies work depends on particular local, 
historical or institutional contexts.
Reconciling the objectives an all-inclusive strategy, basically implement-
ing policies that at once promote growth and macro-economic stability while 
attending to the basic socio-economic needs of citizens, is of course not an 
easy task, especially when one considers the various social pressures and ex-
pectations that emerge during the transition process. Indeed, the record of 
democratic transitions elsewhere shows that such changes resulted, not in-
frequently, in economic recessions that either derailed or potentially could 
have derailed the process of substantive political reform. But, as noted above, 
if they are to succeed, it is a task that transition countries cannot avoid under-
taking, with the determination that emerging political institutions assume the 
required supporting role. Of note are studies showing that transition countries 
that succeeded in implementing socio-economic reform have forged ahead 
economically more than those that failed to do so (Amin et al., 2012).
Chile offers a good example of a transition country that has been able to ad-
dress the needs of the less privileged while implementing policies that have 
achieved growth and stability. Governmental policies supported low-income 
households, promoted education and allowed for investments in local health 
services and housing. Importantly, the government’s social development pro-
grammes were accompanied by tax reform including putting in place a progres-
sive income tax system. Increased social spending was, thus, matched by new 
sources of tax revenue (undp, 2011). A major lesson of the Chilean experience 
is that mobilising the resources necessary for financing the increased spending 
required if long neglected social needs are to be satisfied is of crucial impor-
tance for the maintenance of economic stability while addressing these needs. 
In this context it would be incumbent on the responsible authorities to avoid 
wasteful social spending that does not serve its intended purpose. Egypt’s sub-
sidy programmes are a case in point. Despite a high level of subsidy spending 
on safety net programmes, these programmes did not benefit the less privileged 
nor significantly address income and human poverty issues, though attempts 
have recently been made to improve their efficacy (El Mikawy et al., 2017).
Indeed, as recent research has shown with regards to Tunisia (e.g. Boughzala 
and Ben Romdhane, 2017), it would seem that the consolidation of the country’s 
15 As pointed out by some researchers, developmental opportunities are constrained not 
only by available resources and access to finance and trade but also by the established 




nascent democracy could very well depend on the success of the responsible 
authorities in coping with the country’s existing socio-economic problems. 
Specifically, this implies the authorities’ ability to formulate and implement 
a coherent economic strategy that responds to key economic and social de-
mands, mainly those of the young people that led the revolt. In particular, 
policy priorities should include creating new employment opportunities and 
implementing inclusive development strategies that, among other objectives, 
aim at narrowing regional disparities while (as the Chilean experience dem-
onstrates) generating the financial resources required to maintain economic 
stability. If such policies do not succeed, Tunisia could risk a period of retro-
gression, though given the country’s human potential and its recent history, 
the probability of such a risk being realised seems low.
6 Conclusion
Given that the Arab uprisings are not yet a region-wide phenomenon, a funda-
mental political change towards democratic governance in any one individual 
country will necessarily face negative regional pressures emanating from the 
still existing, non-democratic regional neighbourhood. Similarly, negative ex-
ternal interventions could disrupt a potential democratic process in the region 
that may be viewed by the intervening powers as being contrary to their re-
gional interests. As long as a highly conflictual regional environment contin-
ues to prevail, its corrosive impact will continue to manifest itself, one way or 
another, on political developments in the region.
These influences will not necessarily impede the process of moving towards 
democracy initiated by the dismantling of autocracy in any given individual 
country, as in the case of Tunisia, but they could help derail that process, as 
has been happening in the other countries where uprisings have taken place.
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chapter 3
Rethinking the Rentier Curse
Adeel Malik
Abstract
The Middle Eastern political economy has long been studied through the prism of 
the resource curse—that is, how resource riches undermine the region’s economic 
and political development. While many of the region’s pathologies are rooted in an 
economic structure heavily reliant on external windfalls, the existing literature tends 
to overstate the role of oil. This research note develops the case for a broader con-
ceptualisation of rents that includes not just windfalls from hydrocarbons, but also 
rents derived from aid, remittances and government manipulation of the economy. 
Reliance on these rent streams is the ‘original sin’ that perpetuates underdevelopment. 
Discussions of Arab political economy should therefore be framed as part of a broader 
enquiry into the relationship between rents and development. This requires, in turn, a 
deeper understanding of business–state relationships and the role of regional linkages 
in development.
1 Introduction
This chapter highlights the centrality of ‘unearned’ income streams, typically 
described as rents, for understanding the political economy of the Middle East. 
Many of the region’s pathologies—including unemployment, a bloated state, 
a weak private sector or limited political evolution—are ultimately rooted in 
an economic structure heavily reliant on external windfalls, whether derived 
from oil, aid or remittances. Questioning the exclusive focus of the prevail-
ing literature on oil, I develop the case for a broader conceptualisation of rent 
streams that includes, besides oil, rents derived from foreign aid, remittances 
and government regulation. These non-oil rent streams can also be both size-
able and significant in their impact.1 Regulatory rents that result from market 
1 Empirical studies suggest that natural resource rent is typically 10–20% of the gdp of de-
veloping countries although it can be significantly higher, especially in hydrocarbon-rich 
economies (Auty, 2001). Aid streams tend to be relatively stable and can have somewhat dis-
appointing impacts, but there is disagreement whether this reflects Dutch Disease effects 
(Rajan and Subramanian, 2011), rent seeking (Boone, 1996) or political instability (Islam, 
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subversion are particularly important in understanding the business–state re-
lationship and its bearing on political economy. Reliance on these windfalls is 
the ‘original sin’ of development in the Middle East and North Africa (mena). 
The story of Arab development is therefore a story of how these rent streams 
shape paths of political and economic development. I argue that the Middle 
East’s resource curse can simply be viewed as part of a broader rent curse.
The basic analytical frame used in the literature is the celebrated—but in-
creasingly contentious—paradigm of the Rentier State Theory (rst), which 
argues that unearned revenue streams, external to a country and accruing main-
ly to the government, shape that country’s political and economic character.2  
The upshot: resource-rich societies are systematically condemned to having 
underdeveloped political structures. A key mechanism behind this adverse 
connection between natural resources and democracy is the fiscal indepen-
dence of the state from taxation, which relieves it from intense pressure for 
accountability (the famous dictum, ‘no representation without taxation’). Di-
rect access to resource revenues also allows state elites to buy political con-
sent through repression and patronage. The principal function of a rentier 
state is the allocation or distribution of rents, which tilts incentives away from 
production to predation, stifling competitive structural change that could oth-
erwise have produced a social structure more favourable to democratisation—
independent classes and horizontal alignments in society (Beblawi and 
Luciani, 1987; Ross, 2001).
As a general typology of resource-rich states, the rst captures many salient 
features of rentier states. For a long time it has served as a leading explanation 
for weak political institutions in oil-rich countries. Its deep influence on public 
debate is best illustrated by New York Times journalist Thomas Friedman’s fa-
mous observation that in resource-rich countries ‘the price of oil and the pace 
of freedom always move in opposite directions’ (Friedman, 2009). The broad 
claims of the theory resonate with the actual mena experience. Resource 
rents have enabled ruling elites to expand instruments of both patronage and 
2005). In the period 1995–2004, remittances averaged 3.6% of gdp (Barajas et al., 2009), typi-
cally ranging between 2% and 10% but rising above 15% in seven countries, including Jordan. 
Although remittance flows tend to be stable and diffusely distributed, their net impact is 
disputed (Rajan and Subramanyan, 2011).
2 Rents are defined as ‘supernormal profits, or the excess over the return on capital, land, and 
labour, when these factors of production are put to their next best use’ (Dunning, 2008, 6). 
Beblawi and Luciani (1987) describe four conditions of a rentier state: (a) size and scale of 
the rent streams relative to the economy, (b) external source, (c) limited involvement of the 
population in the state’s production activities, and (d) accrual to the government of a rentier 
state.
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control. Without oil rents, it is difficult to sustain the region’s repressive mili-
tary structures, its bloated public sector, pervasive subsidies, and the ‘cradle to 
grave’ welfare systems. Whether through co-option or coercion, oil wealth has 
allowed states to subdue possible challengers, create new economic elites and 
bind old merchants in a relationship of dependence. In short, rarely can any 
facet of mena political economy be studied without a deep understanding of 
how oil shapes the state–society relationship.
There is growing realisation that, while rst paints a good broad-brush cari-
cature of resource-rich societies, it falls short of fully capturing the nuances, 
contexts and dynamics. Scholars have therefore called for refining and qualify-
ing the claims and predictions of rst by studying the role of initial historical 
conditions, dynastic family politics, the micro-politics of development, and 
emergent forms of capitalism in the Gulf (Dunning, 2008; Hertog, 2010; Herb, 
2009; Gray, 2011). Much of this literature can be read as simply an exercise in 
refinement, rather than an outright rejection of the theory. While agreeing 
with the broad thrust of this literature, this research note insists on develop-
ing a wider political economy of rents and development, which takes into ac-
count the nature, composition and deployment of rents. I argue that there is a 
need to transcend the continuing predilection for tracing the impact of oil on 
development. Oil revenues in mena are complemented with other unearned 
income streams from aid, remittances and government regulation, which to-
gether constitute a broader challenge of ‘rentierism’.
While oil rents clearly dominate the external revenue flows in mena coun-
tries, the impact of other rents derived from foreign aid and remittances is in-
sufficiently explored. Furthermore, far more emphasis has been placed on the 
role of external rents, whereas domestically generated rents from government 
manipulation of the economy are largely neglected by dominant approaches 
to studying mena political economy. Such rents are critical, however, in the 
region’s labour-abundant economies, where—given the relative scarcity of 
oil rents—domestic rents from economic protection play a prominent role in 
generating elites’ commitment to regime continuity. Perhaps the best example 
of the importance of such rents is the pervasive use of non-tariff barriers in 
North African economies. Restrictive trade policy is used to privilege business-
es connected to the regime or other insiders who are given control of the pro-
tected enclaves of the economy. In turn, the regime is able to secure a binding 
commitment to the maintenance of authoritarian order.
Another important dimension—largely omitted from dominant narra-
tives—is the importance of the external anchor in sustaining authoritarianism 
in the Middle East. Existing theoretical accounts have been largely focused on 
how domestic recycling of resource rents buys the political acquiescence of key 
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constituencies at home. While this is admittedly the core political economy di-
mension pertaining to the political economy of oil, another crucial dimension, 
at least in the Middle Eastern context, is the manner in which resource rents 
are externally recycled to build a support base abroad. As this research note 
will show, such recycling can take many forms and is often geared as much to-
wards securing geopolitical returns as towards economic returns for overseas 
investments. As exporters of hydrocarbons, many mena countries are highly 
integrated into global commodity and finance circuits. The external and do-
mestic structures of power are therefore co-constituted in such domains.
All of this underscores the need to unpack the complex architecture of au-
thoritarianism in resource-rich societies. The rentier experience in the Middle 
East is broader and deeper than uni-linear and deterministic oil-based ac-
counts would have us believe.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: Part 2 furnishes a brief 
background of the relationship between natural resources and development. 
Part 3 proposes a broader conceptualisation of rent streams and emphasises 
the role of the external recycling of rents. Part 4 provides a brief conclusion.
2 Natural Resources and Development in the Middle East
Before delving into the analysis of various rent streams it is useful to briefly re-
view the relationship between natural resources and development. Ever since 
the discovery of oil, hydrocarbons have defined the Middle East’s development 
experience. A quick review of the existing evidence suggests that the mena 
region shares with other developing countries the basic pathologies associated 
with a resource curse. Arab economies have experienced a middling growth 
performance with substantial volatility of macroeconomic outcomes. The 
symptoms appear all too familiar: weak private sector, unproductive invest-
ment in white-elephant projects, pervasive rent seeking and a large and over-
sized public sector. Government spending (especially on subsidies and public 
employment) has remained surprisingly resilient in the face of fluctuating oil 
prices. The relationship between oil and development in mena is well docu-
mented (Yousef, 2004; Elbadawi, 2005; Nugent and Pesaran, 2007). Rather than 
offering a comprehensive summary, I will highlight only the salient aspects of 
this literature.
Behind these generic patterns lies considerable diversity in individual de-
velopment experiences. It is customary to classify the mena region along 
two dimensions: labour and resources. The political economy dynamics of 
the  resource-rich, labour-scarce countries of the Gulf are distinct from more 
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labour-abundant economies in the region (some of which are oil-rich, such as 
Algeria, while others are oil-scarce, such as Egypt and Syria). Classifying the 
region by rent endowments, it is initially useful to divide these economies into 
capital-surplus oil exporters; capital-scarce oil exporters; and resource-poor, 
labour-surplus economies. During the first oil boom (1973–80) all three types 
of economy favoured the public sector for allocating rents and developed pa-
tronage systems that undermined markets and competitive structural change. 
However, the development strategies and the nature of underlying rent streams 
differed across countries.
• The capital-surplus oil exporters of the Gulf deployed their sizeable oil rents 
to co-opt political support by providing generous welfare. This has led to the 
rapid absorption of resource rents through high government consumption. 
It has also been accompanied by perverse outcomes: stable  autocracies, 
pro-cyclical fiscal policy, labour market distortions, patronage-driven pri-
vate sectors, and a high dependence on resource rents.
• The capital-deficient economies are labour-abundant with relatively mod-
est resource rents per capita in comparison to Gulf countries. Some of these 
(e.g. Algeria and Iran) deployed rent to initiate state-led industrialisation 
behind high, protective tariffs, but largely failed to create competitive in-
dustrial strength. Like other oil exporters these economies also created sys-
tematic welfare entitlements. Importantly, oil rents are combined here with 
regulatory rents through the manipulation of the economy. This has led to 
rent seeking, unproductive investment, weak private sectors and greater re-
sistance to reform.
• The resource-poor economies might be expected to achieve more rapid 
political and economic development due to their lower resource rents, but 
this ignores sizeable rents derived from foreign aid, worker remittances and 
regulation. In fact, in the first two to three decades following independence, 
Yemen and Syria both derived one-fifth of their respective gdps from hydro-
carbon exports, while Egypt generated aggregate rents in excess of 20–30 per 
cent of gdp. Morocco, Tunisia, and Jordan sustained sizeable rent streams 
until oil prices collapsed in the mid-1980s, after which they accelerated eco-
nomic diversification but resisted opening up politically.
The labour surplus economies witnessed declining rents in the 1980s—result-
ing from falling oil prices and dwindling inflows from foreign aid and remit-
tances. With growing debt-to-gross domestic product (gdp) ratios, economic 
reform became a policy imperative. Several mena countries introduced priva-
tisation and economic liberalisation on a limited scale. This was done in such 
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a way as not to disrupt the status quo. Neo-liberal reform generated opportu-
nities to exploit new rent streams through lucrative contracts and licenses in 
banking and telecommunications. These rents were allocated to consolidate 
elite coalitions and to reorganise political power. Overall, economic reforms 
failed to dismantle pervasive entry barriers and anti-competitive practices.
The second oil boom, which began with the oil price surge in the 1990s, 
led to a sizable windfall (mena oil revenues grew fourfold during the period 
2000–07). Most oil exporting governments initially responded prudently to the 
windfall revenue, through higher savings levels, slower domestic absorption, 
and a greater reliance on markets. During the aforementioned period, total 
mena debt fell from 55 to 17 per cent of gdp. Oil exporting nations began to 
set aside a larger proportion of their current account surpluses in sovereign 
wealth funds (swfs). Arguably, in several mena countries, especially in the 
Gulf, the private sector has shown greater agency and independence. Despite 
this evidence of a steeper learning curve, however, the second oil boom did not 
redefine the rent-dependent model of development.
Public expenditure has accelerated since 2005 due to a growing commit-
ment to salaries, subsidies, and infrastructure projects. Typically, roughly half 
of the extra hydrocarbon revenues have been deployed in resource-rich mena 
states, with public spending noticeably higher in capital deficient economies, 
such as Iran. Public spending continues to be the primary driver of private 
investment in oil-rich mena states, but returns on these investments (espe-
cially those on infrastructure) are typically low (Noumba Um et al., 2009). It is 
therefore unsurprising that the income per capita gains of regional oil export-
ers were mainly attributable to gains in the terms of trade, with limited contri-
bution from non-oil gdp (Arezki and Nabli, 2012). It is pertinent to explore if 
social learning has any role to play in explaining differential policy responses 
to the two oil booms that the Arab resource-rich economies (rres) witnessed, 
in the early 1970s and the first decade of the new millennium.
A key difference, relative to the 1970s, is that spending on infrastructure was 
relatively more restrained during the second oil boom. There was also a more 
robust saving response. Learning from the fiscal challenges of the 1980s, most 
Arab rres have devised explicit strategies to set aside a growing proportion of 
their resource windfalls for the future. swfs emerged as important saving and 
investment vehicles during the second oil boom. Apart from facilitating over-
seas investments, these savings are coming to the rescue of Arab rres in the 
present climate of low oil prices. The question, however, remains: is the recy-
cling of petrodollars fundamentally different across the two oil booms? Apart 
from the differential savings response, the nature and direction of investment 
also displays interesting differences. At home, Gulf Cooperation Council (gcc) 
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countries have invested more in rail infrastructure,3 and in educational and fi-
nancial institutions.
The destinations of overseas investments are also more diversified, with 
greater cross-border investment in Asian and mena countries. But, at least in 
Qatar and Abu Dhabi, the pattern of prestige acquisitions abroad has contin-
ued and, in some cases, even intensified. In some sense, swfs and their as-
sociated investments represent merely a change of form rather than one of 
substance. As investment vehicles, swfs continue to be directed towards pres-
tige projects at home and brand acquisitions abroad. Although investments 
have gradually become more diversified in terms of their destinations, few are 
oriented towards promoting development in the region. There are also linger-
ing questions about the transparency of swfs. Their operations are unusually 
opaque, with little public knowledge of their investment strategies. Many swfs 
lack clear withdrawal rules. Even when specified, these rules are not consis-
tently implemented. As a result, despite being a promising instrument, swfs 
have not been entirely successful in imposing fiscal constraints on the sover-
eign. As the brief review in this section has suggested, despite small changes on 
the margin, the old development model is alive and well. Oil rents continue to 
drive the region’s core trajectory of political and economic development. How-
ever, as the following section will argue, oil rents are only one large component 
of the region’s complex structure of rentierism.
3 From Resource Curse to Rent Curse
While the Middle East’s resource riches are often held culpable for the region’s 
perverse political economy, the role of oil can easily be overstated. It is also 
difficult to explain the adverse performance of relatively resource-scarce Arab 
countries (the likes of Syria, Jordan and Egypt). Despite the absence of vast 
quantities of oil, many of these nations share the resource-curse symptoms of 
their oil-rich neighbours. This is partly explained by the significance of non-
oil rent streams that mimic the effect of oil, and help to shape a similarly ad-
verse political economy. At least three such revenue streams are noteworthy 
in mena economies that are relatively labour abundant and resource scarce: 
aid, remittances, and rents from government regulations. The first of these—
foreign aid—is a geopolitical rent that can replicate resource-curse symptoms. 
By virtue of its strategic location, the average mena state derives greater aid 
3 Gulf Business, 11 January 2015, http://gulfbusiness.com/2015/01/gcc-rail-projects-see-invest 
ments-worth-200bn/#.VfXGqhFVhBc (accessed on 17 March 2016).
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rents than the average low-income country or sub-Saharan African state. Over 
the last fifty years the mena region has received roughly three times more 
net aid per capita than Latin America. Despite being home to a significantly 
greater proportion of poor people, South Asia received only usd 6 per capita 
in net foreign assistance during the last decade, compared to usd 43 per capita 
in mena.
mena economies engulfed in the Palestinian–Israeli conflict are particular-
ly large aid recipients (Jordan and Lebanon receive the highest level of net aid 
per capita—usd 128). The figure for Egypt, while significant by international 
standards, does not take into account the additional stable rent stream in the 
form of us military aid (usd 1.5 billion annually). An average North African 
state receives more net aid (in per capita terms) than an average low-income 
country. Since 2011 aid flows have skyrocketed in Arab Spring countries, rising 
to usd 158 in Egypt and usd 86 in Tunisia (once more in per capita terms). 
In the wake of its political crisis, in 2013 Egypt secured aid pledges worth usd 
12 billion. Interestingly, these aid windfalls are shared even by countries with 
precarious oil exports (e.g. Iraq, Bahrain and Oman).
A second potentially important source of rents is remittances from expatri-
ate workers. The salience of these rents is again evident from the fact that the 
mena region has the highest ratio of remittances to gdp of all the developing 
regions (4 per cent compared to 1–1.5 per cent in Latin America and sub-
Saharan Africa). Jordan and Lebanon derive roughly 20 per cent of their re-
spective gdps from expatriate worker remittances. The ratio is similarly high, 
by international standards, in Yemen, Egypt and Morocco. Unlike oil and aid, 
remittances are well dispersed among recipients, leading to more ambiguous 
political effects. Although remittance flows, together with foreign aid, are sta-
tistically correlated with authoritarian stability, they can also weaken patron–
client linkages and create an independent political space (Ahmed, 2012). The 
mechanisms behind these statistical correlations are unclear, however. It is 
surmised that remittances can influence government spending decisions, tilt-
ing them away from essential public goods, and that they can also relieve the 
political pressure emanating from excessive unemployment.
The economic effects are similarly ambiguous. While remittances can im-
prove financial intermediation, they can also trigger Dutch Disease effects, 
depressing growth in the long term (Rajan and Subramanian, 2011). By provid-
ing the necessary foreign exchange cushion, remittances can shield countries 
from economic crises, thereby weakening incentives for economic reform. 
In mena, a key feature of both aid and remittances is their high correlation 
with oil prices. This is easy to understand: oil rents are recycled in the region 
through financial support for poorer neighbours and the creation of jobs for 
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unskilled migrants from labour-surplus countries. The oil price is, therefore, a 
fundamental driver of these cross-border financial flows. As Figure 3.1 shows, 
aid to Muslim non-oil producers (in percentage of gdp) tracked quite closely 
with oil prices until 2002. A similar trend is observable for remittances.
The third rent stream, with particularly pernicious effects on political 
economy, is generated through government manipulation of the economy.4 
Arab markets are among the most protected in the world. In Arab countries 
domestic economic activity is routinely governed by monopoly concessions, 
price controls, procedural regulations and a raft of arbitrary trade barriers. 
 Effectively, these barriers assign elites control of vital access points to the 
economy,  generating rent streams that support ‘networks of privilege’ deemed 
essential for regime survival. Arguably, the need for such rent streams is most 
acutely felt in labour-abundant countries with more extended distributional 
commitments. This provides an important explanation for why non-tariff bar-
riers remain both more pervasive and persistent in labour-abundant mena 
economies. In fact, in terms of trade restrictiveness, mena’s labour-surplus 
 economies leave all other regions, including sub-Saharan Africa, behind.5
4 These rents are often generated through government intervention that changes relative 
prices.
5 See Figure 7 in Malik and Awadallah (2013, 16).
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Figure 3.1 Inter-linked capital flows: Oil, aid and remittances (1972–2008)
Source: Ahmed (2012).
Note: Oil price (left scale)—usd per barrel
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Such policy-induced rents can be significant even in resource-rich coun-
tries. In most Arab rres little is known about the number and strength 
of those with veto rights with regards to major fiscal policy decisions. The 
activities of many public sector enterprises also remain off the fiscal radar 
screen, with such quasi- public spending believed to be particularly im-
portant in Algeria, where public sector banks are repeatedly recapitalised 
through outright cancellations of their debts, purchase of non-performing 
loans (npls), and liquidity injections. Such transfers are often sophisticated 
ways of transferring rents to elite groups in society, groups without whose 
support the authoritarian order is difficult to sustain. In the gcc countries 
many  popular instruments of patronage, such as land sales and tax benefits, 
are not accounted for in fiscal terms but are crucial forms of rent transfers to 
elite constituents. In fact, the literature on the  business–state relationship in 
the Gulf has long recognised the ways in which a private sector that is struc-
turally  dependent on the state bolsters authoritarian stability (see Hertog, 
Luciani and Valeri, 2013).
Selective economic reform itself provides an important mechanism through 
which rents are generated to reconfigure elite alliances. Most North African 
countries have suffered from the familiar ‘partial reform syndrome’ that has 
remained a persistent feature of African economies (Van de Walle, 2001). Se-
lective liberalisation of trade, finance and services has helped to generate new 
rent streams. The growth of the financial sector provides an important illustra-
tion of this point and deserves a separate mention.
3.1 Finance and the Rentier Structure
The financial sector acts as an important domain in which regulatory rents can 
be generated. This is particularly true in mena’s labour-abundant economies 
where the state has retained a domineering presence in the sector. These econ-
omies also stand out for the greater prominence of state-owned banks (sobs) 
and specialised credit institutions (scis). Another feature of these countries’ 
banking systems is the high share of non-performing loans. As a share of gross 
loans, non-performing loans in Algeria’s government banks stood at 12.6 per 
cent in 2014. As the lead banker for the public sector, the financial sector is of-
ten used to safeguard oligarchic interests masquerading as claims by state en-
terprises. Partly as a consequence of excessive state involvement, there is also a 
greater ‘informalisation’ of the financial sector. Although capital flows are gen-
erally liberalised across the region, financial systems in labour- abundant rres 
still exhibit some form of financial repression. With its pervasive exchange 
controls, which maintain negative real interest rates on dinar assets, Algeria 
presents clear evidence of financial repression.
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Arguably, the banking sector in gcc countries can be considered compara-
tively ‘well-developed, profitable and efficient’ (Creane et al., 2003). With few 
exceptions, the banking sector in these economies extends reasonably high 
levels of credit to the private sector, when considered as a share of gdp. The re-
gion has one of the highest deposits-to-GDP ratios in the world. In most coun-
tries financial systems are also deep, as measured by the M2-to-GDP ratio.6 
Although more developed when measured by conventional yardsticks, the fi-
nancial structures of gcc economies are structurally weak. Although the gcc 
economies are immune from direct interventions in the financial sector, their 
banking systems face high reserve requirements, and interest rates are some-
times explicitly or implicitly capped. Even privately owned banks sometimes 
work as disguised state-owned banks. Overlapping patterns of ownership of 
banks and firms further blurs the boundary between the public and the pri-
vate. Relatedly, the banking sector is predominantly owned by the government 
and there is also a high lending exposure to connected actors. The non-bank 
financial sector is generally underdeveloped, with only a nominal presence for 
equity, insurance and bond markets (Snaije’s chapter in this volume comments 
on this in more detail). The financial sector also remains exposed to volatil-
ity induced by fluctuations in the oil market. Like many Latin American oil 
exporters, external shocks and financial fragility are a fact of life in Arab rres.
All of this is an invitation to look at the political economy of finance behind 
the shallow differences in the organisation and structure of finance between 
resource-rich and resource-scarce countries. While, in principle, financial mar-
kets are needed to facilitate inter-temporal consumption and business invest-
ment, their distributive function often trumps the productive logic in highly 
centralised, extractive regimes. In the mena context, Henry and Springborg 
(2010, 108) provide an apt reminder that the ‘banking system is a major as-
set for these regimes as long as insiders hold the levers of financial power, for 
they then extend the regime’s reach and patronage networks into the private 
sector’. The manner in which finance extends the rentier structure is perhaps 
best illustrated by considering dynamics. All across mena the financial sector 
has suffered from a weak pace of reform. With the exception of Africa, most 
regions have made more significant progress on financial development than 
has the Middle East. Even within mena, the Arab oil exporters have been ex-
tremely slow reformers (Creane et al., 2003).
6 The M2 is defined as the sum of currency outside banks, demand deposits other than those 
of the central government, and the time, savings, and foreign currency deposits of resident 




Such reluctance to reform is rooted in an adverse political economy where 
control of finance helps to sustain the disjunction between the economy and 
society, a hallmark of rentier states. Whatever limited reform has taken place 
has been neutralised to offset such reform’s adverse political consequences. 
Rather than supporting a consistent and predictable process of liberalisation, 
most mena states have engaged in partial liberalisation, which has permitted 
regimes to protect their interests. Foreign banks have usually been allowed to 
operate only if they agreed to broker deals with regime insiders. Such selective 
liberalisation of the financial sector has generated new rents for insiders. This 
is the familiar story of North Africa. In the resource-rich countries of the Gulf, 
the liberalisation of the financial sector was used as a politically safe avenue 
for economic diversification. This is most evident in gcc countries, where the 
need for diversification is most acutely felt. In Bahrain the assets of wholesale 
banks equal 480 per cent of gdp; those of retail banks equal 270 per cent of 
gdp (imf, 2013). However, this regime of high finance does not pose a political 
threat since the bulk of lending is geared towards connected parties and real 
estate. Thus, even where depleting oil reserves have incentivised a move to-
wards diversification, real estate, construction and financial sectors have been 
the preferred avenues for that diversification. This diversification strategy is 
politically more palatable, since it allows for controlled forms of accumulation.
The above discussion on finance underscores the complexity of the rentier 
structure in Arab economies, of which oil is only one—albeit important—
component. Taken together, it is the totality of the rentier experience—rather 
than oil alone—that is potentially most damaging to Middle Eastern political 
economy. The resource curse is, in fact, a variant of a broader rent curse that 
can also manifest itself in resource-poor economies through dependence on 
foreign aid, remittances and regulatory rents. This has an important implica-
tion for how we analytically categorise these economies. Given that some of 
the oil wealth is recycled in the region through aid and remittances, the tra-
ditional distinction between oil and non-oil countries lacks analytical utility. 
The boundaries between the resource-rich and the resource-poor economies 
of mena are indeed more fluid than often perceived.
3.2 External Recycling of Rents
Another neglected dimension of the mainstream analysis of rentier states per-
tains to the deployment of resource rents. The rentier analysis is largely con-
cerned with the domestic cycling of rents that help to buy off key segments of 
society. While clearly a dominant concern, such rent distribution to domes-
tic constituencies is only one major component of the distributive regime. 
It is complemented by a significant outflow of rents to appease strategically 
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 important external constituencies. The political economy implications of this 
external rent recycling are largely understudied. Arab rres are not just ex-
porters of hydrocarbons; they are also net exporters of capital. While overseas 
investments are a natural response to the limited absorptive capacity of the 
domestic economy, the export of capital is also partly geared towards align-
ing the interests of external constituencies with domestic political continuity. 
Resource-rich Arab states face the imperative of sharing their resource wealth, 
not just with their citizens, but also with key external constituencies.
Trillions of dollars are invested abroad in the acquisition of foreign compa-
nies and banks, the purchase of company shares, and in infrastructure proj-
ects, us treasury bills, and other means. The foreign assets of Saudi Arabia’s 
financial system, including the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (sama) are 
estimated to stand at 130 per cent of the country’s gdp. Such investments by 
sovereign wealth funds and high net worth individuals are not purely driven 
by economic returns but, equally, by a geopolitical logic that treats these in-
vestments as instruments for buying leverage in important foreign capitals. 
Closer to home, the Arab oil-exporting nations have also routinely acted as 
a lender of last resort for neighbours who are financially struggling. In fact, 
the resource-rich countries of the Gulf are effectively financing the social con-
tracts of Yemen, Egypt and Jordan. These external commitments include oil 
and budgetary support for regional allies, and the escalating cost of regional 
military engagements. The fiscal cost of these growing external commitments 
is ultimately driven by the need to sustain the authoritarian pact at home. In 
fiscal terms, these can be described as contingent liabilities in the geopolitical 
domain.
Ultimately, high net foreign assets are also a natural outcome of specialisa-
tion in a highly internationalised commodity that inserts the region into global 
commodity and finance circuits. This globalisation of commodity and finance 
is, in turn, intertwined with the formation of classes at home (Hanieh, 2011). 
Capital connects not just financial markets but also Khaleeji elites who are 
both mobile and have a personal interest in a liberalised capital regime. The 
political significance of capital mobility has received attention in comparative 
politics, but largely in a localised context. Asset mobility has been described, 
in the democratisation literature, as a crucial intervening variable. It has been 
argued that democratisation may be less threatening to the elites when assets 
are mobile, since this can lower the risk of redistribution (Boix, 2003). Arab 
countries furnish contrasting evidence of this, however. Here, capital mobil-
ity can bolster authoritarian structures through the interplay between the do-
mestic political and geopolitical arenas. This remains a largely under-studied 
domain of political economy.
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It is in this context that the regime of near perfect capital mobility main-
tained in most Arab rres should be situated.7 Such unhindered movement 
of cross-border capital flows carries a larger political significance hitherto un-
appreciated by the resource-curse literature. From a purely macroeconomic 
standpoint, the regime of perfect capital mobility springs from a pragmatic 
concern for draining excess liquidity from the system and preventing the dan-
gers of Dutch Disease evident in so many other resource-rich contexts. It is 
also inherently tied to preserving the credibility of the fixed exchange rate re-
gime, which is also ultimately tied to regime legitimacy too. But there is also a 
complementary logic for capital mobility, a logic that is rooted in an underly-
ing political economy that is excessively dependent on the import of labour 
from developing countries and the export of capital to developed markets. If 
low-skilled, foreign workers are important for sustaining the segmented la-
bour regimes in gcc states, capital mobility is needed to facilitate outward 
remittance flows. This labour market arrangement is clearly significant from 
a political economy standpoint, since reliance on cheap foreign labour acts as 
an insurance against the possibility of class struggles emanating from labour 
politics (Herb, 2009).
4 Conclusion
In this research note I have tried to advocate a broader conceptualisation of 
rents that goes beyond a simple insistence on the role of hydrocarbon rents 
in shaping Middle Eastern political economy. I have argued that authoritar-
ian structures in mena are underpinned through a broader edifice of rents, 
which are both external and internal. Amongst internal rents, aid and remit-
tances play a significant role in many Arab societies, ranging from Lebanon to 
Egypt. Despite their limited scale in comparison to oil rents, their impact in 
terms of political economy is often significant. Importantly, rents generated 
domestically through government manipulation of the economy play a cru-
cial role in connecting the fate of business classes to the prevailing political 
order. All across the region, rulers often act as businessmen. For independent 
merchants, it is difficult to thrive outside the royal circle (Hertog et al., 2013). 
Domestic economic rents not only provide lucrative deals to insiders; they also 
generate elites’ commitments to the ruler. This is one reason why such rents 
are more prevalent in mena’s labour-abundant economies where oil rents 
are either insufficient or unable to meet the more extensive distributional 
7 Algeria and Libya provide important exceptions to this.
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 commitments of the regime. While the importance of these individual rent 
streams is recognised in the literature, their combined significance for mena 
political economy is underappreciated.
Another important characteristic of the region’s rentier structures relates 
to the external deployment of rents. The political economy significance of 
such deployment has been largely ignored by previous analyses. As mena is a 
resource-rich region par excellence, most hydrocarbon exporters in the region 
maintain sizeable current account surpluses, enabling them to project their fi-
nancial and diplomatic power abroad. Through their overseas investments and 
purchases, Arab exporters buy significant geopolitical influence, which—in 
turn—helps to bolster authoritarian structures at home. Expansive economic 
and financial engagement with the outside world provides interesting clues to 
the external recycling of rents, an activity that helps to build durable foreign 
commitment for the domestic political order. Just as the recycling of domesti-
cally generated economic rents creates binding commitments from the elites, 
several types of capital outflows are guises through which rents are distributed 
to core external constituencies to buy firm commitment to ruling families.
Given the significance of the non-oil rent streams, this article has argued 
that the Middle East appears to suffer from a broader rent curse. The oil curse 
is just a variant of the overall rent curse that mena economies are trapped in. 
Concentrated economic and political structures in the Middle East are there-
fore essentially tied up with the creation, capture and distribution of these 
rents. A focus on the broader rentier structure allows us to frame the political 
economy of the Middle East within the emerging paradigms linking rents and 
institutional development. In fact, as argued by North, Wallis and Weingast 
(2012), it is difficult to evaluate any social order without a consideration of the 
nature, concentration and deployment of rents. With their consequent role in 
restricting economic opportunity, rents fundamentally define the scope and 
possibility of political action. Importantly, in the Middle Eastern context, well-
entrenched rentier structures are crucial for understanding why authoritarian 
regimes are so durable despite occasional challenges to their rule. As the North 
African uprisings have painfully revealed, it is easier to remove regime leaders 
than to eliminate the rentier structures that feed the associated elite coalitions.
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chapter 4
A Brief Political Economy of Energy Subsidies in 
the Middle East and North Africa
Laura El-Katiri and Bassam Fattouh1
Abstract
Energy subsidies are among the most pervasive and controversial fiscal policy tools 
used in the Middle East and North Africa (mena). In a region with few functioning 
social welfare systems, subsidised energy prices continue to form an important social 
safety net, albeit a highly costly and inefficient one. In the mena region’s oil and gas 
producing countries, low energy prices have also historically formed an important ele-
ment of an unwritten social contract, where governments have extracted their coun-
tries’ hydrocarbon riches in return for citizens’ participation in sharing resource rents. 
While it is clear that energy subsidy reform will not be the only variable at play, its 
potential socio-economic dividends are important factors for enabling some common 
regional objectives—sustainable fiscal policies, fiscal space to invest in key areas, and 
a more efficient and equitable distribution of scarce resources—to be achieved, help-
ing to promote a more stable political status quo in the long term. If accommodated by 
effective mitigation measures, reforming energy subsidies in the mena region’s middle- 
income economies could be a powerful tool for governments—addressing those very 
profound socio-economic grievances that have contributed to the outbreak of political 
protest and, in some cases, to an intensification of domestic infighting over political 
control. In this paper, we look at some of the mena region’s potential avenues for re-
form. While the past has demonstrated the political difficulty of reforming energy pric-
es, recent experience also shows that the reform of energy subsidies can be achieved, if 
accompanied by a set of enabling factors.
1 Introduction
Energy subsidies are among the most pervasive and controversial fiscal policy 
tools in the Middle East and North Africa (mena). Their reform continues to 
be difficult, from a political, economic and social perspective, due to the origi-
nal objectives of these measures—such as the need to protect the interests of 
1 A version of this article was published as working paper (https://www.oxfordenergy.org/ 
wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/MEP-11.pdf).
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low-income households and to foster domestic industrial growth. In a region 
with few functioning social welfare systems, subsidised energy prices continue 
to form an important social safety net, albeit a highly costly and inefficient 
one. In the mena region’s oil and gas producing countries, low domestic en-
ergy prices have also historically formed an important element of an unwrit-
ten social contract, where governments extract their countries’ hydrocarbon 
riches, in return compensating their citizens through a variety of direct and in-
direct channels, including subsidies and other welfare benefits (El-Katiri et al., 
2012; El-Katiri, 2013a). Energy subsidies hence play a pivotal role in a complex 
state–citizen relationship, a relationship that has come under increasing scru-
tiny in many Arab countries since the onset of the Arab uprisings in 2010.
The four years or more since protests erupted in Tunisia in December 2010, 
and the widespread regional unrest later summarised under the popularised 
term the ‘Arab Spring’, have placed the issue of greater socio-economic justice 
at the heart of mena politics. In a way this has complicated, and in many cases 
delayed, overdue energy pricing reforms in a number of regional economies, as 
governments have feared that rising living costs would only intensify popular 
turmoil. On the other hand, despite being widely perceived as a fundamental 
economic and social benefit, energy subsidies form an important part of the 
socio-economic problems, and of the vastly distorted economic incentives, 
that plague the economies of the mena region. The reform of energy pricing 
systems is also a complex process, which often requires structural changes to 
ownership and control over some of the most crucial assets of the state in the 
Middle East—oil, gas and electricity, together with their accompanying distri-
bution infrastructure and networks. In lower- and middle-income countries, 
measures for reforming energy prices, if not accompanied by appropriate 
mitigation measures (such as a more effective and transparent social safety 
system), have an adverse effect on the disposable incomes of the poor and the 
aspiring middle classes.
There are also intra-regional differences behind the drivers of reform. The 
fiscal pressures associated with energy subsidies are a primary driver for re-
form in many of the region’s lower- and middle-income countries, particularly 
those in need of financial support from international institutions such as the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (imf). But the recent de-
cline in international oil prices (since the second half of 2014), coupled with 
rising fiscal break-even prices in many oil-exporting countries, has also provid-
ed relatively strong incentives for the wealthier oil and gas producers to con-
sider their respective domestic energy-pricing frameworks. This is in addition 
to the long-term consequences that many oil producers face as they continue 
to divert increasing volumes of oil and gas away from export markets to satisfy 
rapidly growing domestic demand, at prices far below world market levels.
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In this paper, we look at some of the mena region’s potential avenues for 
reform. While the past has demonstrated the political difficulty of reforming 
energy prices, recent experiences in several mena economies also show that 
the reform of energy subsidies can be achieved, if accompanied by a set of 
enabling factors. The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides 
a brief background on energy subsidies in the mena region; Section 3 looks at 
some of the reform experiences in the region; Section 4 concludes.
2 A Brief Background on Energy Subsidies
2.1 Issues with Measuring Energy Subsidies
Energy subsidies are neither straightforward to define nor simple to measure; 
this tends to complicate any meaningful debate around them. There is no 
commonly agreed definition of what constitutes a subsidy, and this fact—in 
part—is reflected in the continued inability of major international organisa-
tions such as the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme 
(undp), and Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (opec) to 
agree on common terms.2 A widely used definition considers a subsidy as:
… any measure that keeps prices for consumers below the market level or 
keeps prices for producers above the market level, or that reduces costs 
for consumers and producers by giving direct or indirect support.
de moor and calamai, �997, �
It is clear from the above definition that many governments’ actions can be 
categorised as involving assistance, including subsidies (in-kind, cash or cred-
it, or relating to tax or procurement). Some of these are on-budget or explicit 
subsidies that constitute explicit transfers made by the government to either 
the producer or the consumer receiving the subsidy, registered in the state’s 
budget. For instance, a government may mandate that a public utility set the 
selling price below the cost of production. The government then finances that 
public utility’s losses by transferring funds from the general budget.3 Energy 
2 iea et al. (2010) notes the existence of a major disagreement among international organ-
isations concerning the choice of the reference price, and that consequently ‘a commonly 
agreed definition of subsidies has proven a major challenge in the G-20 context and coun-
tries have decided to adopt their own definition of energy subsidies’.
3 The budget records of many countries (including Egypt) show how this concept underlies 
the measurement of subsidies in the economy.
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subsidies can also be cross-financed between different energy user groups. 
Cross-subsidies occur when tariffs below the cost of production are charged, 
to household users for instance, and the revenue shortfall is offset by increas-
ing industrial/commercial sector tariffs above cost levels. Countries such as 
Lebanon, Yemen, Egypt, Libya, and Syria all charge their industrial customers 
considerably higher electricity prices than charged to residential customers, 
suggesting some form of cross-subsidisation.4
But there is also the question of the benchmark against which domestic pric-
es should be compared. For instance, the national oil company can be man-
dated to sell petroleum products to the domestic market at below international 
prices but above production costs. In this case, the national oil company does 
not incur financial losses, and hence the government does not need to make 
an explicit transfer to compensate for those losses. Nevertheless, there is still 
an implicit cost involved, which represents the opportunity cost (the economic 
rent/revenue wasted by the failure to sell oil at higher, market prices). This en-
tails a transfer from the government to the final consumers, even though such 
a transfer does not appear explicitly on state oil companies’ records or in the 
government budget. If this foregone revenue had been collected, it could have 
been used by the government in a variety of ways, including to reduce the bud-
get deficit and the size of the public debt; to increase expenditure in more pro-
ductive areas such as infrastructure, education or health; by redistributing it 
directly to its people through cash transfers; or to reduce, where applicable, tax-
ation (Gupta et al., 2003). Implicit subsidies are less transparent and more diffi-
cult to calculate. They typically occur in oil producing countries, where mostly 
state-owned oil companies produce, refine and market petroleum products.
Based on the price-gap approach—which measures the gap between the 
subsidised price and a benchmark price to reflect the opportunity cost (de-
fined as the supply cost of an energy product including transport and distri-
bution costs)—a recent imf report estimates pre-tax energy subsidies in the 
mena region as having reached usd 237 billion in 2011, equivalent to 48 per 
cent of world subsidies, 8.6 per cent of regional gdp, and 22 per cent of gov-
ernment revenue (Sdralevich et al., 2014). These figures, however, should be 
treated with caution given the many caveats to using the price-gap approach 
in some contexts. Issues such as the production of joint products (for instance 
crude oil, natural gas, and natural gas liquids (ngls)), the availability of spare 
capacity in some Arab oil-producing countries, and the ability of key Arab oil 
4 Since in all these countries public utilities do not recover their costs, this form of cross-




exporters to influence international oil prices could affect the measurement 
of subsidies.5 A recent study by the imf broadens the definition of an energy 
subsidy to:
… [a post-tax energy subsidy, which arises] when consumer prices are 
below supply costs plus a tax to reflect environmental damage and an 
additional tax applied to all consumption goods to raise government 
revenues.
coady et al., �0�5, �
Based on this definition, global energy subsidies are estimated at a massive 
usd 5.3 trillion for 2015, or 6.5 per cent of global gdp, despite the recent fall in 
the oil price. This higher estimate of global energy subsidies results from the 
inclusion of components such as local air pollution, global warming, and other 
(non-internalised) domestic externalities in the post-tax energy price.
2.2 Energy Subsidies and mena Fiscal Stability
As has become evident throughout the first decade of the twenty-first cen-
tury, energy subsidies constitute a significant fiscal burden. With rising world 
 market prices for oil and natural gas since the turn of the new millennium, the 
mena region’s parallel surge in domestic demand has translated into a rapid 
growth in fiscal expenditure on energy subsidies in importing countries such 
as Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. Egypt’s expenditure on energy 
subsidies reached a staggering usd 21 billion (egp 143.7 billion) in the financial 
year 2013/14—a figure equivalent to 19.5 per cent of total government spending, 
or almost the entire value of aid received by Egypt from Middle Eastern donors 
since mid-2012.6 Yemen’s energy subsidy bill for 2013/14 was most recently es-
timated to be around usd 3.5 billion, a third of government expenditure and 
in excess of the country’s budgeted deficit of usd 3.2 billion in that fiscal year 
(mees, 2014h; Ghobari and El Gamal, 2014). The recent fall in the oil price comes 
as a welcome relief to these oil importers, but such relief could prove tempo-
rary, given that the future trajectory of oil prices remains highly uncertain.
5 A report notes that the price-gap method has limitations, which apply particularly in the 
case of countries with large endowments of energy resources (iea et al., 2010).
6 mees (2014a); authors’ estimates of Gulf and Turkish aid paid to Egypt since the Morsi re-
gime assumed power until February 2014 (around usd 24.5 billion). It is important to note 
that in measuring energy subsidies, Egypt only considers the actual expenditure on subsidies 
and not the opportunity cost. Based on the opportunity cost, the size of the subsidy would be 
much higher.
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A parallel problem related to current energy pricing in oil and gas produc-
ing countries—and in countries, such as Egypt, that are net importers of some 
fuels—is the medium- and long-term effect that current pricing policies have 
on these countries’ own domestic production, and hence on their future rev-
enue streams. Low domestic energy prices in many oil and gas producing coun-
tries provide a poor incentive for independent oil and gas companies to invest 
in new exploration and upstream development projects. Natural gas is the en-
ergy source most affected by domestic pricing policies—reflected in the poor 
fiscal terms offered to oil and gas companies considering investment opportu-
nities. This will become increasingly important as a larger proportion of Mid-
dle East oil and gas becomes more expensive to produce. The development of 
gas reserves has hence lagged decades behind the Middle East’s massive gas re-
source endowment undermining the long-term supply potential of the region.
The mena economies’ exceptionally high reliance on oil and natural gas—
tradable fossil fuels whose world market prices fluctuate significantly—has also 
made the region highly vulnerable to international commodity price cycles. 
Energy subsidies have also been shown to be strong, procyclical ‘destabilisers’ 
in oil- and gas-importing countries across mena, as government spending on 
subsidies increases during economic boom times along with  rising demand, 
and declines as economic activity falls (Sdralevich et al., 2014, 21–22; imf, 2013, 
37–40). Several studies have demonstrated the negative consequences of pro-
cyclical spending in developing economies (Lane, 2003; Abdih et al., 2010; 
Kaminsky et al. 2004; Erbil, 2011), including the effect of commodity cycles on 
political stability over the medium and long term.7
2.3 Energy Subsidies and Social Equity
The widespread use of energy subsidies in developing countries continues to 
be widely defended on the basis of social security and ensuring access to en-
ergy. However, energy subsidies are largely inequitable as they naturally accrue 
most to the largest users—energy-intensive industries and middle- to high- 
income households.8 Petroleum product subsidies in particular benefit pri-
marily the urban middle class, and households that can afford a car. In a recent 
study, the imf found that the poorest quintiles in Egypt, Jordan, Mauritania, 
Morocco, and Yemen receive only about 1–7 per cent of total diesel subsidies, 
while the richest quintiles receive subsidies to the tune of 42–77 per cent of 
7 E.g. Collier and Hoeffler (1998).
8 This also, where applicable, relates to natural gas/LPG. Kerosene, by contrast, tends to be 
proportionately consumed most by lower-income households, although substantial leakages 
exist to higher income groups. See e.g. Alderman (2002); Clements et al. (2003); Coady et 
al. (2006); Hope and Singh (1999).
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the total. In Egypt, the poorest 40 per cent of the population receives only 3 per 
cent of direct gasoline subsidies, 7 per cent of natural gas subsidies, and 10 per 
cent of diesel subsidies (Sdralevich et al., 2014).
Energy subsidies, many of which leak to higher income groups and indus-
tries, could otherwise have been invested in alternative channels—free public 
health and education, infrastructure improvements, or alternative tax reduc-
tions for small and medium-sized businesses. All these would provide sub-
stantially higher social and economic returns than perceived citizen benefits 
bound to energy consumption. Separate funds could have been spent targeting 
low-income households more effectively, for instance, through comprehensive 
social safety nets. In some mena countries, the size of energy subsidies rela-
tive to other forms of expenditure is staggering.9 In Egypt, total government 
expenditure on energy subsidies in 2008 equalled combined expenditure on 
health and education; as did fuel subsidies in Jordan prior to the country’s 2008 
reform of fuel prices. Yemen’s budgeted expenditure on fuel subsidies in 2008 
amounted to more than 34 per cent of total government expenditure—more 
than one and a-half times the expenditure on education and health combined 
(Breisinger et al., 2011).
The widespread use of energy subsidies also affects the rate of investment 
in the energy sector in parts of mena; the quality of coverage of different en-
ergy services, including fuel supply and electricity, consequently affects social 
groups differently. Caps on government subsidies paid to producers, or flat 
payment subsidies, often may not fully compensate domestic oil/gas produc-
ers, refineries, importers and distributors, and electricity producers for their 
incurred losses, and may undermine the rate of return on their investment. 
When funds are diverted away from state-owned enterprises and oil marketing 
companies and distributors, these companies will not be able to upgrade their 
internal capabilities, invest in new infrastructure, or shift to modern, cleaner, 
and more efficient technologies. The result is often the provision of low-quality 
services to end users, most visibly in the region’s electricity sector.
Recurring power outages have characterised electricity provision through-
out wide parts of mena, typically due to decade-long underinvestment in elec-
tricity generation and in transmission and distribution networks. In many parts 
of the Levant and the Gulf, this situation is further exacerbated by a culture 
9 The imf reports that in about half of mena countries, total pre-tax energy subsidies 
were higher than capital spending in 2011. In all oil exporters, total pre-tax energy subsi-
dies exceeded spending on education and on health, while in Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon 
spending on total pre-tax energy subsidies was higher than spending on capital, health, or 
education. In 2008, Egypt dedicated 11.93% of its gross annual expenditure to education, 
5.94% to health, and an estimated 17.85% to fuel subsidies. Fattouh and El-Katiri (2012b).
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of non-payment of utility bills by some parts of the population. Recurring 
blackouts, seen in recent years across many parts of the Levant, Iraq, Egypt, 
and perhaps most paradoxically in several Gulf Cooperation Council (gcc) 
member states (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United 
Arab Emirates (uae)), are just one of the most visible consequences of lagging 
new investment and insufficient capacity across many parts of mena. These 
blackouts proportionally affect middle-income households and small busi-
nesses significantly more than any other energy-consumer group. Long waiting 
times for new electricity connections for private households and businesses 
are often the consequence, resulting in annual losses in foregone business ac-
tivity and backup costs for the economies concerned (World Bank, 2008).
For some of the poorest parts of mena, however, the consequences of un-
derinvestment and a lack of electricity grid access are staggering. Lack of elec-
trification in remote areas can be seen primarily in Yemen and in some rural 
parts of Morocco. In Yemen, little more than half the population has access to 
electricity, as the chronically underfunded state utility has insufficient funds 
to invest in expanding the country’s electricity grid and generation capacity 
(Breisinger et al., 2011; El-Katiri and Fattouh, 2011). Of those households with 
electricity access, which are entirely concentrated in the wealthier former 
North, nearly 70 per cent are on ‘lifeline rates’, supposedly enabling electricity 
access for low-income households. Yemen’s case painfully illustrates the highly 
regressive nature of energy subsidies.
Continued significant fuel price differences between neighbouring coun-
tries in mena, owing to different subsidy regimes, have also incentivised large-
scale fuel smuggling across borders. Fuel smuggling has been of particular 
concern among neighbouring countries in the Levant, such as Syria, Jordan, 
and Lebanon; between Egypt and the Palestinian territories; across the closed 
borders between Algeria and Morocco and between Tunisia and Libya (result-
ing from the 2011 uprisings) (Algerie dz, 2008; France 24, 2011); into and from 
Iraq and neighbouring countries; and from and to Yemen (Wahab, 2006; Ibra-
him, 2011). Iran, with (up to end-2010) some of the world’s lowest prices for fuel, 
has suffered from endemic cross-border fuel smuggling to all its neighbours, a 
problem also incurred by other Gulf States (Arab Times, 2011). Fuel smuggling 
not only contributes to illegal contraband trade at the expense of the domes-
tic economy, but in many cases substantially exacerbates existing fuel short-
ages in subsidising countries, as seen most recently in Yemen (mees, 2014h; 
Ghobari and El Gamal, 2014).
2.4 Energy Subsidies and Domestic Energy Consumption
While high revenues and foreign assets are currently shielding many of the 
mena region’s larger oil and gas exporters in the short term, energy exporters 
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face a longer-term challenge related to the way in which their current pricing 
policies affect their domestic energy consumption. The pivotal role played 
by national hydrocarbon resources in the development of many large mena 
oil and gas producers has deeply affected the way energy features as a critical 
component in the citizen–state relationship. Oil wealth has facilitated much of 
the modern-day socio-economic development in the region, particularly that 
of the very oil-rich Gulf monarchies. Rather than engaging in more democratic 
forms of government, many of these countries’ traditional political systems are 
based on the state’s central role as a distributor or allocator of wealth in return 
for political legitimacy (Luciani, 1987; El-Katiri, 2013a).
The perceived abundance of energy resources, guaranteed by the state, and 
coupled to the state’s role as a provider for its citizens, has historically been 
enshrined in some of the world’s lowest prices for fuel, natural gas, and elec-
tricity. These in-kind citizen benefits, which also fuelled many oil producers’ 
industrial expansion towards energy-intensive industries during the 1960s and 
1970s, are supplemented by often generous welfare systems that have become 
an effective element in these states’ political stability over several decades.
Low domestic energy prices have led to a surge in regional energy con-
sumption—beyond the influence of such factors as economic and population 
growth. With regional energy consumption having more than quadrupled in 
less than 30 years (authors’ calculations based on World Bank, 2014), the mena 
region is now one of the world’s fastest growing energy markets, and is forecast 
to become the second most important driving force of global energy demand 
after Asia in the period to 2040 (iea, 2011; eia, 2011). Saudi Arabia is already the 
world’s twelfth-largest energy consumer, and the sixth-largest consumer of oil 
and natural gas, with oil consumption alone having more than doubled over 
the past ten years (based on bp and eia statistics). Other large regional oil and 
gas producers in the Gulf follow this pattern, albeit with smaller populations, 
and are leading the world’s league tables in terms of per capita living standards.
The fiscal problems arising from current consumption patterns that remain 
tied to current pricing policies in mena’s oil and gas producers in the long 
term are related to the way in which most of these states finance their spend-
ing. Many of these countries do not tax their domestic citizens, but finance 
themselves to an overwhelming extent on the basis of export revenues for their 
valuable oil and natural gas resources—the level of this dependence ranges 
from around 60 per cent of total government revenues in Qatar to over 90 per 
cent in countries such as Libya, Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia (Fattouh and 
El-Katiri, 2012a, 3). A further increase in already generous welfare handouts 
(for background, see El-Katiri, L., 2013a; El-Katiri, M., 2013; Gause iii, 2013) has 
also allowed the oil- and gas-rich Gulf monarchies to avoid Arab Spring-style 
political upheaval. This modus operandi works as long as sufficient volumes 
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of hydrocarbon exports are available. However, some studies have shown that 
under the business-as-usual scenario (where domestic demand keeps increas-
ing at a robust pace and the gcc governments fail to diversify their economies) 
export capability could be eroded, leading to a collapse of these countries’ rev-
enue base, with detrimental political consequences.10 Recent falling oil prices, 
if they persist, will make the need for an adjustment of spending patterns (in-
cluding a reform of energy subsidies) increasingly urgent.
The mena region’s low energy prices have also had many unintended con-
sequences, including the very high and (countering trends virtually every-
where else in the world) rising energy intensity of mena economies, meaning 
that more energy per unit of economic output is needed in these economies 
than anywhere else in the world.11 This is partly because the concentration of 
economic activity around energy-intensive industries in mena’s oil-producing 
countries has diverted much investment from other economic sectors. Howev-
er, the high energy intensity of mena economies is also due to inefficiencies in 
energy use across the region.12 A recent abb study, comparing energy efficien-
cy rates in power generation across a range of countries globally, shows that 
mena energy producers such as the uae, Libya and Saudi Arabia are among the 
world’s least energy-efficient countries in terms of domestic power generation 
10 Simulations of Saudi Arabia’s domestic oil demand, such as those conducted by Chatham 
House and Citibank, show the potential for Saudi Arabia—under a business-as-usual 
 scenario—to exhaust its own domestic reserve base in just 15–20 years, turning itself ulti-
mately into a net importer of oil, unless alternative policy options are pursued. (Lahn and 
Stevens, 2011; Daya and El Baltaji, 2012). See also El-Katiri, L. (2013b).
11 Total primary energy consumption per dollar of gdp (an indicator of energy intensity) 
over the past three decades has declined in all parts of the world, with the exception 
of mena. Energy intensity growth rates in several mena economies, including the uae, 
Saudi Arabia and Oman, have risen particularly fast, more than tripling in the uae and 
Saudi Arabia since 1980. This growth is not a Gulf phenomenon alone, however; energy 
intensity in several other economies, including Jordan, Egypt and Syria, also increased by 
more than a third over the same time period. Egypt and several Mashreq economies—
including Jordan—whose industries are generally less energy intensive, still require over 
40% more energy per unit of economic output than do some of the world’s less energy-
intensive economies, such as Denmark or Spain. Fattouh and El-Katiri (2013).
12 In a recent article, Prince Abdulaziz Bin Salman Al-Saud argues that ‘Although this growth 
in demand is partially attributed to the industrial growth and growing economic prosper-
ity in the kingdom, a rather significant portion of it results from the inefficient use of ener-
gy; deeming this accelerated growth unsustainable. Whereas the vast majority of countries 
have managed to lower the energy intensity of their economies, the kingdom’s energy in-
tensity increased significantly over the last two decades. Hence, it is a strategic imperative 
for the kingdom that energy efficiency becomes a major topic for all decisions related to an 
increase in demand for fuel and feedstock’. (Al-Saud, Prince Abdulaziz Bin Salman, 2014, 4).
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(abb, 2014). However, mena’s net-importers of energy, including Jordan, Leba-
non and Morocco, fare little better, comparing unfavourably to other develop-
ing economies, including those in Latin America. Similar conclusions apply to 
the region’s rapidly growing transport sector, where average fuel consumption 
per vehicle across the Middle East is more than twice the average of countries 
without fuel subsidies.13
Low energy prices for regionally produced oil and natural gas have also af-
fected the composition of the mena economies’ domestic energy mix. While 
these economies have historically not faced the same incentives as consumer 
countries in Europe and North America to diversify their domestic energy 
mix away from fossil fuels (for domestic energy security reasons) they may 
well have overlooked the economic potential of alternative energies such as 
renewable energy sources and nuclear power, given the influence of some of 
the world’s lowest domestic prices for fossil fuels (El-Katiri, 2014; El-Katiri and 
Husain, 2014). As a result, the mena economies remain dependent on oil and 
natural gas for a staggering 95 per cent of their domestic energy needs; more 
than any other region in the world (El-Katiri (2014) based on World Bank (2014) 
data). Their lack of diversity in domestic energy sources has left many mena 
energy importers exceptionally exposed to commodity price cycles and to 
surging world market prices for oil and natural gas.
Recent evidence from Kuwait shows that a realignment of prices at, or clos-
er to, the market price level confers a benefit on current and future generations 
of Kuwaitis (in terms of fiscal savings) that outweighs the impact of raising 
consumers’ electricity and water prices to market price levels.14 Such studies 
also underline the tremendous potential for economic savings to be made, in-
cluding through the reduction of deadweight loss.
3 Reforming Energy Subsidies in mena
Although energy subsidies are an inefficient and regressive distribution meth-
od, their reduction or elimination is a delicate economic and political task that 
13 Notably, the Middle East region in this context includes Iran, which until 2010 was widely 
cited as the single largest subsidiser of domestic fuels in the world. (Bressand et al., 2007).
14 See Fattouh and Mahadeva (2014). The authors show that in the market price scenario 
with consumer prices at about ten times current levels, there is a total fiscal cost of about 
a third of the value of fuel input used in the power sector (or about 1.5% of gdp), entirely 
due to the cash transfer. This, however, is just less than a fifth of the fiscal cost of the cur-
rent low-price regime, and in principle represents a massive saving. The net benefit of 
moving to market prices is 6.3% of gdp.
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requires considerable skill and political will. Without appropriate compensa-
tory programmes and without effective state capacity to provide public goods 
such as public transport networks and social welfare for the poorer segments 
of a society, energy price increases following reform will impact real incomes 
and could become a very potent source of public anger and social unrest. Nota-
bly, energy pricing reform affects not only the poor, but also the mena region’s 
aspiring middle class, and the region’s industries. This is all the more concern-
ing for oil and gas producing countries, whose industrial base is often highly 
energy intensive, and for whose populations the ownership of a car is a critical 
sign of social progress.
The economic lock-in effect of energy subsidies in mena countries is fur-
ther reinforced by strong coalition-building by groups who benefit from 
 current pricing systems—in particular industrial groups, but also members 
of current sociopolitical elites, who tend to have little interest in supporting 
public spending reforms. The Arab Spring affected the region’s political cli-
mate, deterring meaningful reform of domestic energy pricing policies across 
the mena region due to widespread government concern that the fear of ris-
ing living costs, associated with subsidy reform, could stir up further popular 
discontent. Nevertheless, reform efforts have become much more common in 
mena than expected, providing a wealth of experience around the ‘how and 
when’ of regional subsidy reform (Sdralevich et al., 2014, 44–55).
3.1 Gradual Reform Efforts in the Levant and North Africa
Fear of incitement of a popular backlash has kept those mena countries that 
were largely unaffected by Arab Spring-style unrest cautious of energy pricing 
reform. In spite of remaining largely unaffected by street protests, in compari-
son with countries such as Egypt and Tunisia, Morocco and Jordan both rolled 
back reforms following the ousting of the Tunisian and Egyptian presidencies 
in 2011 and the outbreak of political protest across many other parts of the re-
gion. Both Morocco and Jordan are imf debtors who, a few years previously, had 
initiated tentative reforms to reduce domestic energy subsidies. Jordan had, 
for instance, made several attempts to reform the domestic prices of food and 
energy—in 2008 its government announced a programme of domestic energy 
price liberalisation. However, the reform stalled and was reversed in January 
2011, when the government decided to cut food and fuel prices in response to 
political protests seen in neighbouring countries. In an unexpected gesture of 
cross-regional solidarity between Arab monarchies, the wealthy gcc states ex-
tended an invitation to the kingdoms of Morocco and Jordan to join the Gulf Co-
operation Council, and subsequently increased their level of assistance to both 
countries, in the form of advantageous loans and unconditional development 
aid. This helped both countries initially withstand calls from international 
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lending organisations for further fiscal reforms (mees, 2011; mees, 2012a; 
mees, 2013; mees, 2014e).
A year on from the Arab Spring, however, domestic energy subsidy reform 
was back on the agendas of several North African and Levantine energy im-
porters. Jordan’s rapidly rising fuel imports—partly due to declining gas im-
ports from Egypt, which has since been struggling to supply its own domestic 
market—subsequently contributed to a skyrocketing energy subsidy bill that 
eventually reached 40 per cent of total government spending. Faced with lim-
ited room for manoeuvre, the Jordanian government was forced to curb pub-
lic spending significantly—including that on fuel subsidies—as part of a usd 
2.05 billion standby arrangement with the imf; one aim of this arrangement 
was to help the kingdom recover from the economic strains associated with 
the mass inflow of Syrian refugees, a result of the political crisis in neighbour-
ing Syria (mees, 2012c). But Jordan’s reform efforts were not exclusively ex-
ternally driven; the repercussions of the Arab Spring had made fiscal reforms 
practically unavoidable if political and economic stability were to be main-
tained. This was a small but significant turning point in the way in which many 
governments have since come to see energy subsidy reform.
Jordan’s November 2012 decision to gradually lift all petroleum product 
subsidies—later followed by the lifting of lpg and electricity subsidies—was 
painful, and faced considerable opposition both in parliament and on Am-
man’s streets. Street chants denouncing the Jordanian king led to a series of 
confrontations between protesters and the police. Having withstood this initial 
opposition, Jordan has since progressed with its reforms, following a gradual 
drying-up of popular opposition to them. The government’s response included 
a series of television and newspaper interviews underlining the government’s 
need to reduce the burden of subsidies, or otherwise ‘face catastrophe and 
insolvency’.15 In an effort to mitigate the effects of fuel price increases on Jor-
danian families, the government announced that within a week of the reform 
poor Jordanian households (below an annual household income of usd 14,100 
(Jordanian dinar ( jod) 10,000)) would receive a direct cash handout of usd 
99 ( jod 70); in effect around 70 per cent of the population would receive cash 
transfers. Electricity tariffs for individual economic sectors and high-income 
households have been increased a further three times since May 2012—part 
of a strategy to ensure the return of the National Electric Power Company 
nepco, Jordan’s national electric power company, to cost recovery over the 
medium term.
15 Prime Minister Abd Allah al-Nusur said, ‘If the move [had been] delayed, we would have 
faced a catastrophe and insolvency’. (mees, 2012c).
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The interim results of the reform have been largely positive; alongside other 
fiscal reforms, energy subsidy reforms helped reduce the Jordanian govern-
ment’s deficit from 14.5 per cent of gdp in 2011 to around 8.3 per cent of gdp in 
2014. As a result, Jordan’s access to lending from international capital markets 
has markedly improved (imf, 2014a).
Morocco decided to freeze energy prices in 2011 in spite of the high and ris-
ing level of global oil prices and the country’s dependence on imported en-
ergy for virtually all of its domestic energy needs. The move came largely as a 
direct response to popular protests in neighbouring North African countries 
and to—in small numbers and for a short period of time—protests on its own 
streets. This decision soon led to a rapidly ballooning energy subsidy bill. By 
the end of 2012, Morocco’s energy subsidy bill had become
… almost the size of the overall fiscal deficit, as much as spending on 
investment, and more than the spending on health and education 
combined.
imf, �0�4b, �6
An initial round of energy price rises reduced the cost of subsidies by nearly 
half to—still—around usd 4.1 billion, or 10 per cent of government spend-
ing in 2013 (mees, 2014f). Agreeing with the imf to reduce the fiscal burden 
of subsidies in return for a usd 6.2 billion imf Precautionary and Liquidity 
Line in August 2012, Morocco announced far-reaching domestic pricing re-
form for petroleum products between late 2013 and early 2014. Morocco’s case 
is interesting as it is one of the few mena countries that not only raised prices 
for domestic fuel products, but actually linked them on a permanent basis to 
international prices. Price adjustments are made twice monthly by the Minis-
try of General Affairs and Governance, independently from the ministries of 
Energy and of Electricity.16
In order to avoid any political backlash from this reform effort (having faced 
mass popular protests during the 1980s when it attempted to raise prices for 
basic foodstuffs), Morocco implemented a comprehensive and fairly well- 
orchestrated communication strategy to accompany the reform. This includ-
ed public tv and radio discussions, newspaper articles, advertisements, and 
debates explaining in remarkable and easily understood detail the economic 
reasons for the reform of prices, the different reform steps, the reason for link-
ing prices to a regularly reviewed international price index, and the multiple 
16 For the law governing this arrangement, see Royaume du Maroc (2013).
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benefits of reform to society as a whole17 (including the availability of more 
money for investment elsewhere18). The government also assured the popula-
tion of what benefits would remain: electricity prices, already among the re-
gion’s highest, initially remained unchanged, but were increased in July 2014 
(nearly a year after the indexation system was launched) as part of the govern-
ment’s restructuring of the Office National de l’électricité (one); while lpg, 
used  primarily as a cooking and heating fuel in Moroccan households, remains 
heavily subsidised.
The reform clearly targeted those people who, supposedly, could afford 
higher prices: industrial consumers, factories, and car drivers. Finally, the gov-
ernment emphasised that price indexation offered a fair deal on both sides: 
prices could increase, but would also fall when international prices decreased. 
The Moroccan reform effort was not met with a public outcry, and subse-
quently went largely unnoticed by international media. Key to enabling this 
notable success has been two consecutive governments that, despite varying 
party interests, were willing and able to build the necessary coalitions to enact 
the price increases, despite opposing views within their own ranks. The coun-
try’s moderate Islamic party, the Parti de la justice et du développement (pjd), 
has notably been instrumental in rallying support for the reform, both within 
government and among the population. Morocco’s total subsidies—including 
food, which had peaked in 2012 at 6.6 per cent of gdp, fell to around 3.9 per 
cent of gdp in 2013 (Verme et al., 2014).
3.2 Yemen’s Failed Reform Efforts
Yemen illustrates the converse case, of domestic pricing reform efforts that 
have largely failed over several years. While these policies have been revised 
over time, in the most recent conflict they have proven to be additionally de-
stabilising in an already heated political situation. By the end of 2010, subsidies 
for liquid fuels, lpg, and electricity had usurped around a third of state spend-
ing, more than the country’s combined spending on health and education 
(Fattouh and El-Katiri, 2012b, 49). Yemen’s subsidies overwhelmingly benefited 
the country’s urban upper and middle classes, who have access to transport, 
17 For an example of how the French-speaking urban middle classes were targeted, see 
Agueniou (2013).
18 A study of some past Moroccan publications aimed at younger audiences illustrates the 
government’s line of argument. In Jeune Afrique, Ahmed Lahlimi, head of Morocco’s High 
Planning Commission, cited the volume of petroleum product subsidies across several 
North and sub-Saharan African countries, concluding ‘C’est effectivement problématique 
car cela représente autant d’investissements en moins pour le pays’. (Author’s translation: 
‘[“These amounts of expenditure on fuel subsidies”] are highly problematic since they 
represent foregone investment’) (Ballong, 2010).
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energy, and infrastructure links. Even today, around half the country (primar-
ily the former South and the geographically remote provinces across Yemen’s 
northern borders) lacks infrastructure; formal, price-controlled markets; and 
the ability to access the country’s highly subsidised electricity grid.19 Yemen’s 
severely deteriorating domestic security situation prior to and following the 
onset of the Arab Spring has led to a further deterioration in the country’s fi-
nances. An increasing number of attacks on its oil and gas infrastructure have 
halted the country’s hydrocarbon exports, adding to pre-existing domestic fuel 
shortages (mees, 2014i; Saeed, 2014; mees, 2014g).
Having had to import rising volumes of fuel products to cover shortfalls in 
domestic production, fiscal pressure on Yemen reached unprecedented levels; 
in a hasty and ill-prepared reform effort in July 2014, the country was forced 
(under intense pressure from lenders) to raise domestic energy prices. Amidst 
political turmoil, daily demonstrations in the streets of Sanaa and continued 
violent conflict between tribal groups and the central government in several 
provinces (many of which remain isolated from any electricity or fuel supply), 
the government’s decision to raise domestic energy prices was seen as a further 
failure by the state to provide for its citizens (Abdullah, 2014). Yemen’s weak 
central state has subsequently been unable to withstand pressure from non-
state groups—notably the Houthis—for a swift reversal of initial reform efforts 
(Security Council, 2014). This underlines the difficulty, if not impossibility, of 
reforming energy pricing once a state has failed fiscally and politically and has 
lost its credibility, and once its citizens’ faith in its capabilities has collapsed.
Yemen’s case also illustrates the enormous challenges that the region’s weak 
states face in implementing subsidy reform. With the complex interrelation-
ship between energy subsidies and economic efficiency, and the difficulty of 
communicating the value of suffering short-term pain (removal of energy sub-
sidies) versus the desirability of achieving long-term gain (economic growth) to 
their populations, weak states are clearly in no position to reform energy subsi-
dies. Even more so when they are faced with the need to respond to fiscal pres-
sures, rather than being in a position to present a credible set of reforms that are 
aimed at improving people’s livelihoods over the medium and long term. This 
difficulty, experienced by Yemen, is reflected in other contexts. For instance, Al-
Khatteeb and Istepanian describe the fear of reform in the case of Iraq, writing:
There was and still remains a general fear among the Iraqi officials that 
any radical economic reforms, such as the elimination of subsidies for 
basic necessities like kerosene, cooking gas, electricity, and food rations 
19 El-Katiri and Fattouh (2011, 30–40) give an overview of access to electricity and different 
fuels across Yemen’s provinces and income groups.
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would be faced with strong opposition by the public and might cause 
widespread rioting, destabilizing an already fragile political process.
al-khatteeb and istepanian, �0�5, 4
3.3 Egypt’s 2014 Five-to-Midnight Reform
Egypt offers an interesting counterexample to the Yemeni case. Having expe-
rienced political turmoil as part of the Arab Spring through not one but two 
subsequent changes of government, in addition to transitory government 
and years of instability, Egypt has nevertheless carried out a series of fuel and 
electricity price reforms since the election of President General al-Sisi. Fiscal 
 pressure resulting from the country’s spending on subsidies has been the main 
factor pushing Egypt’s new government to engage in these reform efforts, de-
spite the risk of popular unrest.20
While Egypt’s July 2014 price hikes on most petroleum products were steep 
(up to 70 per cent price increases overnight),21 they have also been fairly suc-
cessful in reducing the country’s spending on oil subsidies (down to less than 7 
per cent of total government spending in the planned budget for 2015/16, from 
a figure of 20 per cent back in 2012/13) (mees, 2015).22 However, whilst spend-
ing on oil subsidies has fallen, spending on electricity subsidies has risen. Initial 
figures suggest that electricity subsidies are set to cost Egypt an estimated usd 
3.42 billion (egp 24.6 billion) for the fiscal year 2014/15, up 85 per cent on the 
2013/14 figure of usd 1.84 billion (egp 13.3 billion), though somewhat down on 
the original 2014/15 budget figure of usd 3.78 billion (egp 27.2 billion) (mees, 
2015). The process of phasing the subsidy out is thus likely to be lengthy, al-
though the government has been ambiguous on the timing and nature of 
future price rises.23 In addition, Egypt’s declining natural gas production has 
meant that the country has had to import growing volumes of internationally 
sourced lng, while natural gas continues to be sold to domestic consumers at 
prices far below the import cost.
20 For a background to Egypt’s unfolding energy problem during the first decade of the 
twenty-first century, see Darbouche and Mabro (2011).
21 Diesel prices increased by 64%, gasoline 80 by 77%, and gasoline 92 by 41%. However, 
these prices are still very low by international standards. See mees (2014b).
22 Naturally, the decline in international prices for oil has also contributed towards this re-
duction in spending on subsidies.
23 According to the Financial Times the Egyptian government plans to phase out electricity 
subsidies over five years. The case of products is less clear, but the Minister of Planning 
has been quoted as saying that ‘In five years fuel will be offered at 80 per cent of its real 
cost to sections of the population which are deemed to need subsidies, the rest will pay 
market prices’. (Saleh, 2014).
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These recent reform measures are bold by any standard, especially so in light 
of the political and social instability still engulfing Egypt, and reveal the extent 
of fiscal pressures and the limited choices faced by the Egyptian government. 
Defying many analysts’ predictions, these price hikes, though very steep, have 
not resulted in mass protests and civil unrest.24 Part of the reason for this re-
lates to timing. The reform measures were announced following a wave of na-
tionalist fervour that saw President al-Sisi assume power, with strong support 
from his base for the onslaught against the Muslim Brotherhood. The violent 
crackdown on both the brotherhood and public protests may also have dis-
couraged people from demonstrating. With hopes for a more stable future, for 
many Egyptians the prospect of paying higher prices for energy was arguably 
the lesser evil compared with the disastrous economic consequences of yet 
more political turmoil. The al-Sisi government may also have benefited from a 
much higher level of credibility than previous governments, promising a fairer 
socio-economic system and tying the reform of fuel and electricity prices to 
the unmistakeable need for financial resources to be used on essential services 
such as health and education. President al-Sisi, and Prime Minister Ibrahim 
Mahlab have been key proponents of the reforms, and have been personally 
engaged in communicating their necessity, using a series of media interviews 
to emphasise the need for common sacrifices in order to make Egypt ‘great 
again’ (Al Bawaba, 2014; Mubashir Misr, 2014).
While such factors can partly explain the muted response on the streets, the 
energy reforms’ success will depend on the government’s ability to introduce 
measures to mitigate the impact of high energy prices for the most vulnerable 
groups in society. Some such measures have, indeed, been introduced—the 
government freezing the prices of publicly distributed bread, rice, sugar, tea, 
flour and oil. The government has also expanded the food subsidy system, ap-
plying discounts to the prices of additional products such as meat and chicken. 
The price of lpg (widely used by low-income households) was not raised in 
the latest wave of reforms. Yet despite these mitigating measures, there is deep 
frustration among Egypt’s low- and middle-income households related to the 
higher costs of living due to the price hikes. There is also scepticism about the 
government’s ability to translate savings made thanks to the reforms into real 
benefits for the population (Rashwan, 2014).
Although the Egyptian government can be relieved that its initial reform 
steps did not cause mass protests, the road is long and key challenges remain. 
24 There have been some small-scale protests and strikes (taxi drivers), but these were not 




Experience in other countries shows there is always the risk that the pace of re-
form slows down, or even that reforms are reversed. The government therefore 
needs to strengthen its currently highly ineffective social protection schemes 
and safety nets. For instance, in the case of ration cards, the World Bank has 
found that eligibility criteria (such as being retired or a public sector employee) 
are not pro-poor, leaving poor Egyptians less eligible for a high-subsidy ration 
card than are non-poor Egyptians. Also, these regressive eligibility criteria are 
not well enforced—more than two-thirds of those holding high-subsidy ration 
cards do not meet the requisite criteria to do so.25 The Egyptian  government 
also has to establish credible commitments, including measures in areas such 
as public transport and infrastructure investment, laying the ground for the 
sound implementation of future price reforms.
Another issue to consider in the Egyptian case is the continued level of reg-
ulatory intervention in energy markets as a whole, given that Egypt has been 
adjusting prices on an ad hoc basis with no apparent plan in mind for future 
reform steps. One rationale for the current wave of reforms is that it will pro-
vide the government with the fiscal space needed to increase investment in 
public infrastructure and improve key services. In the absence of regular price 
adjustments, however, fluctuations in international energy prices may quickly 
erode current fiscal gains, further reducing the funds available for mitigation 
measures and public investment. For instance, the savings Egypt has made in 
the area of oil subsidies have partly resulted from the collapse of international 
oil prices since July 2014. Higher prices would reverse some of these savings 
and could force the government to adjust prices by engaging in highly visible 
political interventions, rather than by applying an automatic mechanism that 
helps reduce fuel subsidies.
3.4 The Iranian Reform Experience
Iran’s targeted subsidy reform, initiated in 2010, is one of the most interest-
ing cases the region has to offer. It is all the more significant as it has been 
conducted by a large oil and gas producing state that has, in the past, been 
perceived to be the most immune to calls for the rationalisation of domestic 
energy prices. The reform followed more than a decade of political controversy 
with regards to Iran’s domestic oil prices, which were then among the lowest in 
the world. Surging domestic demand for energy, following more than a decade 
25 Households in the top quintile receive subsidies of around 20% on the rationed products, 
compared with less than 16% for the lowest quintile. In terms of coverage, a third of the 
poor do not have ration cards, excluding them from the benefits of ration card subsidies. 
(World Bank, 2005).
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of international sanctions that had severely affected Iran’s ability to produce 
from its enormous reserve base, had left the world’s largest reserve holder of 
natural gas reliant on top-up imports to avoid power shortages and load shed-
ding. Iran’s domestic subsidy burden, measured on the basis of opportunity 
cost, was estimated to be around usd 100 billion by 2010, an amount that ex-
ceeded the country’s annual revenues from oil exports—at the time—of usd 
70–80 billion (Guillaume et al., 2011, 4; Energy Compass, 2011; Tabatabai, 2011).
Iran’s initial energy subsidy reform step, in December 2010, was estimated 
to have removed around usd 50–60 billion worth of subsidies (around 15 
per cent of gdp) based on average 2010 international selling prices; this was 
achieved by dramatically raising the prices of such items as gasoline (300 per 
cent), natural gas (50 per cent), and diesel (900 per cent), virtually overnight 
(Energy Compass, 2011; Argus, 2013a). Within five years (coinciding with the 
country’s Five-Year Plan) Iran’s domestic energy prices should have risen to 90 
per cent of their international market value. The architects of Iran’s subsidy 
reform have been clear that price increases should be meaningful, in order to 
reduce demand effectively. Moreover, as outlined by some observers:
… relatively small domestic price increases could be rapidly eroded in 
real term by domestic inflation, an increase in international prices, or 
exchange rate depreciation.
guillaume et al., �0��, ��
Finally, a front-loaded reform resulting in fast, large savings was a key require-
ment for the implementation of the Iranian government’s single most impor-
tant mitigation effort—a compensatory cash transfer system.
An essential part of Iran’s strategy from the beginning was the redistribution, 
via cash grants, of proceeds generated by the reforms to different elements in 
the economy. Initial plans in 2010/11 included specific allocation targets: 30 per 
cent to domestic industries, in cash, to help them adjust to a gradually higher 
pricing environment (enabling energy efficiency-enhancing investments); 20 
per cent to government institutions for similar adjustments; and 50 per cent 
to citizens, in the form of cash grants, to compensate households for generally 
higher living costs (Guillaume et al., 2011, 10). An initial plan to target lower- 
income households with these cash transfers proved unworkable, so the gov-
ernment moved on to a universal cash transfer system with sums paid per adult 
to the head of each household. The sum—on average usd 180 for a household 
of four during the first six months of the reform—amounted to around half of 
the nation’s minimum wage: a substantial benefit, particularly for those on low 
incomes (Tabatabai, 2011, 15).
El-Katiri and Fattouh78
<UN>
To further reduce the risk of widespread protest following these bold price 
rises, Iran’s reform efforts were accompanied by a meticulously planned and 
executed public communication strategy, run by a government-appointed 
spokesman. Iranian news media (television, radio, websites and newspapers) 
and political, business, and social leaders and academics were all mobilised 
to speak in favour of the reform and to outline its many benefits to Iranian 
society. The campaign placed special emphasis on the background to the 
transformation—the enormous waste of Iranian natural and financial resources 
caused by the subsidy regime and the fact that the rich rather than the poor 
benefited most. The expected gains were also explained in detail—a universal 
cash transfer benefiting many poor households (Guillaume et al., 2011, 17–19; 
 Tabatabai, 2011, 18–19). The entire communication strategy emphasised the 
shift of subsidies from products to people, a policy that would improve social 
equity, industrial competitiveness and economic diversification. To further 
counter the risks associated with the reform, the government widely adver-
tised its policy of actively using monetary policy to counteract inflationary 
risks; prior to the reform, it also built up large stockpiles of basic goods to avoid 
bunkering and panic buying (Guillaume et al., 2011, 11).
Iran’s subsidy reform has not been without complications. International 
sanctions (tightened significantly, and acting as a considerable restriction on 
oil exports since mid-2012), and the accompanying steep fall in the country’s 
currency exchange rate, have created a surge in Iranian living costs and signifi-
cantly complicated the efforts towards transformation; a second phase of the 
subsidy reform, planned for October 2012, has been suspended (mees, 2012b).
In the run-up to presidential elections in 2013, the clear political value of 
Iran’s cash transfer system also meant that the system—intended only initially 
to be universal—became a major issue in a political tug of war between differ-
ent camps. Iranian politicians and oil and gas business leaders criticised the 
country for continuing to pay near-universal cash transfers that the system was 
increasingly unable to afford—the popularity of the scheme had seen the gov-
ernment keep handing out universal transfers at levels that soon exceeded the 
net savings it was making, with little left for other intended recipients such as 
industry.26
A new round of price increases, coupled with a reduction in monthly 
cash transfers to households, was initiated in early 2014, with the intention 
26 Iran’s Oil Minister, Bijan Namdar Zanganeh, has vociferously criticised Iran’s cash transfer 
system, saying the Iranian oil and gas sector (from which the majority of revenues for the 
system come) could not afford to pay the handouts that were increasingly threatening 
domestic, upstream and refining companies’ development projects (Argus, 2013a; Argus, 
2013b).
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of achieving combined savings of around usd 19.1 billion in the Iranian year 
2014/15 (mees, 2014c; mees, 2014d).
A systematic evaluation of the impact of Iran’s price reform on consump-
tion is difficult due to the presence of various other factors including the inten-
sification of international sanctions against the country in mid-2012; sanctions 
that have affected Iran’s oil exports. Furthermore, demand for electricity, and 
for natural gas in particular, are highly supply-driven, implying that shortfalls 
in the supply of these commodities in some provinces may translate into re-
duced demand growth even where price effects would not have indicated a 
steep fall in consumption. Among Iranian observers, some general agreement 
has emerged that the initial energy price rises in 2010 reduced fuel product and 
natural gas demand significantly in the following months, although the effect 
in subsequent months is less clear (iod, 2011; Amuzegar, 2012). The main les-
son to draw from the Iranian case, however, is the political feasibility of even a 
radical reform process if it is accompanied by sufficient planning, and makes 
use of an approach that provides a credible reform framework in the form of 
government commitments to facilitating the switch towards greater energy ef-
ficiency, coupled to a well-designed mitigation scheme that offers cash, rather 
than in-kind, benefits.
4 Conclusions
The reform of energy subsidies in mena remains an economically and politi-
cally delicate task, one from which many of the region’s governments still shy 
away, for several reasons. The Arab Spring has added a further, interesting vari-
able to the region’s energy subsidy dilemma, for it has instilled in many of the 
region’s governments an even greater fear of the Arab street, including in coun-
tries that have remained largely unaffected by the political turmoil that has un-
folded across the region since late 2010. Initially a complicating factor that has 
significantly delayed plans for energy pricing reform in the region since that 
turmoil began, the lessons of the Arab Spring could also provide an important 
underlying measurement against which governments can systematically reas-
sess the way they spend national resources within their domestic economies, 
and a way of both the poor and the middle class receiving a better deal than 
has been offered in the past.27
27 Some recent, country-focused papers have started to explore various avenues for change 
(Kandil, 2010; Verme et al. 2014; World Bank, 2011). Verme et al. (2014) specifically model 
the effect a further subsidy reduction, combined with a universal cash grant, could have 
on poverty levels in Morocco.
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In the short term, however, rather than questions of wider social justice, 
the energy subsidy reform agenda in mena will likely be dominated by ques-
tions of fiscal sustainability. The manner in which the fiscal burden of energy 
subsidies has spiralled out of control in recent years will render their reform 
increasingly unavoidable in a growing number of mena economies—mainly 
energy importers and small-sized oil and gas producers such as Jordan, Leba-
non, Egypt, Syria and Yemen. This is undoubtedly the most unsatisfactory path 
towards reform, and the long-term success of current policies—most of which 
have been implemented on an ad hoc basis under pressure from international 
lending organisations at times of severely compromised government capac-
ity in a number of conflict-ridden mena states—stands in marked contrast to 
the more desirable objective of comprehensively overhauling social security 
and equity issues throughout the mena region. Striking the right balance be-
tween these parallel objectives will undoubtedly prove critical to determining 
the eventual success of energy subsidy reform, beyond mere fiscal savings for 
cash-strapped governments.
The importance of government credibility and capacity to mitigate the neg-
ative effects of energy subsidy reform on domestic customers has been made 
painfully clear in cases where energy price reforms have led to counterproduc-
tive outcomes, which has been the case—for example—in Yemen. The Yemeni 
case, as well as positive examples of reform efforts in countries such as Jordan, 
Morocco, Egypt and Iran, suggests that it is better to reform energy subsidies 
before a political or economic crisis point is reached. The fiscal discipline re-
quired for such endeavours may still prevent many mena governments from 
initiating such comprehensive fiscal reform efforts proactively, and without 
immediate pressure from international lending bodies. In the medium and 
long terms, however, rationalising the way in which energy and fiscal resources 
are spent domestically will become an ever more critical element in ensuring 
the political and economic stability that these states ultimately seek.
The Iranian example is an important one, as it has demonstrated that a re-
form of domestic energy pricing can be economically and politically feasible 
for large oil and gas producers. Iran’s unique features—including a large, het-
erogeneous population and geography, relatively large gaps between rich and 
poor, and additional complicating factors such as the presence of intensify-
ing international sanctions—further strengthen the country’s experience as a 
case in point. Many of the Gulf ’s other oil and gas producers—wealthy both in 
absolute and per capita terms—are equipped with even more powerful fiscal 
resources with which to enact the necessary mitigation measures to ensure a 
more rational use of their valuable oil and gas resources over the long term. 
In this context, the uae’s August 2015 move to deregulate domestic fuel prices 
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sends an encouraging message in view both of the consistency with which the 
reform has been carried out, and the complete absence of any political turmoil 
during the first round of gasoline price increases (of up to almost 25 per cent) 
(The National, 2015). In view of the need for many more of the region’s govern-
ments to accommodate the rising economic and political aspirations of their 
populations (which are becoming increasingly younger and better educated), 
the reform of energy pricing mechanisms, together with the provision of more 
effectively targeted benefits for their citizens, should arguably be an urgent 
priority for many mena countries.
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chapter 5
The Political Economy of Distribution in the 




The majority of Arab political economies are characterised by a peculiar distribution-
al system built on excess public employment and wide-ranging energy subsidies— 
features that exist in other developing countries but are more pronounced in the Arab 
world. This chapter provides an overview of this distribution regime, develops hypoth-
eses regarding its historical origin, and analyses the political and economic distortions 
it creates. It builds on a wide range of literature on energy subsidies and on recent 
publications on (the weakness of) conventional social safety regimes. In its compara-
tive analysis of public employment, it mostly relies on primary data.
The article proposes that the current distribution regime not only benefits insiders 
and creates multiple segmentation of labour markets, it also weakens links between 
business and citizens. There follows a discussion of the outlines of an alternative so-
cial contract based on less distortionary welfare systems, notably direct cash grants for 
citizens. In this, the text again draws on a well-developed literature on energy subsidy 
reform and on potential strategies for compensating for energy price increases. The 
article’s main contribution to the literature lies in its analysis of public employment 
reform and its labour market implications and of the wider political economy impli-
cations of distributional reform. It spells out the potential impact of a more inclusive 
and less distortionary distribution and welfare regime on social stratification and on 
relations between state, business and citizens.
1 Introduction
If there ever was a social contract in the Arab world’s low- to mid-income coun-
tries, it has frayed badly in recent decades—and, as the uprisings that have 
taken place since 2011 have shown, has in some cases altogether broken down. 
This is not because regimes have not tried to provide for their citizens: despite 
relatively low levels of economic development, most Arab countries have de-
veloped large ambitions to distribute resources among their  populations in the 
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post-second World War era. Compared to other economies in the developing 
world, Arab countries stand out in particular regarding the scale of govern-
ment employment and the provision of subsidies, notably but not only on en-
ergy products.
This distributional regime has however proven fiscally unsustainable, eco-
nomically distortionary and, most importantly, ineffective in reducing income 
inequalities as it has created insider–outsider dynamics and benefited the priv-
ileged most of all. It did not prevent socio-economic grievances from spread-
ing in the run-up to 2011—and yet, as a first reaction to the regional uprisings, 
most regimes increased patronage through public employment or subsidies 
even more. Some Arab governments have recently tackled subsidy reforms in 
a piecemeal fashion. Wider-reaching thinking about which new type of social 
contract might replace the unfair and unsustainable old distributional regimes 
is lacking however. In fact, there is little encompassing analysis of the existing 
regimes of wealth (re)distribution to start with.
To contribute to filling these gaps, this contribution will provide an over-
view of the current distribution regime in core Arab countries in the Maghreb 
and the Mashreq, and will then discuss potential policy alternatives, with a 
particular focus on a regime of direct, unconditional cash grants. In the de-
scription of the status quo and the analysis of the distortions it creates, the text 
draws on a variety of detailed studies on Middle East and North Africa (mena) 
energy subsidies and on more recent work on (the weakness of) conventional 
social safety regimes.
There is less literature on public employment, and no literature pulling the 
different aspects of distribution together in a comparative fashion. The politi-
cal economy implications of current distribution patterns in particular have 
gone unanalysed; this contribution will propose that the current regime not 
only benefits insiders and creates multiple segmentation of labour markets, 
it also weakens links between business and citizens. A high-level descriptive 
overview and political economy analysis of the Arab welfare regime is hence 
the first main objective of the contribution.
In its subsequent discussion of an alternative social contract, the chapter 
can again draw on a well-developed literature on energy subsidy reform and 
on potential strategies for compensating for energy price increases, including 
cash grants. There is less literature on public employment reform and its eco-
nomic implications, and practically nothing on the wider political economy 
implications of distributional reform. The chapter’s second core contribution 
will hence lie in the latter area, focusing on the potential impact of a more in-
clusive and less distortionary distributional and welfare regime on social strati-
fication, and on relations between state, business and citizens.
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The contribution primarily focuses on non-Gulf Arab countries in the 
Maghreb and the Mashreq.1 I have written a separate paper on rent distribu-
tion in high-rent countries around the world, of which the gcc monarchies 
are leading representatives (Hertog, 2014b). Many of the arguments presented 
here, however, apply in a modified fashion also to the Gulf Cooperation Coun-
cil (gcc) countries; notably those on economic distortions, labour market 
segmentation and cash grants as a viable distributional alternative. While the 
fiscal situation is less pressing for gcc members, and there is correspondingly 
more leeway to experiment with alternative distribution regimes, the scale of 
subsidies and government over-employment and the resulting distortions are 
if anything more dramatic.
2 Current Distributional Structures
2.1 Public Employment
Public employment has been a critical tool of wealth distribution across 
the Arab world since independence. Populist-authoritarian republics in 
particular—such as Egypt, Syria and Algeria—have historically tried to guar-
antee government jobs for all nationals. This ambition has been scaled back 
since the 1970s, as the share of public employment has been stagnating and 
real public sector wages have declined. Yet in international comparison, most 
countries on which we have data retain a quite high proportion of government 
jobs to total employment (Figure 5.1).
Morocco is a conspicuous exception and is also, as we will see, the Arab coun-
try with the smallest subsidy provision. Among core Maghreb and Mashreq 
countries, Morocco stands out in having been less ambitious in both distri-
bution and public service provision and in relying more strongly on private- 
driven development. As Figure 5.2 shows, however, public salaries represent 
a large share of the gross domestic product (gdp), which seems to reflect a 
concentration of resources on smaller cadres of better-paid public servants. In 
Egypt, by contrast, salaries are spread thin among a much larger government 
workforce. Altogether, however, Arab public salary expenditure—just like 
1 The peripheral cases—Djibouti, Mauritania and Sudan—are not included systematically as 
their distributional regimes and histories of state-building differ from those of more central 
Arab countries. Similarly, Lebanon, although located in the middle of the Arab world, is in-
cluded mostly as a contrast case that has not seen the ambitious state-building of other core 
Arab regimes.
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Figure 5.1 Public employment shares in international comparison
Source: Author, calculated from ilo, World Bank Development In-
dicators, and national data.
Note: gcc countries are left out of this graph, as the large-scale presence of for-
eign workers in the private sector makes a direct comparison of private and public 
employment problematic. We know however that in all cases bar Bahrain, more 
than half of citizens are employed by the respective governments (Hertog, 2014a).
employment numbers—lies above international averages (the exception of 
Lebanon in Figure 5.2 will be briefly discussed below).2
Although available data are patchy, in the cases where we have data, sala-
ries in government, long-term stagnation notwithstanding, typically are higher 
than in the private sector, especially compared to the informal sector (Bodor, 
2010; Yousef, 2004).3
2 In Egypt, the relatively low numbers might also be explained by the lack of accounting for 
employment costs in state-owned enterprises and potentially in the large military sector. In 
gcc countries, the low shares in gdp are an artefact of the large share of the oil sector in gdp 
(where few are employed); their share in non-oil gdp is much higher.
3 Another piece of evidence comes from the 2010–14 wave of the World Values Survey, which 
included 12 Arab countries, and which asked respondents both about their income and their 
employment status. While government employment appears to be on average better paid all 




Figure 5.3 shows that government subsidies and transfers, to the extent that 
they are recorded as government expenditure, also tend to be somewhat above 
the average for countries with similar incomes.
As accounting rules for subsidies are often unclear, and energy subsidies in 
particular are often under-reported, one can dispute how meaningful these fig-
ures are (energy subsidies are discussed separately below using International 
Monetary Fund (imf) data). It is clear however that this budget item for the 
most part does not comprise conventional social safety systems in mena, the 
volume of which is only estimated to be 0.7 per cent of gdp (Levin, Silva, and 
Morgandi, 2012).
2.2 Subsidies
While information on public employment is patchy, more research has been 
carried out on subsidies in the Arab world, particularly on energy subsidies. 
With energy subsidies that are on average 12 times higher than in the world at 
large according to 2011 imf estimates, the region stands out even more—and 
this includes energy importers, where subsidies have a direct fiscal impact rath-




















Figure 5.2 Public salary expenses in international comparison
Source: Author, calculated from ilo and World Bank 
Development Indicators data.
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Figure 5.3 Government subsidies and transfers in international comparison
Source: Author, calculated from World Bank Development 
Indicators data.
exporters (Luciani, 2012). Among the core Arab countries, Morocco alone has 
managed to reduce energy subsidies to a fiscally manageable level (Figure 5.4). 
Although the 2011 figures are inflated by the high international energy prices of 
that year, Arab countries continue to devote much more resources to the provi-
sion of cheap energy than do most other developing countries.
The subsidies consist of cheap transport fuel, electricity and gas. Average 
diesel prices in mena are lower than in any other region of the world and only 
half of us prices. Electricity subsidies average 2 per cent of gdp (Sdralevich 
et al., 2014).
Most mena governments also continue to provide food subsidies that rep-
resent an average of almost 1 per cent of gdp and are considerably higher in 
formerly ‘progressive’ republics like Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Syria and Iraq.
2.3 Historical Roots
While this chapter cannot engage with the historical roots of Arab distribu-
tional systems in any detail, some preliminary remarks are in order: First, the 
historical protagonists of mass employment and subsidisation arguably were 
the Arab nationalist republics, whose populist-authoritarian leaders aspired to 
the creation of a new middle class and the removal of old bourgeois elites, and 
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who tried to leverage the state apparatus as the main driver of economic de-
velopment (Henry and Springborg, 2010; Heydemann, 1999; Richards and Wa-
terbury, 2007). The heavy statist legacy of these republics remains visible in the 
aforementioned employment and subsidy statistics but also in the heavy and 
cumbersome bureaucratic penetration of the lives of citizens and businesses, 
as evidenced by international statistics on government effectiveness and ease 
of doing business.
The stronger commitment to food subsidies among republics in particular 
reflects an agenda of redistribution. It is noteworthy that while Tunisia started 
to shed its socialist ambitions from the 1960s on and has gone further in lib-
eralising than its former nationalist republican peers, it too retains large food 
subsidies as a core ‘socialist’ legacy.
It is likely that the populist-distributional policies of the nationalist repub-
lics put pressure on other countries in the region to play catch-up. The ideologi-
cal competition between Arab nationalism and conservative monarchism from 
the 1950s on (Kerr, 1965) forced monarchies to step up their own distributional 
efforts—a decision visible in the gcc countries’ employment and subsidy poli-
cies, but also in similar policies in much poorer Jordan, which was positioned 
at the fulcrum of regional ideological competition for much of post-second 
Wold War Arab history. Morocco, as a more peripheral monarchy with deeper 
historical roots, appears to have been under less pressure to play catch-up.
The one republic that never quite embarked on a path of nationalist state-
building is Lebanon (Henry and Springborg, 2010). Despite considerable  energy 




















Figure 5.4  Pre-tax energy subsidies as % of gdp in 2011
Source: imf, 2013b.
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subsidies, it is also the country with the smallest distributional footprint in the 
region. Its unusually weak statehood however contributed to its descent into 
a civil war in the 1970s that itself was shaped by the ideological and power ri-
valries of the region. At least in the classical period of ideological rivalry in the 
region from the 1950s to the 1970s, distributional state-building may have been 
a condition of regime survival.
The availability of both natural resource and strategic rents in the region did 
of course help states to engage in over-employment and, especially, provision 
of cheap energy. As the experience of other regions shows, however, rents do 
not automatically generate such structures: sub-Saharan African or South East 
Asian oil states for example have much lower levels of energy subsidies and 
tend to have smaller state apparatuses.
2.4 Lack of Other Social Safety Mechanisms
While public employment and subsidies are costly and distortionary, most 
Arab governments offer comparatively little by way of social security policies. 
This might be another legacy of authoritarian-populist state-building, in which 
elites saw direct state employment as a tool not only of distribution but also of 
reshaping and controlling society—an objective for which mundane policies 
like unemployment assistance and income support grants for the poor were 
less suited. The tangible nature of directly provided, subsidised goods might 
also make them more attractive to authoritarian rulers.
As mentioned above, non-contributory social safety programmes only 
amount to an average of 0.7 per cent of gdp across the Arab world (Levin, 
Silva, and Morgandi, 2012). Those few programmes that do exist are, moreover, 
remarkably ineffective: World Bank research shows that they fail to reach two-
thirds of individuals in the poorest quintile, a coverage rate that is less than 
half the world average, including in regions not generally associated with gen-
erous welfare benefits, like Latin America or Central Asia.
As with subsidies, ineffective targeting means that a considerable share 
of social safety resources actually go to the non-poor.4 In every one of the 11 
Arab countries included in the World Bank study, the size of general food and 
fuel subsidies dwarfs that of social safety spending. It appears that in the Arab 
world, public employment and subsidies function as a substitute rather than a 
complement for conventional welfare tools. As we will see, the Arab approach 
to sharing wealth is as costly as it is ineffective in realising objectives of equity 
4 ‘The average nonsubsidy ssn program in the region distributes only 23 percent of its total 
benefits to the bottom quintile, while the corresponding figure for the average comparator 
programs in Latin America and the Caribbean and in Eastern Europe and Central Asia is 59 
percent’. (Levin, Silva, and Morgandi, 2012, xxiv).
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and poverty alleviation. It also appears path-dependent, in the sense that early 
decisions to distribute resources through particular channels have—even if 
the political reasons for these decisions might now be obsolete—proven hard 
to reverse, while decisions to deepen the existing pattern of distribution are 
taken more easily.
2.5 Distortionary Economic Impacts
Because Arab distributional regimes involve in-kind distribution rather than 
distributing money as is the case with most modern social safety nets, their 
distortionary economic impact is particularly pronounced. To the extent that 
government employment is surplus to requirements—and there is much anec-
dotal evidence that some of it is—it takes human resources out of the private 
labour market where they might be more productive. Due to higher wages and 
shorter working hours, the general preference for government employment 
is widespread among Arab citizens. As Figure 5.5 shows, in every single Arab 
country polled by Gallup, the majority of respondents prefer government over 
private employment. As one might expect, private sector preference is rela-
tively strongest in the least distributive states—Lebanon, Morocco and Sudan.
A preference for government employment, and government recruitment 
based on formal credentials, arguably lead to educational decisions that are 
suboptimal for the private labour market. While it has become a much more re-
mote prospect for most young jobseekers, educational systems are still geared 
to preparing participants for government employment, with an excessive 
focus on tertiary education and on subjects of limited relevance for the private 
economy (Adams and Winthrop, 2015; World Bank, 2008). Figure  5.6 shows, 
for  example, that—according to unesco statistics—a disproportionate share 
of Arab students study arts and humanities subjects. This is unusual in the 
content of developing economies and probably best explained as a legacy of 
public sector oriented ‘credentialism’, where the formal level of education mat-
ters more than the subject studied (Salehi-Isfahani, 2012). Public sector over-
employment also creates overhead costs that arguably represent a deadweight 
loss to society.
Distortions in economic behaviour are even more obvious in the field of 
energy subsidies. imf research shows that the energy intensity of economic 
output in the mena region is not particularly high in global comparative 
terms (although it is higher among oil exporting countries). Different from 
most other world regions, however, energy intensity has stagnated over the 
last decade among mena oil importers and has increased among oil export-
ers, while it has declined in all other regions bar Latin America, which itself 
has seen a commodities boom. Low energy prices hence give no incentives for 
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Figure 5.5 Preference for government employment in the Arab region
Source: Gallup/Ishac Diwan.
Note: Gallup poll, conducted in the Arab world in several waves, asking respon-
dents whether for similar pay and conditions they would prefer to work for the 
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Figure 5.6 Share of students in arts and humanities in select Arab countries
Source: unesco uis data centre (http://data.uis.unesco.org/)
energy conservation but instead lock in costly and increasingly unsustainable 
consumption structures. The imf also documents the energy-intensive bias 
of Egyptian industry despite the fact that Egypt is a labour-surplus country; 
the imf argues that low energy prices create a bias towards capital-intensive 
industries that fail to absorb the large numbers of jobseekers in the mena re-
gion (Sdralevich et al., 2014, 23, 65).
Figures 5.7 and 5.8 show various countries’ shifts in energy intensity from a 
longer perspective—from 1980 to 2010—with 2010 oil and gas rents per capita 
and year on the x axis. mena countries are circled. We see that:
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Figure 5.8 Rents per capita and shifts in energy intensity since 1980 without high-rent countries
Source: Author, based on World Development Indicators.
Figure 5.7 Rents per capita and shifts in energy intensity (energy used per unit of gdp) 
1980–2010
Source: Author, based on World Development Indicators.
99The Political Economy of Distribution in the Middle East
302201
(a) High-rent countries around the world have generally experienced a de-
cline in energy efficiency.
(b) Mid-rent countries have not experienced such a decline in general, but 
mid-rent cases in mena (Algeria, Egypt, Syria) have, although less dra-
matic in scale.
Particularly in energy-importing countries, low electricity prices also tend to 
create undersupply and shortages, as energy producers—which are often state 
owned—struggle to recover their costs. Energy subsidies also lead to negative 
environmental externalities. Fuel subsidies in particular cause smuggling, while 
electricity subsidies undermine incentives to develop alternative energies, 
which in principle have significant potential in the hot and sunny mena region.
While food subsidies are smaller in scale, they have also created distortions— 
perhaps most famously in Egypt, where at least until partial reforms in 2014, 
subsidised ‘baladi’ bread was so cheap that it was regularly used as animal fod-
der (Reuters, 2015).
3 How the Distributional System Creates Social Stratification
In addition to economic distortions, the current wealth-sharing regime also 
has undesirable and arguably unintended distributional consequences. These 
are well documented for energy, but less so for public sector employment.
3.1 Labour Market Consequences
Public employment is a scarce, lumpy, private good. Given the fiscal con-
straints of all but the very richest Arab countries (Kuwait, Qatar and the uae), 
it has to be rationed. It tends to benefit the more educated, who are usually 
of a privileged economic background to start with (Assaad and Krafft, 2014; 
Dougherty, 2014). There is also a widespread perception that nepotism and cor-
ruption play a role in the allocation of public jobs (El-Gammal, 2013), which 
reflects such allocation’s potential to be used as a discretionary tool of political 
patronage, and creates further inequities in access.
Excessive public sector employment has contributed to a triple segmenta-
tion of labour markets between public, formal private, and informal private—
a structure that itself contributes significantly to inequality. To—among other 
aims—make private employment competitive with public employment, Arab 
governments have created fairly wide-ranging labour market regulations and 
high barriers to dismissal from formal private employment. As a result, how-
ever, all non-gcc Arab countries bar Jordan rank—according to the World 
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Economic Forum—in the bottom fifth of 144 countries with regards to ‘labour 
market efficiency’ (Jordan ranks 97th). While intended to protect employees, 
regulation has instead created a huge informal sector, which ranges in size from 
25 to 45 per cent of non-gcc Arab economies (imf, 2011, 45), and in which jobs 
are precarious and badly paid.
Together with the high share of government employment, this means that 
formal private employment—the mainstay of developed labour markets—
remains a residual category across the Arab world. Arab public employment 
and labour market policies have, probably unintentionally, created an unequal 
‘double insider’ system.
There are no estimates for the impact of public employment on income dis-
tribution in the Arab world, but given its scarce and relatively privileged nature 
it is likely to contribute to inequality, especially since it has been more strongly 
rationed from the 1970s on. It might not be coincidence that the cases with the 
strongest estimated increases in inequality since then appear to be republics 
that once made the more expansive distributional promises and relied more 
strongly on public sector employment, notably Egypt and Tunisia (Figure 5.9) 
(Syria, despite rampant crony capitalism, retained more of its statist economy 
until recently). While some of this inequality could result from the structural 
adjustment programmes these countries underwent, it is also clear that the 
rationing of public sector employment—and the resulting unequal access 
to opportunities— was a fiscal inevitability even in the absence of structural 
adjustment.

















Figure 5.9 Gini coefficients of selected Arab countries
Source: Estimated Household Income Inequality dataset, Univer-
sity of Texas Inequality Project
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3.2 Regressive Energy Subsidies
The negative distributional consequences of subsidies are better understood 
and documented: it is widely known for example that most energy subsidies are 
regressive in that they benefit larger and richer consumers disproportionately. 
The imf has shown that the bottom 40 per cent of the population receive 
only between 3 and 20 per cent of diesel and gasoline subsidies in eight differ-
ent Arab countries. The regressive effects of lpg and electricity subsidies are 
somewhat less dramatic, but in no single case do the poor receive their pro-
portional share. The picture for food subsidies is somewhat better; but even for 
these, many individual policies disproportionately benefit richer strata (Sdra-
levich et al., 2014).
The staggering opportunity costs of energy subsidies are illustrated by com-
paring them to government capital spending and education and health bud-
gets. In many Arab countries, subsidies are larger than total capital spending, 
and in all 11 mena oil exporters analysed by the imf, subsidies in 2011 were 
larger than education and health budgets respectively, and sometimes larger 
than both budgets combined. Among oil importers, Jordan and Lebanon main-
tained energy subsidies that were larger than capital spending, education, 
and health, respectively; in Lebanon they were larger than the education and 
health budgets combined, while in Egypt they were larger than all three budget 
items combined (Sdralevich et al., 2014, 18).
3.3 State, Business and Citizen in the Distributional System
A subtle but potentially important political economy consequence of the Arab 
distributional regime is that it weakens the link between the business class and 
citizens: few citizens aspire to private employment and those who are privately 
employed often operate in the informal sector. At the same time, business re-
mains state-dependent in many ways—through the provision of cheap energy 
but also due to high levels of administrative protection (World Bank, 2009). 
Together with a legacy of cronyism and corruption—themselves potentially 
facilitated by heavy state intervention, and over-staffed and unaccountable 
bureaucracies—this arguably explains the prevailing low trust placed in Arab 
businesses. According to the 2010–14 World Values Survey, 20 per cent of re-
spondents in the ten non-gcc Arab countries polled have ‘no trust at all’ in big 
companies, compared with a figure of 10 per cent in the rest of the world. This 
likely helps to explain the lack of leadership that Arab business showed during, 
and has shown since, the regional uprisings.
At the same time, in eight out of ten non-gcc Arab countries—all bar 
Jordan and Morocco—public trust in government institutions, including 
the civil service, is lower than in other countries with comparable levels of 
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 development. This demonstrates that the region’s comparatively expansive 
but lopsided welfare regime fails to generate political buy-in. While the state 
hence plays a dominant role, it does so in an ineffective way, failing both to 
steer the economy towards higher productivity and job creation, and to create 
equitable social outcomes or inspire public trust.
3.4 Attempts at Change
Whether seen from the standpoint of efficiency or of equity, there could hardly 
be a worse way of distributing wealth than through subsidised energy, particu-
larly in the Arab region’s energy-importing countries. Public sector employ-
ment as a tool of welfare is somewhat less economically irrational, but more 
distortionary of politically sensitive labour markets.
The above problems, albeit rarely looked at in an integrated fashion, are 
not unknown to regional policymakers. Facing increasing fiscal constraints, 
poorer Arab countries made some attempts at partial subsidy reform before 
2011 (Sdralevich et al., 2014; imf, 2013a; Devarajan et al., 2014). These how-
ever were abandoned with the uprisings. Instead, both old and new regimes 
relapsed into ingrained patterns of patronage spending, showing how deeply 
entrenched the old distribution regime has become. The post-Mubarak tran-
sitional government in Egypt ordered rises in subsidies and public sector sala-
ries, and the transitional government in Tunisia new public sector jobs; while 
in Syria Assad has increased the heating oil allowance for public workers and 
augmented government salaries. The Jordanian government increased subsi-
dies as well as salaries and pensions, while Morocco temporarily doubled its 
subsidy budget (Hertog, 2011).
These steps have proven unsustainable and have since been partially rolled 
back. Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia and Yemen have initiated partial pricing 
reforms of transport fuels and electricity since 2012 (Sdralevich et al., 2014).
It is encouraging that most of these reform efforts have been accompanied 
by some form of compensatory policy. These include cash transfers to fami-
lies below a certain income threshold in Jordan, plans to strengthen existing 
social safety nets in Morocco, a ‘lifeline’ electricity tariffs for small consumers 
and a new social housing programme in Tunisia, and expanded coverage of 
the Social Welfare Fund in Yemen. The reform process generally is piecemeal 
however and the compensation strategies often diffuse and not clearly enough 
linked to, and financed through, the savings achieved. Reforms are also limited 
to energy subsidies in particular, while public employment and labour mar-
ket regulations remain untouched. The initiatives hence fall short of the big- 
picture thinking that is necessary for moving towards a new social contract 
and a distributional regime that are both more efficient and inclusive.
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4 Potential Alternatives to Current Distributional Regimes
The unfairness, inefficiency and fiscal non-sustainability of the current systems 
are obvious. Most economists agree that the Arab world needs further energy 
subsidy reform and a thorough reform of the public sector, moving govern-
ments towards needs-based hiring and potentially a smaller public workforce. 
But the regional reform debate touching on these issues remains disjointed, fo-
cused on individual sectoral problems, and typically apolitical. The discussion 
of reform is seldom related to the underlying political economy of distribution 
that has been constraining reform options.
As a result, no answers are offered to how the frayed social contract embed-
ded in existing regimes can be reshaped to become more economically and 
politically sustainable. If distribution structures are to be reformed, however, 
Arab citizens will require an alternative, inclusive welfare regime that goes 
beyond small-scale, sector-specific compensatory measures. Reforms that fall 
short of this are unlikely to be politically acceptable and are hence likely to 
remain piecemeal.
While some of the recent energy reforms in Arab countries have been ac-
companied by compensatory measures such as ration cards or cash grants 
for needy households, both reforms and compensation policies have been 
smaller scale and partial—and there has been no serious thinking devoted 
to how to make public sector reform politically palatable. There is a need for 
more ambitious thinking that combines a reduction of traditional forms of 
patronage with the creation of new wealth sharing and social security institu-
tions that will foster a more inclusive, less economically distortionary social 
contract.
This contribution cannot provide a comprehensive answer in this search for 
a new contract—but it can hopefully contribute some larger-picture ideas that 
take into account not only economic but also social and political constraints to 
reform. In this spirit, the following section will propose direct, unconditional 
cash grants as a comprehensive alternative to subsidised energy and public 
sector over-employment. A move towards cash grants would both remove the 
economic distortions created by the current distribution system and provide a 
fairer and more inclusive wealth-sharing regime, helping to alleviate the deep 
socio-economic segmentation of Arab societies.
4.1 The Long Run: Modern Social Security Systems
As we have seen, most Arab governments have devoted considerable resources 
to existing patronage mechanisms. Even if only some of the savings derived 
from dismantling these structures were available to be spent on new welfare 
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institutions, the resources at the disposal of governments would be consider-
able, and far above the current scale of social security provision.
In the long run, Arab countries should build up conventional social secu-
rity mechanisms such as means-tested income support, unemployment as-
sistance, unemployment insurance, and active labour market policies such 
as retraining and job placement services. In the short run, these are not an 
option, as putting them in place will require considerable capacity-building ef-
forts. Compensation for any distributional reforms in the sectors of energy and 
public employment, however, will have to be immediate: both to protect the 
livelihoods of vulnerable populations and to make reforms politically feasible. 
Savings from reforms should be immediately ‘ring-fenced’ for social spending, 
to ensure they are not just frittered away and used to plug holes in national 
budgets.
What could instant social spending look like? There is one simple option 
that has been widely discussed for advanced countries and for resource-rich 
developing countries, but not to date for the lower-income parts of the Arab 
world: direct, unconditional cash grants for all adult citizens. These would 
be particularly easily justified and implemented in the Arab world’s oil-rich 
states. But the potential windfall from distributional reform in most of the 
hydrocarbon- poor Maghreb and Mashreq countries makes them a serious op-
tion there too.
4.2 The Short Run: Cash Grants to All Citizens
Universal, unconditional cash grants have been debated at some length as the 
most appropriate way of sharing national wealth in resource-rich developing 
countries, and governments as diverse as those of Alaska, Bolivia and Iran have 
had encouraging experiences with such schemes (Hertog, 2014b; Sandbu, 2006; 
Segal, 2011). There is also an extensive literature about the potential advantages 
of unconditional cash grants over conventional welfare mechanisms in ad-
vanced, capitalist countries (for an overview see Van Parijs, 2000).5
There are numerous general arguments for cash grants, and these arguments 
apply with at least equal force to the Arab world’s poorer countries: compared 
to existing subsidy systems that privilege insiders and rich households they are 
more equitable (Sandbu, 2006), distort consumption decisions less, and are 
more transparent (Moss, 2010). Compared to means-tested support systems, 
they are easier to administer, generate smaller overheads, and are less prone 
to stigmatisation and errors of exclusion (Segal, 2011). In the Arab world, the 
5 For a global policy initiative on basic incomes, see the Basic Income Earth Network website: 
http://www.basicincome.org/about-bien/.
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administrative capacity for means testing is particularly limited, as tax systems 
generating household income data are weak.
Cash grants could keep at least part of the state’s resource revenues out of 
the hands of self-interested politicians, thereby reducing corruption (Baena, 
Sévi and Warrack, 2012; Birdsall and Subramanian, 2004). They could impart a 
sense of ownership to citizens, increasing their ‘buy in’ into the political sys-
tem (Palley, 2003), and create a more level playing field between state and citi-
zens (Gelb and Grasmann, 2010; Gillies, 2010).
By providing a secure revenue stream to citizens, cash grants could at least 
on the margin incentivise private investment, entrepreneurship and the de-
velopment of local markets, including financial markets (Gelb and Grasmann, 
2010; Palley, 2003; Sandbu, 2006). Authors of the cash grants literature have 
adduced considerable evidence that private agents are adept at investing cash 
windfalls well (Birdsall and Subramanian, 2004; Gelb and Majerowicz, 2012; 
Sandbu, 2006) and at smoothing their consumption over time (Hsieh, 2003).
While taxation capacity in the Arab world is low, basic administrative capac-
ity is fairly high in most countries. A cash grant system could be set up quickly, 
as it only requires basic information about citizenship and age. Individuals 
without bank accounts could be reached through the use of special cash cards. 
As we have seen, trust in the state is particularly low in the region, making 
simple and hard-to-manipulate systems like a universal cash grant particularly 
attractive politically. The unconditional nature of grants would maximise po-
litical buy-in. Options for means testing along the lines of Latin American style 
conditional cash grants could be considered later on.
4.3 Consequences for Labour Markets
A cash grant system could help to reorient citizens towards gainful private em-
ployment in at least two ways. First, it should be accompanied by public sec-
tor employment reform that would make government hiring a more remote 
prospect. Citizens would hence not be incentivised to wait for easy, often unre-
warding government jobs in order to secure their share of the country’s wealth, 
but would be free to pursue their own preferences, including on the private 
labour market. Citizens would also be more likely to seek education relevant 
to the private sector, helping them to contribute to the creation of economic 
value. Fewer human resources would be ‘parked’ in unproductive, surplus gov-
ernment positions, and the public sector itself could reorient its staffing and 
hr policies away from politically determined patronage and towards needs-
based, productivity-oriented strategies.
This effect would be less powerful in poorer Arab countries where public 
sector employment is already a fairly unlikely scenario for most new labour 
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market entrants (although their preferences and educational behaviour in-
dicate a continued orientation towards the public sector). There is, however, 
a second potential design feature through which giving cash grants could 
provide a universally strong incentive for private employment: excluding in-
cumbent public servants above certain income levels—who, after all, already 
receive an implicit subsidy as they typically earn more than equivalent pri-
vate sector employees—from receiving the grants.6 In this way, the effective 
earnings gap between private and public employment would be narrowed or 
closed—without any net loss to existing government employees.
This citizens’ income would then function in a manner somewhat analo-
gous to an unconditional wage subsidy for private employment:7 citizens could 
achieve acceptable total income levels even if they held less-well-paid private 
jobs, as their citizen’s income would top up their wages without penalty.
An unconditional cash grant would have an ‘income effect’ that would po-
tentially disincentivise work effort on the margin. Any negative effect however 
would be less strong than under conventional means-tested support mecha-
nisms: unconditional grants would avoid the substitution (or ‘tax’) effects of 
unemployment assistance or insurance and other forms of conditional income 
support, where benefits are lost as work is found and/or wages increase (Wider-
quist and Lewis, 2009).8
A cash grant scheme could help politically justify the gradual re- engineering 
of the Arab world’s bloated public sectors. It is quite likely that future gen-
erations would prefer a safe cash grant over the highly uncertain prospect of 
gaining a surplus government job at some point. This quid pro quo would al-
low governments to recruit on the basis of administrative needs rather than 
imperatives of patronage. The resulting improvements in administrative effi-
ciency could contribute significantly to citizens’ quality of life, and to the local 
business climate.
4.4 Consequences for Income Distribution
Given the regressive nature of current distribution arrangements, the cash 
grant alternative would reduce economic inequality. The impact could be 
6 Public sector salary schemes could be adjusted to make sure that the lower earners in the 
government sector would not be disadvantaged vis-à-vis private employees.
7 Not strictly analogous, as wage subsidies are only paid when an individual is in paid 
employment.
8 Targeted subsidies for low-wage workers (like the Earned Income Tax Credit in the us) would 
have similar, if weaker, disincentive effects relative to the citizen’s income, reducing work ef-
fort and incentives to upgrade one’s skills.
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 substantial: Iranian energy price reforms of recent years were coupled with 
the introduction of a universal household cash grant. As a result, the country’s 
Gini coefficient is estimated to have dropped to 0.37 in 2011 from 0.41 in 2010 
(Sdralevich et al., 2014, 52). This is about two-thirds of a standard deviation 
in the international distribution of country Gini values. Similarly, World Bank 
simulations have estimated that poverty in Egypt would be cut by one-third if 
energy subsidies were reduced by 50 per cent and the savings used to finance 
a universal cash grant (Sdralevich et al., 2014, 57). The more even income dis-
tribution achieved through cash grants would probably also boost domestic 
demand, as poorer households, who would disproportionately benefit, have a 
higher propensity to consume.
4.5 Consequences for Energy Consumption
If grants were financed through energy reforms, this would positively impact 
domestic energy markets: higher energy prices would help reduce energy con-
sumption both through immediate price effects and by providing longer-term 
incentives to choose more energy-efficient technology and lifestyles. Drawing 
on panel data from 66 countries, Charap, Ribeiro da Silva, and Rodriguez (2013) 
estimate a long-term price elasticity of energy consumption of 0.3 to 0.5. This 
indicates a considerable potential for energy savings: assuming that a typical 
Arab country’s energy prices could be doubled, consumption would decrease 
by between 19 and 29 per cent given these elasticities. More realistic energy 
prices would also reduce the energy dependence of industry, end the often 
politicised rationing of cheap industrial energy, and provide incentives for in-
vesting in more modern production processes.
Despite maldistribution, levels of inequality in the Arab world are moder-
ate compared to most other developing regions; basic infrastructure, state ca-
pacity and public services could be improved but again compare reasonably 
well to the bulk of the Global South. The region would hence have much de-
velopment potential if economic distortions were reduced and distributional 
spending leveraged so as to empower rather than segment and immobilise 
populations.
4.6 Potential Magnitudes
How much spare cash would there be for a universal cash grant? I provide below 
some upper-boundary estimates based on 2011 imf energy subsidy estimates— 
the last year for which we have data that is consistent across countries.
Figure 5.10 shows the size of annual cash grants that could be provided to all 
nationals above 15 years of age if subsidies were eliminated (i.e. energy prices 
increased to international levels).
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Actual cash grants would in all likelihood have to be lower: the current energy 
subsidy regime has become fiscally unsustainable and at least some of the sav-
ings made thanks to its reform would likely have to be used to reduce govern-
ment deficits. Lower current energy prices mean, moreover, that the subsidies 
themselves have somewhat declined since 2011. Finally, any cash grant scheme 
would incur some administrative costs.
But even if only half of the above amounts could be realised, this would 
make a substantial difference to the livelihoods of poorer households in most 
Arab countries—especially Egypt and Yemen, where the grants amount to 10 
per cent or more of gdp per capita.
4.7 Political Feasibility of a Transition
The political economy rationale for moving from the current distributional 
regime to cash grants is straightforward: Due to the stark inequality of the cur-





























































Figure 5.10  Size of per capita annual cash grants that could be financed through energy 
subsidy reforms
Source: Author, based on World Development Indicators (World 
Bank) and imf data.
Note: gcc cases here include non-nationals. For more detailed estimates for 
high-rent countries see Hertog (2014b).
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be a majority—certainly compared to a business-as-usual scenario, which will 
lead to deeper fiscal deficits and either unilateral subsidy reductions without 
compensation or further deteriorations in public services.
Recent World Bank research into mena social security systems adds to our 
confidence in the feasibility of a cash grant system: respondents in Egypt, Jor-
dan, Lebanon, and Tunisia all reported—in 2012—a strong preference for cash 
support over in-kind social benefits, and for unconditional over conditional 
support schemes (Levin, Silva, and Morgandi, 2012, 35f.). Low confidence in 
public institutions in the Arab world arguably makes citizens warier of target-
ed, more complex programmes, hence putting a premium on simple, inclusive 
distribution policies. Finally, the imf reports that energy pricing reforms in-
volving compensatory measures have been successful in 100 per cent of cases, 
while only 17 per cent of subsidy reforms without compensatory transfers suc-
ceeded (Sdralevich et al., 2014, 42).
4.8 Political Economy Implications
The above mentioned distributional reforms could go a long way towards 
increasing social security, making private employment more attractive, and 
weaning private industry off costly state support. The existing system of dis-
tribution is regressive (in terms of energy subsidies) and has created a rigid 
and unfair insider–outsider system (in terms of access to public employment). 
Replacing this regime with a cash grant system would provide a foundation for 
a new social contract based on shared access to universal channels of govern-
ment support and to an integrated, more dynamic labour market.
To the extent that cash grants would boost formal private employment, the 
new system could also improve trust and organic linkages between citizen and 
business—elements that have been tenuous under the old regime. In the long 
run, this could contribute to the emergence of a real bourgeoisie that enjoys 
substantial autonomy from the state, pulls its weight in the national economy, 
and enjoys social legitimacy.
Distributional reform would only be one major step towards a new social 
contract and should be accompanied by further reforms of labour markets—
for example, making formal private employment rules more flexible to reduce 
the size of the informal sector—and, in the medium term, by the introduction 
of more advanced social safety mechanisms. Labour market liberalisation it-
self would, however, be easier to justify politically if accompanied by a basic in-
come guarantee, an ingredient of compensation that was lacking in many past 
reform efforts. The first order challenge is hence to re-engineer the distortion-




This contribution has provided an overview of the distributional regime on 
which the political economy of much of the Arab world has been based since 
the age of Arab nationalism. Even if in most countries this system ‘peaked’ 
decades ago, the legacies of subsidisation, public sector over-employment, and 
labour market segmentation remain strong and are likely to characterise Arab 
political economies for many years to come—if only in circumscribing the re-
form options available to Arab governments. Understanding them is hence a 
prerequisite for any meaningful debate on the subject of reform.
In its second half, this contribution has developed a proposal for compre-
hensive distributional reform: converting existing mechanisms of uneven pa-
tronage into a universal system of unconditional cash grants. The discussion 
has been very preliminary and there is need for much further thinking and 
research, including on implementation strategies, the precise mechanism for 
setting the amount of grants, whether and how underage dependents should 
be accommodated in the system, the way in which savings from public sector 
reform can be accounted for in this process, and how universal cash grants can 
be combined with or converted into a differentiated modern social security 
system etc.
If nothing else, I hope that the contribution will help to generate a broad-
er debate about comprehensive reform of distributional systems in the Arab 
world, the various parts of which are interlocked yet seldom discussed togeth-
er. Any wider-ranging solution will have to take into account political feasibil-
ity and the need for immediate compensation.
The old social pact is decaying. The region needs to move fast to replace 
it with a more sustainable system before existing distributional structures 
are whittled away entirely and governments lose their room to manoeuvre in 
creating anything new. Maldistribution creates social inequality and distorts 
economies, but it also provides an opportunity for reallocating resources in a 
fairer, less distortionary way. This opportunity will not last forever.
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chapter 6




In the Arab world, the role of the state in the social contract has been addressed from 
various angles: as a provider of employment, as a supplier of goods and services, as a 
guarantor of security and political stability and more generally as an enabler of eco-
nomic growth. State-owned enterprises (soes), which contribute significantly to all of 
the above objectives, have not been considered in economic policy making, despite the 
fact that they are integral to the economic history and competitiveness of most coun-
tries in the region. Tracing the history of state ownership from the nation- building pro-
cess to the present time, this article argues that the scope of state capitalism in most 
Arab countries is not retreating and that the mechanisms of state control have become 
increasingly diverse. Across the region, the performance of state enterprises has been 
highly variable: while some operate with private governance models, those that oper-
ate as an extension of the public sector still underperform despite being subsidised. Re-
cent experience demonstrates that in countries that have recently undergone political 
changes, political appetite or popular support for soe reform is lacking and the pros-
pects for the transfer of positive experiences of soe management in the region are so 
far limited.
1 Introduction: Emergence of Arab States as Capitalists
The rise of state capitalism has emerged as a topic of growing global public and 
academic attention, fuelled by the virtual death of the ‘Washington Consen-
sus’, the rise of economies such as Russia, China, and India, and—finally—the 
growth of sovereign wealth funds not only as national actors but also as major 
cross-border investors. While the means and mechanisms of state involvement 
in the economic sphere are varied, governments have emerged as owners of 
commercial assets across a range of sectors, challenging liberal economic ide-
ologies that dispute the efficiency of states as economic actors. Far from play-
ing second fiddle to private enterprise, some soes have become behemoths of 
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economic power, with 28 of the 100 largest firms globally counting the state as 
a significant shareholder (The Economist, 2014).
A recent survey of 34 industrialised countries, mostly oecd members, re-
vealed that their governments collectively own 2,111 companies, valued at usd 
2 trillion and employing approximately 6 million people (oecd, 2014a).1 State 
ownership in developing economies is even higher: whereas in the oecd area 
firms majority-controlled by governments are estimated to contribute 3 per 
cent of total market capitalisation, they represent an estimated 13 per cent of 
the value of listed equity in emerging economies. The scope of state owner-
ship in the Arab world is higher than in most other developed and emerging 
markets, whether judged by government participation in capital markets, state 
ownership of unlisted firms, or other metrics.
Although data on unlisted mena soes is unavailable, our calculations 
suggest that, currently, 62 per cent of market capitalisation of Arab stock ex-
changes relates to firms in which sovereign shareholders have ‘blockholdings’ 
(10 per cent and above). In fact, of the 600 largest listed firms, accounting for 
97 per cent of the region’s market capitalisation, close to 40 per cent have a 
sizeable number of their shares held by the state (Amico and Ozcelik, 2015). 
 Government ownership is even more prevalent in larger firms, with govern-
ments having a considerable stake in 89 of the 100 largest listed firms in the re-
gion. While these figures are telling, they exclude the majority of state-owned 
enterprises, especially in strategic sectors such as petrochemicals, network in-
dustries and utilities, as they remain unlisted.
Arab governments are significant owners of both listed and unlisted com-
mercial companies, not only in strategic sectors such as hydrocarbons, min-
ing and minerals, and aviation but also in other, less strategic sectors. And 
yet, the role of the state as a capitalist in the region, as opposed to as a 
policymaker, has not been subject to considerable analysis. This represents 
a curious omission and one that is only partially accidental. Governments in 
the region do not publish consolidated information on their shareholdings, 
partly due to the fragmentation of state ownership and the difficulty of col-
lecting data, partly due to the inherent opaqueness of state ownership in 
some countries.2
As a result, the mechanisms and the performance of state capitalism in 
the Arab world have eluded analysis, with the few existing studies focusing 
1 For the purposes of the survey, state ownership was defined as 10 per cent and above.
2 Only Morocco and to a lesser extent Tunisia publish data on the portfolio of state sharehold-
ings and no Arab country publishes information on the performance of soes.
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on privatisation experiences and their impact (cf. Omran, 2009; Haider, 2008; 
Haider and Dawley, 2008;). After decades of economic dogma that sought 
to reduce the role of the state in the economy, considering all soes as inef-
ficient and corrupt, the tide has turned and the emergence of successful 
state-backed firms, notably in the Gulf countries, has prompted a recon-
sideration of Washington Consensus policies. The global financial crisis has 
further highlighted the cost of private sector failure, prompting governments 
to become ‘unwilling capitalists’ as a consequence of their rescue of faltering 
firms.
The revolutions and subsequent political transitions experienced in some 
Arab countries provide a useful political economy backdrop against which 
the performance of state capitalism can be evaluated. In particular, it appears 
pertinent to investigate how transitions to democratic governance models, as 
witnessed in Tunisia, will affect the nature and extent of state ownership. Re-
cent events provide a rich context for examining state ownership in the region 
considering that soes are a long-term fixture of mena economies, many of 
them having been established to support nation building in postcolonial or 
independence periods.
In North Africa, the end of colonisation prompted governments to establish 
local institutions and companies to deliver basic services. In the Gulf, the roots 
of a number of the largest soes can be traced to the process of the forming of 
the states themselves, and such enterprises continue to simultaneously per-
form a range of regulatory, commercial and social functions. For instance, the 
National Bank of Abu Dhabi—today one of the ten largest Arab banks and 
top ten listed firms in the region—was established in 1968 to finance domestic 
infrastructure and also to perform central banking functions.
The emergence of governments as major shareholders followed a some-
what different trajectory in other parts of the Arab world, where it was gen-
erally delinked from the process of the formation of the state, instead being 
motivated by the rise of political ideologies that favoured greater state inter-
ventionism, inspired by the Soviet developmental model. This was particu-
larly the case in Syria, Algeria and Egypt, where swaths of economic activity 
were brought under state control during the nationalisation process in the 
1950s to 1970s.
Nationalisation of strategic assets was also a part of the story of the emer-
gence of soes in the region, especially those in the hydrocarbon field or other 
strategic sectors. For instance, Saudi Aramco, originally established in 1933 
as a result of an oil concession granted by the Saudi government to the affili-
ate of Standard Oil of California (today’s Chevron), was nationalised in 1980. 
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 Likewise, the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation was fully nationalised in 1975, 
when the government acquired the remaining 40 per cent stake from British 
Petroleum and American Gulf Oil.
Only in parts of the Levant, notably in Lebanon and the Palestinian Author-
ity, has the state never emerged as a significant shareholder. Even so, in Leba-
non where the government owns less than 30 soes their impact on the state 
budget is estimated to be significant. Transfers to Electricité du Liban, the na-
tional electricity company, account for 20 per cent of the budget—the second 
largest item after debt servicing (Hasbani, 2011). Even with such considerable 
subsidies, the company is unable to provide uninterrupted services to most of 
the country and its name has become synonymous with public sector failure 
in Lebanon.
Despite these similarities, the evolution of soe sectors in the region has dif-
fered in important respects. In countries that followed a statist developmen-
tal model (Egypt, Iraq, Syria and Yemen), soes were established in a broader 
range of industries. In Lebanon and Jordan, their establishment was arguably 
more selective. In the Gulf countries, their emergence was more gradual, only 
initially resulting from nationalisations and in recent years closely related to 
national industrialisation and competitiveness strategies.3
2 Structure of State Shareholdings
The initial interest of Arab states in establishing and maintaining soes 
was supported by a number of well-known academic arguments, notably 
those advanced by post-World War ii developmental economists such as 
Alexander Gerschenkron who argued that the state needed to take a lead-
ing role in capital accumulation and infrastructure development in order 
to ‘catch up’ with advanced countries. At the time, local private sector ac-
tors were perceived as weak and short-term oriented, interested in catering 
to consumer demand rather than in long-term investment and national 
competitiveness.
More recent arguments put forth advocating state interventionism in the 
economy include private sector coordination failures, fear of the emergence 
of private monopolies, and ‘externalities’ in production that may benefit the 
3 For instance, the Executive Councils of Dubai and Abu Dhabi and the Emirates Competitive-
ness Council consider and integrate soes in their broad strategic orientations.
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whole economy but in which private sector actors may invest less than is so-
cially optimal. In recent years, the systemic risks associated with ‘too big to fail’ 
private sector firms have also entered the equation as a motivation for govern-
ment ownership.
Most of these rationales for state ownership found their echo in the Arab 
world when governments decided to establish soes, and arguably continue to 
resonate today, although the structure and challenges of soe sector reform dif-
fer by country, as highlighted in Table 6.1. Significant differences can be noted 
in terms of the number and size of soes in countries of the region and of the 
mechanisms of control used by governments. In Morocco, the Ministry of Fi-
nance reports that it owns 241 soes in addition to 44 companies in which the 
Treasury has a direct interest, some of which are newly created (Semmar, 2012). 
The Tunisian government holds a portfolio of approximately 200 soes, in ad-
dition to smaller stakes in 480 firms nationalised following the revolution in 
2011. In Egypt, the Ministry of Investment holds a portfolio of approximately 
150 soes in sectors as diverse as insurance and cotton production in addition 
to over 660 joint ventures between public and private firms as well as an un-
disclosed number of strategic firms held by sectoral ministries or the military 
(Bremer, 2012).
The sectoral orientation of soes is similar in each of the sub-regions com-
prising the Middle East and North Africa (the Mashreq, the Maghreb, and the 
Gulf). The range of sectors in which state companies are present owes its va-
riety both to earlier development approaches and to the recent use of soes 
and Sovereign Wealth Funds (swfs) as instruments of economic diversifica-
tion and industrial competitiveness, especially in the Gulf countries. As a re-
sult, soes are mostly concentrated in the minerals and hydrocarbon sectors, 
service sectors (e.g. utilities, capital-intensive modes of transport, banking, 
and  telecoms) and industrial sectors (e.g. heavy industry operations such as 
steel and cement) (oecd, 2013).
The extent of state ownership in listed companies—the only available 
metric of state ownership in the region—indicates high and growing lev-
els of government participation in the economy. Sovereign investment ve-
hicles—historically important players in local capital markets—are reported 
to have been increasing their participation in capital markets both for com-
mercial reasons and, occasionally, to ‘support’ market valuations in times 
of crisis (e.g. in Saudi Arabia in 2006). For instance, the stake of the Public 
Investment Fund in Tadawul-listed companies had increased by 26 per cent 
in August 2014  year-to-year, exceeding 20 per cent of the overall market 
capitalisation.
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Table 6.� Classification of mena soe sectors






enterprises; soes major 
recipients of state subsidies; 
the state seen as an employ-
er of last resort; underinvest-
ment in soes
Corporatisation and valuation 
of soe assets; creating mecha-
nisms for reducing redundant 
employment in the soe sector; 
reviewing the soe legal frame-




Large soe sectors  owing 
to the socialist legacy; 
banking sector historically 
 dominated by soes; high 
non-performing loans in 
state-owned banks as a 
result of lending to other 
soes; the state seen as an 
employer of last resort
Rethinking the role of the state 
in specific sectors (e.g. textiles, 
agro industries); reorganisa-
tion of the state-ownership 
function; reducing political 
interference in soe boards; 





Rationalised by privatisation 
during the 1980s and 1990s; 
the state present in selected 
sectors and is generally not 
seen as an employer of last 
resort; soes are not highly 
present in the financial 
sector but remain active in 
network industries
Reviewing state ownership in 
loss-making enterprises; better 
co-ordination of the state’s 
ownership function; improving 
the skills and independence of 









Hydrocarbon soes unlisted; 
minority stakes in non-
strategic soes listed in part 
to develop capital markets; 
new soes being established 
in recent years; Sovereign 
Wealth Funds (swfs) and 
holding companies increas-
ingly exercise ownership
Improving soe transparency; 
preparing listings of equity 
stakes or debt issuance by 
some soes; consolidating soe 
ownership under  professional 
management;  reproducing 
 successful ownership 
experiences
Source: adapted from Amico, �0��.
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3 Ownership and Regulation of mena soes
Unlike oecd countries, many of which have introduced ownership or coor-
dination entities to oversee state shareholdings, the political patronage, and 
hence the oversight of state shareholdings in the region, remains dispersed. 
Only Morocco, and to a lesser extent Tunisia and Iraq, have seen some con-
solidation of oversight in the hands of one or two government entities. Other 
countries, such as Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, have also witnessed a degree 
of consolidation of soes under national sovereign investment funds. For in-
stance, the Ministry of Finance of Bahrain transferred government ownership 
in a range of large soes, such as Aluminium Bahrain and Gulf Air, to Bahrain 
Mumtalakat Holding Company in an effort to restructure the companies and 
limit subsidisation.
Despite recent efforts towards consolidation, ownership fragmentation of 
soes in the region is far from accidental. Sectoral ministries and ministers 
have often been unwilling to relinquish control of soes that have proven to be 
politically useful tools—regardless of their financial performance—and have 
allowed them not only to control key assets but also to create employment, de-
cide on the provision of essential services, and ultimately intervene in the day-
to-day operations of these companies. soes have therefore emerged not only 
as remnants of nationalisation policies but also, effectively, as mechanisms via 
which political actors control strategic assets.
In this ownership configuration and in the absence of clarity between own-
ership and regulatory functions, the role of sectoral regulators has emerged as 
an important one, with the possible exception of soes operating in monop-
oly sectors. Yet, apart from a few sectors—such as telecommunications and 
 transport—sectoral regulators remain relatively rare, which effectively exac-
erbates the conflicts of interest faced by those ministries that own the soes 
in question. In addition, some sectoral regulators lack the necessary indepen-
dence, precluding them from effectively exercising their functions. For instance, 
the Lebanese Telecommunications Regulatory Agency remains dependent on 
the Minister of Telecommunications and is not in a position to act as an inde-
pendent regulator since it regulates services directly provided by the ministry.4
4 Ogero, the state-owned fixed-line operator, is managed directly by the Ministry of Telecom-
munications, which is the same body that issues contracts to it. At the same time, the cre-
ation of a joint stock company, Liban Telecom, that would effectively corporatise services 
currently provided directly by the ministry and that could be eventually privatised, was pre-
viewed but has not materialised.
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Some regulatory authorities provide services while simultaneously being 
responsible for sectoral regulation. These include the Dubai Roads and Trans-
ports Authority (rta), which is responsible for the construction and opera-
tion of the Dubai metro, and also operates the state-owned taxi service, and 
inter-city transport and bus services. This creates potential conflicts of interest, 
especially if state-owned incumbents are to be subjected to competition. Con-
versely, where independent sectoral regulators have been established (e.g. the 
Telecom Regulatory Authority in Bahrain or the Supreme Council for Informa-
tion and Communications Technology in Qatar), their presence has allowed 
for the emergence of more robust competition between state incumbents and 
private sector competitors (oecd, 2013).
The emergence of competition frameworks to address potentially compet-
ition-distorting aspects of state capitalism is a priority for private sector de-
velopment and hence for employment creation in the region. Yet the field of 
competition law in the mena region has been slow to develop.5 Few com-
petition authorities in the region can pursue cases against soes, which in a 
number of countries are not included or explicitly excluded from the remit 
of competition legislation. In the United Arab Emirates (uae) for instance, 
soes are explicitly exempt from the Competition Law, and in Egypt and Oman 
a narrower set of exemptions for soes are in place.6 Even in countries where 
soes are subject to competition law, competition authorities are usually only 
empowered to prevent price gauging and cartel formation and deal with mar-
ket access issues.
While the impact of competition authorities on the integrity of state own-
ership has been mixed, the establishment of anti-corruption watchdogs and 
the empowerment of state audit courts have played a positive role. The allega-
tions of the misuse of public assets and of crony privatisations, and—more 
 generally—calls for greater public sector transparency in the wake of recent 
revolutions, have resulted in more active scrutiny of state shareholdings by 
these entities. This focus on soe integrity is indeed not surprising and is not 
limited to the Arab world: a recent global survey of 427 enforcement actions 
5 Jordan was the first Arab country to adopt competition legislation (in 2002) and Oman the 
last to issue a Competition Law (in 2014).
6 In Egypt, public utilities managed by the state are not subject to the Competition Law, while 
private utilities may apply to the Egyptian Competition Authority for a total or partial ex-
emption. In Oman, a similar exemption is in place: the Competition Law does not apply to 
public utilities wholly owned or managed by the state.
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related to the bribery of foreign public officials found that employees of soes 
were the largest target recipient of bribes and that 57 per cent of all bribes were 
related to procurement transactions (oecd, 2014c).
State audit bodies in most countries in the region are empowered to review 
the financial and non-financial performance of companies where state owner-
ship exceeds 25 per cent; though few state auditors are authorised to examine 
all state shareholdings and all types of corruption and potential abuse of pub-
lic goods. Unlike most of its peers, the state audit court in Morocco (the Cour 
des Comptes) publicly discloses details of investigations into inefficient and 
corrupt practises in soes and is in the process of conducting a thematic audit 
of soes: a first in the Arab world. One of its recent reports heavily criticised 
one of the large real estate soes, Al Omrane, which in addition to its purely 
commercial functions is responsible for building social housing under the Cit-
ies Without Slums programme.7
In Tunisia, the Tunisian Anti-Corruption Commission, created  immediately 
following the revolution, has uncovered cases of crony privatisations and 
rigged procurement in soes, including in large companies such as Tunisie Té-
lécom.8 In addition, expropriation measures were taken against assets unlaw-
fully acquired by the former regime and a special Confiscation Commission 
was created to address this. In Egypt, in various rulings in 2011 and 2012, the 
courts ruled that the privatisation of formerly public companies was illegal, 
requiring the acquirers to return shares at the original sale price and to restore 
employment contracts. A number of other cases are still pending.
In the Gulf countries, governments have recently demonstrated an interest 
in ‘cleaning up’ soes, establishing new oversight entities and allowing corrup-
tion charges to be brought and prosecuted. In one of the most publicly fol-
lowed cases in the region, the ceo of Oman Oil was sentenced in 2014 to 23 
years in prison on charges related to bribery in public tender. The same year, 
the managing director of Galfar Engineering stepped down after being charged 
with giving bribes to Petroleum Development Oman in exchange for contracts. 
The former ceo of Aluminium Bahrain was recently sentenced in a London 
7 The audit reports state that the company only built 31 per cent of planned social housing 
units and that only 11 per cent of its kpis were achieved considering that built units were not 
allocated to defined beneficiaries of the programme.
8 Tunisie Télécom was found to have accorded a number of large advertising contracts, never 
approved by its board, to a private company for a total amount of 48 million Tunisian di-
nars, without following either the public procurement procedures or the internal approval 
processes.
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court for accepting bribes in return for securing contracts worth in excess of 
usd 3 billion.
The renewed focus on the governance of soes owes much on the one hand 
to post-revolutionary expectations and low trust in governments, and on the 
other to poor performance of soes as a result of inadequate governance and 
management structures. While private listed companies have over the past 
 decade been subjected to specific governance requirements in the form of 
corporate governance codes and regulations, all but a few state-owned firms 
have escaped such restrictions: only Egypt and Morocco have developed 
governance guidelines specifically targeted at soes.9
On the other hand, all mena countries except for Iraq have a corporate 
governance code or guidelines for listed companies, and a number have also 
developed specific regulations for banks and insurance companies. This is im-
portant since corporate governance guidelines applicable to listed firms are 
not extended to state-owned firms unless those firms have listed equity, and 
in some countries—such as the uae—even listed soes are exempt from the 
application of the corporate governance code.
Furthermore, governance requirements stipulated in company laws only ap-
ply to those companies incorporated under these laws, which excludes most 
strategic companies as they are incorporated as statutory corporations. This has 
resulted in governance structures in soes that are, on average, less transparent 
when compared with listed companies and with their peers globally. To bridge 
this ‘regulatory gap’, a number of leading soes, including Du, the second largest 
telecom provider in the uae and Ma’aden, the largest Saudi mining company, 
have developed internal governance protocols including guidelines for board 
members and charters for board committees. Some soe holding companies and 
sovereign wealth funds with responsibility for soe ownership have developed 
guidelines for board members they nominate (e.g. Mumtalakat in Bahrain).
While some, primarily Gulf-based, soes have recognised the value of pro-
fessionalising their boards and management, this has been far from a universal 
phenomenon in the region (oecd, 2015). In Tunisia for instance, soe board 
members and management are not given the authority to set and implement 
corporate strategy and refer to the government for all operational decisions. 
In Iraq and Syria, where soe reform is at earlier stages—overshadowed by 
the complexities of ongoing conflicts—addressing ‘bread and butter’ issues of 
9 Tunisia and Oman are currently in the process of developing such guidelines. Globally, re-




 corporatisation and the valuation of soe assets is an even higher priority than 
the professionalisation of boards and the competitiveness of soes.
4 The Role of the State in Capital Markets
Over the past decade, as privatisation has become unpopular in the region, 
governments have divested few of their stakes in soes, while at the same time 
increasing their ownership in a range of public listed firms. Privatisation activ-
ity in the region has ground to a halt, victim of allegations of crony capitalism, 
especially in Tunisia and Egypt—once the top ‘privatisers’ in the region,10 and 
of the unwillingness of governments to further privatise companies in which 
stakes were already divested over the past 20 years.
Whereas, globally, a few countries—such as Norway and Spain—are con-
templating comprehensive privatisation programmes, few countries in the 
region including Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Oman seriously consider this as a 
policy option. In recent years, privatisation activity in the region has been ad 
hoc and relatively insignificant with the possible exception of the listing of the 
National Commercial Bank in Saudi Arabia, the second largest Initial Public 
Offering (ipo) globally in 2014. However, even this transaction saw the alloca-
tion of 40 per cent of shares to the Public Pension Agency, a Saudi state-owned 
pension fund.
Other sovereign institutional investors in Saudi Arabia, including nota-
bly the Public Investment Fund and the General Organisation for Social In-
surance, are increasing their investment stakes in Tadawul in advance of its 
planned opening to foreign investors. This reflects the growing participation 
of sovereign pension funds, insurance companies and banks in mena capital 
markets, facilitated by their ‘preferred access’ to privatisation tranches as part 
of the subscription process.
An analysis of the 600 largest firms listed on the region’s exchanges, ac-
counting for 97 per cent of total market capitalisation, demonstrates that sov-
ereign investors are the largest investor category in all mena markets with 
the exception of Lebanon and Tunisia (see Figure 6.1), ahead of family offices. 
Unsurprisingly, the largest sovereign investment in capital markets occurs in 
the Gulf countries, where such investors are estimated to control 75 per cent of 
10 According to the World Bank’s Privatisation Database, Egypt was the largest privatiser in 
the region from 2000 to 2008 with usd 11.6 billion in privatisation revenues, followed by 
Morocco with usd 7.9 billion and Tunisia with usd 3.6 billion.
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listed companies in the uae and 65 per cent in Qatar (in terms of their market 
capitalisation).
As a result, 34 of the top 100 largest listed companies in the region are ma-
jority state-owned and a further 55 have significant but not controlling state 
blockholdings. Overall, 40 per cent of the 600 largest listed firms in the region 
have the state as a shareholder (Amico and Ozcelik, 2015). These figures are 
substantially higher than equivalent estimates in other emerging markets, 
with a few exceptions such as China.
A positive feature of this situation is that sovereign institutional investors in 
the region tend to act as long-term passive shareholders in mena equity mar-
kets, which are known for their volatility driven by retail investors. However, to 
the extent that private institutional investor ownership in listed soes is poised 
to increase following the opening of the Saudi market and the upgrade of the 
uae and Qatar to emerging market status in 2014, companies with a mix of 





















































Figure 6.� Value held by institutional investors (as a percentage of market capitalisation by 
country)
* Alternative investors; asset managers; insurance companies; investments/mutual 
funds; pension funds.




Unlike sovereign investors, which might take into account social or politi-
cal considerations, foreign pension funds for instance would act as purely fi-
nancial investors, likely implementing similar engagement tactics as those 
they have used in their home markets. Although the mena region has seen 
virtually no shareholder dissent in recent years, some signs of this tension in 
state- controlled companies are beginning to emerge. At Emaar Properties, a 
uae-based real estate developer, shareholders have recently questioned the 
involvement of the chairman and other directors in competing firms and their 
cross-directorships in these (The Arabian Post, 2015). However, investor dissent 
might be muted by the fact that the returns on investment provided by state-
controlled firms are generally superior to the market average.11
5 Conclusion
While it is now widely accepted that private sector-led growth is necessary 
if structural unemployment in the region is to be addressed, state-led de-
velopment remains a pervasive characteristic of the Arab world, supported 
by both sovereign financial and industrial actors: swfs and soes. The ide-
ologies that underpinned the privatisation momentum of the 1980 and the 
1990s are no longer seen as relevant to the current socio-economic realities 
of the region by the general public and by policymakers across the political 
spectrum. This owes to the fact that privatisations in a number of countries 
were tainted by corruption and that today mistrust of the private sector 
looms large.
One manifestation of this is that many Arab governments continue to act as 
the largest employers of nationals, even as fiscal constraints in oil-importing 
and exporting countries place significant pressure on public spending. While 
public sector employment of nationals is a long-standing tradition in the Gulf, 
growing soe employment in other countries of the region—including Tunisia, 
where it is estimated to have doubled from pre-revolution figures—indicates 
that transitioning these firms to the private sector will require politically un-
popular reforms.
At the same time, question marks surround the private sector’s capacity to 
act as a locomotive of economic growth in the Arab world. Many large, family-
owned firms in the region, established post-independence, are currently going 
11 A recent Morgan Stanley report found that soes in the Middle East, but also in other re-
gions, generate superior returns compared to benchmark indices (Morgan Stanley, 2012).
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through succession changes and their sustainability is being tested. With 65 
per cent of all firms in the Middle East valued in excess of usd 1 billion being 
family controlled (The Economist, 2015), it is anticipated that these transitions 
will have a significant impact. Few new firms are being created to grow the 
private corporate sector as the rate of new firm creation in the region is one of 
the lowest globally, better only than that of Sub-Saharan Africa.
State-owned firms are thus implicitly being accepted as an integral part of 
Arab economies going forward; as much in the Gulf where experiments with 
state-led growth have been generally positive as in other countries, such as 
Egypt and Tunisia, where a few soes are largely not profitable or able to sub-
stantially contribute to established social objectives.
On the one hand, the mena region’s reliance on soes is a consequence of 
a number of ‘inspiring’ experiments with state capitalism in the Gulf coun-
tries, notably in Saudi Arabia and the uae. In other countries in the region, 
the  survival of state capitalism is linked to the difficulty of finding an alterna-
tive, private sector-led development model as experimentations with private– 
public partnerships and privatisations have fallen short of expectations.  Recent 
global events have further exacerbated mistrust of the private sector, the most 
recent financial crisis having underscored the risks of having ‘too big to fail’ 
private companies and revealed the costs of rescuing them. On other hand, the 
2008 crisis in Dubai demonstrated that soes can be rescued and restructured, 
with contained long-term economic impact.
As a result, for the foreseeable future, reliance on state-owned companies 
as pioneers of national infrastructure projects and as actors with diverse de-
velopmental mandates (e.g. construction of social housing, infrastructure 
development, employment creation) is bound to continue regardless of fiscal 
pressures. Post-revolutionary expectations that governments can play the role 
of fair arbiters of wealth distribution will arguably facilitate government use of 
soes as an active development tool.
Examples of the developmental and social activities of soes vary but are 
visible across the region. For instance, Saudi Aramco, characterised as ‘an is-
land of efficiency’ within the local administration, has consistently been giv-
en mandates related to developing firms in its value chain and occasionally 
 projects beyond its sectorial expertise (e.g. the construction of stadiums). In 
the uae, soes such as Emaar, Jumeirah Group and the Emirates Airline have 
been collectively used as a lever for the development of the tourism and hos-
pitality sectors. Unlike Saudi Arabia, the uae’s success in fostering performing 
soes is underpinned not by granting independence to the management and 
boards of individual companies, but instead by linking these soes together in 
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competitiveness strategies and through informal networks such as those cre-
ated by cross directorships.
Regardless of the ‘soe model’ applied, even critics of state interventionism 
would find it challenging to deny the success of some state capitalism experi-
ments in the region, though they would argue that reliance on soes comes at a 
cost to private sector growth, notably as a result of the lack of a level-playing field. 
Indeed, few sectors where soes are present—such as banking and telecommu-
nications—have been opened to competition, precluding analysis of how state-
controlled firms could fare against their private competitors. Even the telecom-
munications sector—which in most countries has been a success story of soe 
incumbents competing against private firms—has not been fully liberalised.12
In addition to the efficiency losses potentially incurred by not subject-
ing soes to competitive dynamics, the cost of the subsidies or privileged 
treatment provided to soes—while not taken into account in the official 
 statistics— remains sizeable in most countries. For example, in Tunisia where 
state-owned banks have extended loans on preferential terms to industrial 
soes, non-performing loans are estimated to be in excess of 15 per cent, much 
higher than in private sector banks (oecd, 2015; Alpha mena, 2014). Even 
implicit subsidies can have other negative implications: allegations that Gulf 
States subsidise their national airlines have resulted in a major commercial 
dispute with their American and Canadian competitors.
In the long term, attaining competitive neutrality is an important policy ob-
jective in the mena region; not only to improve economic efficiency and the 
fairness of competition between soes and private companies, but also for the 
future development of the private sector. Insofar as key soes operate in sectors 
with relatively high barriers to entry, they face few competitive pressures. 
While private sector competition does not exist in all the sectors in which soes 
operate, relatively intense competition in some sectors has emerged among 
state-owned incumbents.13
While this intra-soe competition generates rents for governments and al-
lows the redistribution of rents to social projects, it also generates considerable 
risks through the high exposure of domestic financial institutions to soe debt. 
While the concern that state-led capitalism might cripple private enterprise 
12 To stimulate competition without forgoing state rents, some countries have instead fos-
tered competition between two state-owned incumbents (e.g. Du and Etisalat in the 
uae).
13 Competition among state-controlled firms has emerged as a distinctive feature of the 
‘Gulf brand’ of state capitalism, in which state-sponsored media, airlines and banks com-
pete quite intensively.
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remains valid, an equally important challenge for the sustainability of state 
capitalism—as highlighted by the 2009 crisis in Dubai—is adequate risk man-
agement at the level of the state to ensure, notably, that risks taken on by soes 
do not negatively affect the financial sector and overall fiscal stability.
However, given the high cost of bailing out failed private enterprises in the 
most recent financial crisis, and given public scepticism of private monopolies 
in the Arab world, the continued reliance on soes is perceived to be accept-
able. In the Gulf, where soes possess ‘privatised’ management insofar as their 
governance organs feature representatives of the private sector—reflecting 
the historical alliances between the state and merchant families—their per-
formance by and large does not give reason to militate for their privatisation. 
A few loss-making firms ought to be restructured in countries such as Kuwait 
and Bahrain, taking into account successful soe experiments nationally and in 
other Gulf Cooperation Council (gcc) countries.
Where soes operate as an extension of the public sector, without the nec-
essary autonomy being afforded to their executives and boards, poor per-
formance has been their common characteristic, both in post-revolutionary 
countries (e.g. Libya and Tunisia) and in other republics (e.g. Iraq and Algeria). 
Somewhat paradoxically and for reasons explained above, the weak perfor-
mance of soes in these countries has not yet stimulated any demands for soe 
reform apart from calls to reduce corruption and nepotism. This suggests that, 
at least for the near future, soes will be accepted as a fixture of the new social 
contract in the region.
For entirely different reasons, neither the Gulf monarchies nor the regimes 
that have emerged as a result of recent revolutions perceive the need to dra-
matically alter the terms of their involvement in mena economies. Indeed, 
privatisation was not on the agenda of regional governments until 2016, 
when the fiscal situation of some gcc countries started to deteriorate due 
to falling oil prices. Elsewhere in the region, the reduction of state owner-
ship  anticipated by some observers of the Arab Spring failed to materialise as 
populations of such countries as Egypt and Tunisia grew disenchanted with 
previous experiments.
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Can economic growth and democracy be fuelled by finance and credit? This chap-
ter examines mechanisms that have positive effects on democratic transition in the 
Middle East and North Africa (mena) region, such as credit growth and the develop-
ment of capital markets-based credit, based on a bond market and a Sukuk market, 
its sharia-compliant equivalent. The contribution analyses the general role of credit 
as a network of legally binding contracts of trust between economic actors, includ-
ing the state, in any given country. By comparing the role and size of credit in the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (oecd) countries and the 
mena region, the author argues that, in general, the growth of credit’s role in mena 
countries and, in particular, the development of debt capital markets in the region, 
strengthen public participation in the economic activity of the region. The spread of 
contractual obligations requires more transparent and accessible accounting and fi-
nancial reporting, and a wider network of legally binding obligations. These powerful 
mechanisms therefore facilitate democratic transitions in mena countries, even in 
autocratic regimes.
1 Introduction
A democratic system provides ‘trust between the largest number of people 
who do not know each other’ (Leca, 2014). It is in this context that finance and 
credit play the important, or even central, role of providing monetary means 
towards industrial or commercial opportunities fuelling economic growth. In 
this chapter, we will examine how the financial sector, and particularly credit 
activity in the Arab world, can contribute to transitions to more democratic 
processes through fostering economic growth, and trust based on rules and 
institutions rather than on previous acquaintance. We will compare the place 
and role of credit in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment (oecd) countries and in the Middle East and North Africa (mena) 
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and discuss how it could promote or impede transitions to more democratic 
processes and economic growth in the Arab world.
2 Capital Markets, Governance, and the Economy
The capital markets of the major oecd nations are fuelled by credit in its 
various forms. The banking industry and capital markets have created an eco-
nomic environment, mainly through the use of debt, that is an essential com-
ponent of economic activity and a determinant of the monetary policies of 
central banks. Credit inventories mirror the nature of economic activity, and 
new credit that becomes available reflects developing trends in economic ac-
tivities. The financial sector, and more specifically credit (rather than equity 
investment), can therefore be considered the cement that binds together all 
the components of a given economy: producers, consumers, regulators and 
government agencies alike.
Financial contracts, and specifically credit availability and development, 
represent the agreements of trust between the parties involved in producing 
and consuming finance and credit. This network of agreements of trust enables 
the highest number of economic agents to participate in economic activity 
and contribute to the growth of the gross domestic product (gdp). The wider 
the network of trust is, the more inclusive the economy and the higher the 
potential for the development of a country’s gdp.
Using these fundamental equations, the central role that credit plays is 
clear. But the role of credit is only possible if the inventory built on agreements 
of trust is within a given framework of rules. All parties—whether providers of 
credit, or agents accessing it to fuel their activity—must agree to these rules 
in a general consensus. The credibility and effectiveness of agreements of trust 
are thus a function of this framework, which is in fact a democratic framework 
in as much as it is not controlled from the top down, but responds to multiple, 
independent, decentralized decision-making.
The governance of advanced credit systems is composed principally of the 
following elements:
• An independent judicial system—Independent courts with fully developed 
commercial and bankruptcy laws.
• Licenses and Permits—In order to produce, distribute and manage credit, 
banks and financial institutions should operate within a set of regula-
tions that impose conditions for the volume and price of credit, and that 
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determine which corporations, entities or individuals can access it. Banks 
and financial institutions must be licensed within the context of gover-
nance to which all parties subscribe.
• Regulatory bodies—Independent or neutral entities (central banks, capital 
markets authorities, and stock market boards) should oversee the function-
ing of the system.
• Information—Composed from data representing the components of credit 
(prices, volumes and conditions), and from the elements of risk and the 
price of non-performance for each transaction. Information should include 
documents provided by the credit distributors describing the products and 
their risks to potential clients, as well as the appropriate disclaimers and 
reports that facilitate the understanding and management of the evolution 
of these products over time. Information is also a function of the gover-
nance context in which credit operates, and this context should make all 
economic data and accounting standards available to active participants. 
A democratic framework provides for central, independent information in-
stitutes (national statistics institutes) and a general set of accounting and 
fiscal regulations, allowing all parties contracting credit transactions to have 
access to the same information.
The closer a country comes to this framework, the better the conditions for 
credit availability and growth are. It is not by accident that countries that have 
developed the most advanced credit systems and frameworks have demo-
cratic institutions. It is difficult to expect that appropriate conditions for a 
well- developed credit system may obtain under authoritarian regimes, which 
inevitably rely on limitations to the rule of law, to data transparency, to inde-
pendent institutions, and to freedom of enterprise.
3 The Financial Structures of oecd and mena Economies Show 
Significant Differences
The most developed credit systems are found in oecd member countries, the 
majority of member states having economies that operate with most of the de-
sirable conditions we have described, delivering the most creditable set of ‘trust 
contracts’ to the largest possible number of participants in their economies. In 
oecd countries, banks’ share of the total funding of the economies of member 
states is on average in a range of 33 to 35 per cent (oecd, 2014); capital markets’ 
share is between 65 and 67 per cent. Within capital markets, stock markets and 
equities contribute between 25 and 30 per cent, and bonds between 40 and 42 
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per cent of the total. This shows that credit’s share of total sources of finance in 
oecd countries as a whole amounts to 75 per cent on average.
This places credit at the centre of the oecd’s economic activities, an as-
sessment consistent with the theoretical position that credit should have in 
the context of developed democratic frameworks. Two primary characteristics 
emerge when looking at the structure of oecd country balance sheets in the 
banking sector:
1. Banks fully play the role of ‘transformation’ or gap management by hav-
ing longer-term assets and relatively shorter-term liabilities. For example, 
within the eu, loan-to-deposit ratios show the transformation of bank 
deposits, which account for 50 to 60 per cent of banks’ very short-term 
liabilities, into assets that are longer than two years (ecb, 2014).
2. Bank balance sheets show a relatively high level of leverage towards capi-
tal availability. The median equity-to-total-assets ratios in the eurozone 
banking sector are between 6 and 8 per cent. If one uses a stricter defini-
tion of capital, such as equity over total bank liabilities, these ratios are 
even lower.
This indicates high leverage in the sector, which confirms the level of trust 
in the governance framework surrounding the inventory of credit delivered 
through this channel, and a high level of confidence in the mechanisms in 
place to guarantee the protection of rights and the execution of clauses in the 
multitude of contracts struck between all parties related to this credit inven-
tory. This can be considered a confirmation of the credibility of the governance 
framework provided by the democratic context in oecd countries.
The structures of mena economies paint a very different picture. In early 
2000, the financing structure was composed of banks, with a total share of 
80 to 85 per cent, with equity markets representing 12 to 15 per cent on aver-
age and bond markets a mere 2 to 3 per cent (imf, 2004). These numbers 
changed with the rise of stock markets during the years preceding the 2008 
crisis, with the share of stock markets reaching 45 per cent or more (in 2007), 
decreasing again to 26–27 per cent in 2008, and then stabilising around 35 
per cent in recent years. The share of bonds and debt securities has increased 
significantly in the last decade, doubling in size and number of issues. While 
this is an important change, the starting point was very low. Banks’ share, 
while decreasing over the period, remains very high at around 67–68 per cent 
(Kern, 2012).
The primary difference in mena’s financing structure is the dominant role 
bank credit plays in economic activities. Moreover, state banks account for 
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38–40 per cent of total available bank credit (Farazi et al., 2011). However, state 
banks’ share has decreased in the last ten years: the above ratio is an average 
covering all mena economies, and the figure varies significantly from one 
country to another. On average, state ownership of banks in the member coun-
tries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (gcc) has significantly decreased during 
the last decade, but in comparison to the oecd average it remains higher by 
a factor of 2 to 2.5 times. In the other mena countries this ratio has decreased 
far less, and in some cases has remained very high, with state-owned banks ac-
counting for more than 70 per cent of total bank credit.
The balance sheets of banks from the mena region show that a majority of 
their loans have maturities of one year or less, which indicates a lack of trans-
formation in these banks’ financing activities.
Capital adequacy ratios (cars) in the gcc banking sector—where the per-
centage of direct state ownership is the lowest—were in the range of 18 to 20 
per cent in 2003. These ratios were impacted by the 2008 financial crisis, but in 
a limited way, leaving them closer to the level of 15 to 17 per cent. Some coun-
tries were affected more than others; in particular the uae’s banking system 
was hit the hardest in relative terms, with the car decreasing from 18 to 12 per 
cent. While this is a significant decrease (a 35 to 40 per cent deterioration of the 
ratio is a very significant impact by any standards), a 12 per cent ratio remains 
very high compared to ratios observed in oecd countries (Khamis, 2010).
The total inventory of credit to the private sector in mena countries repre-
sents a mere 50 per cent of gdp, while in oecd member states as a whole this 
ratio reaches 150 per cent of gdp. This is an indication of the significant differ-
ence in the role of credit in mena. Although banks seem to have an important 
share in the economies of the region, they do not perform with the same ratios 
as those observed in oecd countries, delivering on average one year matu-
rity loans—a figure that is 2.5 times lower than in oecd countries. This is low 
leverage given the high capital adequacy ratios they maintain. Moreover, the 
relatively high number of state-owned banks should discount the banking sec-
tor’s share in mena credit activity.
Such low performance leads to exclusion. A study carried out by the World 
Bank Financial Access Group in 2010 (cgap, 2010) shows that small and me-
dium-sized companies in oecd countries receive close to 27 per cent of total 
loans, while the figure is only 7.6 per cent for mena countries. The study also 
shows that in oecd countries the number of bank accounts per 1,000 adults is 
2,300, of which 750 are loan accounts—an indicator of access to the credit pool 
available in the economy. This compares with only 750 accounts per 1,000 adults 
in mena, of which only around 100 are loan accounts. Another study, carried 
out by the imf in 2007, shows—if any additional proof were needed—that 
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in the us approximately 90 per cent of the population has access to financial 
services; in Europe this figure is about 75 per cent; and in mena countries only 
about 30 per cent.
All these elements show that banks in mena are highly capitalised, mean-
ing that their potential to deliver credit is much higher than their actual contri-
bution. Additionally, the credit they provide is very short term. This is partly a 
result of limited access to risk assessment tools, the absence or poor reliability 
of data that would allow a robust credit scoring system, and the difficulty of ac-
cessing a set of enforceable guarantees that would allow them to project credit 
risk visibility towards longer average maturities for their loans.
4 Finance and Democracy in mena
Given the financial structure of the economies in the mena region, the role 
credit plays is consistent with a relatively poor democratic environment de-
livering a weak governance framework due to the deficit in the enabling en-
vironment. mena countries’ economies are therefore fuelled by a top-down 
conversation, in which banks are dominant and debt securities providing 
credit through capital markets offer a limited contribution and alternative to 
bank financing. Moreover, family groups and individuals close to ruling fami-
lies or to members of the states’ regimes dominate the ownership structure of 
private sector banks with a significant size and market share. This promotes 
credit access only to a reduced perimeter of participants who enjoy personal 
relationships with members of the ownership structure itself. Name lending, 
rather than credit scoring and financial solvency ratios, becomes the basis for 
credit access.
These examples of exclusion show how the position of credit in mena 
economies creates links dependent on agreements of trust between people 
who already know each other, and are linked together in a manner that is not 
necessarily based on economic ventures. This can lower the publicly disclosed 
accountability requirements that would impose a governance framework 
more consistent with a democratic environment.
With credit’s low share of mena economies’ financing, and the banking sec-
tor being the main source for its allocation, access to financial and economic 
opportunity remains a ‘closed’ process. The ownership of banks validates the 
consensus of power in place and keeps gatekeeping privileges in the hands of 
those close to the ruling structures in mena. This slows down the entry of new 
participants into the economy unless those individuals possess substantial 
amounts of capital and, thus, do not need to access credit.
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5 The Important Role of the Market for Debt Securities
In oecd countries as a whole, credit is the central element of economic activ-
ity as indicated by the size of the inventory over total gdp. The share of the 
banking sector is significant, but the share of credit generated in the capital 
markets is even larger.
Capital markets-based financing appears to thrive and seems consistent 
with significant and credible democratic processes. Debt securities sold to in-
vestors demand a different type of conversation, in which the terms of the con-
tractual agreements, commitments and obligations of the parties involved are 
more balanced—investors placing their trust in a transaction no longer need 
to do so based purely on personal connections. Rather, a given transaction 
would be a business proposal, a project or a cash flow, presented to investors 
in a conversation in which there is no certainty of the outcome in advance and 
the price is not fixed by a dominant party, such as a bank, in a market where 
alternative means of accessing financing are scarce.
The process of financing through a debt security is, in a sense, a voting 
process (although one in which voting powers are unequally distributed). It 
implies disclosure, transparency of information at inception, the obligation 
for information to be available throughout the life of the transaction and a 
set of clauses designed to manage problems, delays, and potential default. 
Credible enforcement agencies are necessary to convince both investors and 
borrowers seeking an alternative method of financing their projects. This is 
very clear with respect to the market for government bonds, where a govern-
ment’s misbehaviour is punished by an increase in the cost of borrowing and 
a loss of legitimacy, even if that government does not face the test of an im-
minent election. It is also one reason why many governments prefer to borrow 
internationally rather than expose themselves to the judgment of domestic 
investors and credit markets.
In general, bond market growth assumes a level of financial and accounting 
disclosure, which is necessary for the credibility of the interest payments that 
the transaction promises to deliver to the subscribers. This exchange of prom-
ises backed by sufficient financial and legal documentation from the issuers, 
and the delivery of accounting and financial tools to the investors in order to 
convince them first, and encourage them to increase their investments in ex-
isting or new issues, is effectively based on many elements of democratic pro-
cesses and governance frameworks. Agreements of trust between people with 
no previous connection are able to expand, mirrored by the bond transactions 
representing this trust. The price of these bonds at inception, and the evolu-
tion of that price through independent actions of selling or buying units of 
the bond issue indicate the reaction of people with no previous connection to 
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the issuers and assess the level of trust that these people have. This is a typical 
example of capital market voting behaviour, implying independent decision-
making based on required information, disclosure, transparent price fixing 
and access to the mechanisms of investing or divesting, buying or selling in an 
anonymous process.
The growth of credit through the issuance of bonds is therefore an important 
development; it encourages behaviour and expectations within the economic 
sphere, which can support the transition towards more democratic behaviour 
in the political realm. It allows the number of participants in economic activ-
ity to increase. The trust and links are no longer between previously connected 
parties, allowing the number of conversations and growth impulses to increase. 
Increasingly available and accessible credit fosters economic expansion.
6 The Market for Debt Securities in mena
In mena, the amount of credit available through debt securities is limited 
compared to the dominant share of the banking sector. However, as described 
above, the rate of growth in different segments of the financial sector varies. 
Bond issuance is accelerating significantly. Taking the example of the gcc, 
where capital markets are developing faster, bond issuance volumes have been 
increasing at a rate of 30 per cent for more than a decade, from a mere usd 9 
billion total issuance in 2003 to usd 57 billion in 2012, and an accelerating trend 
leading to expected bond issuance levels of more than usd 80 billion in 2015.
Another important phenomenon is the growing Sukuk (Sharia-compliant 
debt equivalent securities) market. Between 1996 and 2010, a total of 276 Sukuk 
bonds were issued in the gcc. For the year 2011 alone, 150 Sukuk bonds were 
issued. Domestic Sukuk amounts reached usd 120 billion in 2014, from a level 
of usd 5 billion equivalent in 2001, while the international Sukuk market saw 
issues increasing from usd 1.6 billion in 2003 to usd 28 billion in 2014, and 
increasing interest from non-Islamic or non-gcc or mena participants—both 
sovereign and corporate issuers (iifm, 2014; Markaz, 2010).
Debt issue trends observed in both conventional bond markets and more 
importantly in the Sukuk market point to strong and accelerating momentum, 
attracting international borrowers and investors. While the international Su-
kuk market remains small, its development—matching the pace of domestic 
and global issues from gcc-based borrowers—is an important indicator of the 
fact that these markets are gaining depth and credibility, an important factor 
in the further acceleration of growth.
Access to credit made available via capital markets remains limited; but 
the probability of a widening of the perimeter of new participants entering 
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credit markets is increasing in line with the growth of the debt capital market. 
Furthermore, the existing actors involved in credit are changing the nature of 
their relationships, going from trust based on pre-existing relationships to an 
exchange of rights and obligations via instruments that are regulated and su-
pervised within a set of rules and pricing mechanisms, and reflecting a trad-
ing activity that makes price, and its evolution, transparent to a wider set of 
potential participants.
The development of capital markets-based finance is in turn helping create 
additional rules and regulations and pushing the improvement of the regu-
latory and legal environment of the credit activities delivered through these 
channels. While the financial crisis in 2008 significantly slowed growth for two 
years, it also created in certain cases a need for restored credibility and the 
incentive to improve the regulatory environment. The quick recovery of issu-
ance and volumes is testimony to the strength and potential of these markets.
The development of capital markets and credit has taken place within an 
environment of high oil prices in the last decade, generating tremendous cash 
reserves and making the need for credit less essential for economic activity. In 
the new context of significantly lower price levels, and considering the stress 
that this puts on the spending budgets of many mena countries, credit is ex-
pected to play a more central role, accelerating the growth of its share in the 
financing of economic activities.
As credit growth accelerates, it will progressively shape and improve a gov-
ernance framework that will provide a stronger foundation for increasing re-
liance on capital market debt. If the currently observed trends continue, we 
should see the ratio of credit to mena countries’ gdp rise, approaching lev-
els observed in oecd economies. This will encourage a more open economic 
playing field, where people who do not necessarily have personal connections 
can trust each other, progressively influencing the way economies function 
and how they are fuelled by credit.
The rising market for debt eventually encourages the uptake of behaviour 
that resembles voting processes in the economic and financial sphere. This 
fosters changes in economic structure, which can also progressively promote 
democratic features in the political spheres of mena.
7 Financial Crises and the Development of Regulations
Credit’s role in oecd member democracies is at the core of the functioning 
of their economies. This does not mean that the credit system itself functions 
well at all times. The evolution of the credit inventory and its rate of growth, 
141Can Finance And Credit Enable Economic Growth And Democracy?
<UN>
as well as instruments developed by the financial industry, can be the cause of 
major economic crises.
The crisis of 2008 showed how banks and financial markets, through their 
excessive use of leverage and their ability to ‘exclude’ competitors from the in-
formation and transparency necessary for the proper functioning of the system 
(particularly through the development of complex financial instruments known 
as derivatives), became one of the main reasons for the economic collapse.
One of the measures of a political system’s strength can be the manner in 
which it reacts to crises and produces effective corrective actions. Credit’s in-
ventory size in oecd countries reached a level that was excessive compared 
to the underlying gdp. In this instance, credit became a risk to democratic 
processes and jeopardised the political sphere in which it operated.
An oversized credit inventory, operated by banks that are ‘too big to fail’, can 
be a risk for advanced oecd member democracies. Capital requirements were 
imposed on these banks, aiming to provide a more transparent ‘price’ for lever-
age rather than changing the mechanism at the core of the financial system.
mena countries, in contrast, face the opposite risks, associated with credit 
being too small a component in the way economic activity is financed. The 
trends we have described with regards to the evolution of the financial sector 
in mena point to a healthy and promising level of growth. These trends vary 
from country to country and are most evident in gcc member states. While 
such positive trends are solid, credit still plays too small a part in the financing 
of these economies to become a main agent of change towards greater reliance 
on democratic processes.
Regardless, the influence of credit is growing and the financial crisis of 2008 
could end up having a positive impact. In 2009, several defaults in mena were 
triggered as spillovers of the collapse of global capital markets. In particular, 
the default of Dubai’s flagship corporations significantly impacted the emir-
ate’s access to credit and capital markets. The credibility of Dubai’s implicit 
guarantees—on which previous loans and bonds, both international and do-
mestic, were based—has been permanently damaged. This can have positive 
consequences if we consider that compliance with the more transparent and 
commonly used tools of guarantees and accounting will need to occur. This in 
turn improves the conditions for credit to grow, as it strengthens the quality 
of contracts struck between lenders and borrowers, potentially attracting new 
participants to the credit market.
The defaults of Kuwait’s Investment Dar and Global Investment House, 
the liquidity difficulties of Gulf Bank in 2009, and—in Saudi Arabia and 
Bahrain—the Al-Gosaibi’s financial crisis (triggered by the default of the Inter-
national Banking Corporation and Awal Bank, controlled by Maan Al Sanea) 
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did not endanger the overall solvency of the system given the relatively limited 
size of credit in the economies of those countries. However, the restructuring 
of these failed institutions’ debt involved more than 80 banks internationally 
and domestically. This will tend to force the emergence of improved standards 
of accounting and increased transparency. The quality of guarantees that bor-
rowers in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and in Kuwait will need to provide in 
order to access credit or issue Sukuks will need to improve. The acceleration of 
Sukuk issuance throughout the region and beyond reflects the improved qual-
ity of ‘trust contracts’ struck, and the increase in the number of participants 
accessing and providing credit.
At the end of 2014, the Egyptian government issued investment certificates 
soliciting the savings of national investors to fund infrastructure projects and 
the expansion of the Suez Canal. The transaction was a success: three weeks 
after the certificates were issued they sold out; the government netted usd 8.5 
billion. The certificates represent an important commitment as they promise a 
return (12 per cent) and capital protection, providing credit guarantees based 
on the cash flow of the commercial activity of the Suez Canal as a security for 
capital and interest payments.
While an autocrat is again in power in Egypt, credit in this example intro-
duces an element of commitment from the issuer or borrower towards the in-
vestors, similar to that of an electoral process, given the accountability that 
the certificates impose. It is difficult for the issuer to default on these com-
mitments without damaging its credibility or facing consequences that would 
weaken its hold on power. The universe of investors that has subscribed to the 
certificates is obviously far from representative of the whole of Egyptian soci-
ety, and only a few Egyptians that had the means to subscribe to the certificates 
are ‘voters’ in this exercise. Nevertheless, the process still imposes a significant 
degree of accountability.
8 Conclusion
Democratic transitions benefit from expanding credit within the economy. Au-
tocratic governments that use the benefits of credit to finance growth are also 
faced with new governance obligations that increase the level of accountabil-
ity in their regimes. For this reason, the trend towards a growth of the share of 
credit in the financing of mena economies should be encouraged, especially 
by new democratic regimes.
One of the priorities of new democratic regimes should be the reform of the 
banking system and the promotion of capital markets-based finance in order 
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to spread ‘trust contracts’ within their countries, helping to trigger higher lev-
els of growth. The development of credit within a strong regulatory context, 
can only strengthen new democratic regimes.
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This paper analyses the role of agriculture in the political economy of the Middle East 
and North Africa (mena). It outlines agriculture’s relative contribution to development 
and employment, shows linkages with food security policies, and discusses possible fu-
ture scenarios. Agriculture’s role in the economies of mena is limited nowadays, but 
its contribution to employment is still substantial. In many countries it is at the heart 
of the region’s water crisis as it withdraws about 80 per cent of water resources. Ag-
ricultural constituencies have played an important role in sociopolitical transforma-
tions of the region. Populist regimes tried to win them over—as support base—with 
land reforms enacted in the 1950s and 1960s. Since the 1980s these earlier reforms have 
been pushed back and the sector has been liberalised under bureaucratic-authoritar-
ian reform coalitions. In other countries, such as Saudi Arabia, extensive production 
subsidies have been maintained. The mena region is the largest cereal importer in the 
world and its governments regard this dependency as a strategic liability. However, the 
quest for self-sufficiency has proven to be elusive in the light of natural constraints and 
population growth. The major challenge in mena is not macro food security or lack 
of calories, but deficiencies of micronutrients such as vitamins and iron and a lack of 
accessible food for the poor. Hence, inclusive growth, rural livelihood strategies, and 
political participation will be crucial for food security in mena.
1 Introduction
Worldwide, agriculture has seen a relentless decline in its gross domestic 
product (gdp) contribution and employment capacities compared to indus-
try and services. The Middle East and North Africa (mena) is no exception. 
Agriculture’s share of gdp hovers in the single digits in most countries. Its 
developmental and political importance is often overlooked. However, the 
1 A Marie Curie Grant from the European Commission funded this research. Some parts of 
this article were first published in a report for the Union for the Mediterranean, Barcelona 
(http://ufmsecretariat.org/).
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figures for its contribution to employment are higher and it withdraws the vast 
majority—around 80 per cent—of scarce water resources. Agricultural con-
stituencies have played an important role in sociopolitical transformations of 
the region. Populist regimes tried to win them over—as a support base—with 
land reforms that enacted in the 1950s and 1960s. Since the 1980s these ear-
lier reforms have been pushed back and the sector has been liberalised under 
bureaucratic- authoritarian reform coalitions. In other countries, such as Saudi 
Arabia extensive production subsidies have been maintained.
The region is the largest food importer in the world, and its governments 
are keenly aware of the geopolitical vulnerability that comes with such de-
pendence. Maintenance of domestic subsidy regimes is crucial for legitimacy, 
but difficult in light of fiscal constraints and structurally higher food prices on 
international markets since the global food crisis of 2008. Economic develop-
ment, or lack thereof, was a contributing factor to the Arab-Spring uprising, 
and it is crucial for democratic transitions (e.g. Tunisia) and autocratic perse-
verance (e.g. the Gulf States or Egypt) alike.
Against this backdrop, this paper analyses the role of agriculture in the po-
litical economy of the region and its relative contribution to development and 
employment. It then shows linkages with general food security policies and 
discusses possible future developments.
2 The Importance of Agriculture in mena
Agriculture is mena’s largest water consumer and still provides a substantial 
proportion of employment in some of the region’s countries. Its contribution 
to economic prosperity is much smaller. In most countries agriculture’s value 
added as percentage of gdp is in single digit territory. In Libya, the Gulf coun-
tries and Israel it is at 2 per cent or below. In some countries, such as Egypt, Iran, 
Syria and Morocco, the rural population is a relatively large proportion of the 
total, at 31–56 per cent; but even in these countries agriculture’s contribution 
to employment and value added is limited, as Table 8.1 shows. In Sudan and 
Yemen, where a majority of the population still live in rural areas, agriculture’s 
contribution to employment and value added also trails behind. This points 
to low productivity and hidden unemployment in the countryside. In a sub-
stantially urbanised country like Turkey, for example, 30 per cent of the labour 
force still work in agriculture, but generate only 8.5 per cent of the value added.
Agriculture is by far the largest water user in the region, withdrawing rough-
ly 80 per cent—with Syria (90 per cent) and Israel (60 per cent) as outliers. 
Agriculture’s water use is consumptive; following evapotranspiration through 
the plants that are grown it cannot be recycled like residential water supplies 
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or used twice like the cooling water of power plants. Hence, agriculture’s share 
of consumptive water use is even higher, hovering around 92 per cent (Allan et 
al., 2015; Allan, 2011; Allan, 2001; Dawoud, 2007).
Past agricultural expansion has been ecologically and economically ques-
tionable because of its reliance on limited water resources and costly producer 
subsidies. Water tables in the region have been sinking at an alarming rate. In 
2008 Saudi Arabia started to phase out its subsidised wheat programme (until 
Table 8.1 Share of agriculture (%)—rural population, labour force, value added
Rural population  
(% of total  
population) 2013
Labour force in  
agriculture (% of total  
labour force) 2013
Agriculture, 
value added  
(% of gdp)
Morocco 42.24 23.47 14.6 (2012)
Algeria 25.32 20.09 9.3 (2012)
Tunisia 33.27 19.59 8.7 (2013)
Libya 21.94 2.53 1.9 (2008)
Egypt 56.19 23.22 14.5 (2013)
Israel 7.99 1.53 1.6 (2013)
West Bank and 
Gaza
25.22 7.06 6.9 (2011)
Jordan 16.79 5.60 3.4 (2013)
Syria 43.15 18.74 17.9 (2007)
Lebanon 12.53 1.47 7.2 (2013)
Turkey 26.60 30.40 8.5 (2013)
Kuwait 1.72 1.01 0.5 (2003)
Qatar 0.92 0.64 n.a.
Iran 30.65 20.42 10.2 (2007)
Iraq 33.61 4.65 n.a.
Bahrain 11.19 0.61 0.9 (1995)
Saudi Arabia 17.29 4.17 2.2 (2012)
Oman 26.05 27.56 1.9 (2004)
uae 15.05 2.73 0.7 (2012)
Yemen 66.52 35.74 10.1 (2006)
South Sudan 70.07 48.64 n.a.
Sudan 70.07 48.61 27.7 (2012)
Mauritania 57.99 49.65 17.0 (2012)
Source: faostat, 2014; World Bank, 2014; United Nations, 2014.
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2016) as aquifers containing non-renewable fossil water have been depleted. 
In a next step it will need to cut back its production of alfalfa, which is used as 
feed for livestock and is even more water intensive than wheat. In the future, 
Saudi Arabia plans to direct scarce water resources to more value-added crops 
like fruit and vegetables grown in greenhouses. Yet a reduction in the water-
hungry flood irrigation of date palms is difficult because of their importance 
for hobby farms and weekend retreats.
Syria is another example of agricultural expansion that has been ecologi-
cally unsustainable. Unlike many other mena countries, Syria did not neglect 
agriculture in the wake of the oil boom. For strategic reasons it had a keen inter-
est in self-sufficiency. With the help of land reform and agricultural subsidies it 
cultivated a political support base in the countryside (Hinnebusch, 2011). The 
system was geared towards large-scale flood irrigation for water- intensive crops 
like cotton and wheat. The irrigated area doubled between 1985 and 2000. Like 
in neighbouring Iraq, much of this irrigation relied on pumped groundwater, 
not on surface water (Voss et al., 2013). By the mid-1990s Syria had become self-
sufficient in wheat and barley. With a short, drought-induced interruption in 
1999/2000 it remained so until 2008. However, aquifers were over-pumped and 
agricultural production was expanded in fragile steppe ecosystems. Competing 
agencies of the segmented, bureaucratic Syrian state cultivated an opaque 
culture of secrecy around water issues and were unable to introduce more ef-
ficient water management practices (de Chatel, 2014).
Agricultural production in mena countries cannot, then, be substantially 
increased due to natural constraints. At best it can be stabilised at current levels 
with improved water management and rain-fed farming. In some cases a great-
er focus on more value-added crops like fruit and vegetables is indicated; this 
will require different technologies, infrastructure and distribution networks. 
Reliance on food imports is here to stay and will likely increase with population 
growth and more varied diets. This raises crucial questions about the reliability 
of global markets in supplying such food imports. Agriculture in mena is un-
dergoing a process of reorientation against the backdrop of past development 
policies, lasting socio-economic importance, and natural constraints.
3 Historical Evolution of Land, Food, and Agricultural Policies
‘Peasants defy categorization’ is the title of an introduction by John Waterbury 
to a book about peasants in the Arab world (Kazemi and Waterbury, 1991). 
Peasants made up the majority of the mena population until not too long ago. 
As recently as 1980 the share of the rural population was above 50 per cent 
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in many mena countries (World Bank, 2014). mena peasants are a heteroge-
neous population ranging from sharecroppers2 through mid-sized farmers to 
large landowners. Their participation in political unrest has often articulated 
itself in the form of ethnic-cum-peasant protests rather than as class-based 
conflict. Yet the agricultural question has loomed large in mena history and 
there is no escaping that it still plays a role today.
In global, comparative terms, parts of mena—such as Egypt and Iraq—
had one of the most unequal distributions of land ownership in the first half 
of the twentieth century. This was the result of the region’s integration into 
a quasi-colonial export trade of agricultural commodities, including cotton, 
sugar, opium and silk. In the course of time, the land tenure system witnessed a 
transformation from Ottoman tax farming to the establishment of private land 
ownership and a cadastre system (Issawi, 1995; Owen, 1993).
Absentee landlords and colonialism not only embodied inequality of land 
ownership, they were also an impediment to the industrialisation that could 
have provided alternative avenues for economic development in the absence of 
land reform. Only Egypt saw attempts at import-substituting industrialisation 
in the 1920s by the urban bourgeoisie, under the aegis of Bank Misr (Davis, 1983).
These sociopolitical conflict constellations led to revolutions and land re-
form in the Arab world after World War ii, especially in Egypt, Syria and Iraq 
(Waterbury, 1983; Hinnebusch, 1989; Batatu, 1978). It was mostly an upper- 
middle segment of the peasantry that benefited from such reforms, being able 
to increase its holdings and market access. The landless and poor peasants saw 
only limited gains, while the power of large landlords of the ancien régime was 
curtailed. Building a political support base in the countryside trumped eco-
nomic motivations such as developing the agricultural sector as a source of 
inputs and demand for the nascent import-substituting industrialisation drive. 
Non-distribution of nationalised land and lack of extension services after re-
form proved to be an issue, particularly in Iraq.
The advent of the oil boom and related Dutch-Disease phenomena further 
affected the efficient management of the agricultural sector. At the same time, 
the capacity of cities to absorb rural migration flows proved limited. The in-
fant industries of the import-substituting industrialisation strategies did not, 
in some mena countries, grow up. They only shifted import dependency from 
manufactured to intermediate goods and contributed to a deterioration of the 
balance of payments. Informal sector employment increased as the formal sec-
tor and the bureaucratic apparatuses failed to provide enough job opportuni-
ties. New arrivals often retained their rural lifestyles as part of their livelihood 
strategies, exemplified by the raising of goats and poultry in backyards and 
2 Tenant farmers who give a part of each crop as rent.
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on rooftops. Alaa al Aswany describes this incomplete urbanisation and the 
ruralisation of cities in his novel The Yacoubian Building, in which he portrays 
a poor rooftop community of rural migrants in Cairo who lead seemingly sepa-
rated lives from the more fortunate dwellers below, while the earlier, bourgeois 
tenants have moved to the suburbs.
mena countries expanded food and energy subsidies in the wake of the oil 
boom of the 1970s. In the case of Egypt, a particularly prominent example, the 
government regulated cotton, wheat, rice, sugar cane, beans and winter onions 
via an often paradoxical mix of production taxation and consumer subsidies. 
In contrast, it protected livestock production by tariffs and bureaucratic im-
port hurdles until 1987. Only the markets for fruit and vegetables remained free 
of government interference. This encouraged a shift of acreage into horticul-
ture and fodder production, including clover (birsim).
In the 1980s the Egyptian state began to dismantle these policies. Fiscal 
pressures were one reason for this, but the government was also alarmed about 
a widening food gap and declining self-sufficiency. Liberalisation policies were 
pushed further in the 1990s. Low oil prices and reduced opportunities for the 
acquisition of strategic rents after the end of the Cold War strained public fi-
nances. The overextended security states of mena that relied on institutional-
ized networks of coercion on a limited economic base implemented neo-liberal 
reform agendas that cut government expenditure and support schemes. By 
1995 only cotton and sugar cane remained under government regulation in 
Egypt. On the consumption side the peak for food subsidies occurred in 1980 
when they covered 20 commodities and accounted for 15 per cent of govern-
ment spending. By 1997 this figure had declined to 6 per cent. Subsidies now 
only covered four commodities: coarse ‘baladi’ bread, coarse ‘baladi’ flour, ed-
ible oil, and sugar (Richards and Waterbury, 2008; Adams Jr., 2003).
Israel and Turkey are particular cases in mena. Both reduced consumer sub-
sidies early on, but still retain considerable producer subsidies. Turkey used to 
have a far-reaching programme of agricultural producer subsidies that entailed 
price supports, input subsidies and marketing monopolies. These have been 
pushed back with policies that have favoured privatisation and the removal of 
trade barriers. Turkey is the seventh largest agricultural economy in the world. 
It is one of the few countries in mena that is a significant agricultural exporter 
and it has considerable self-sufficiency in cereals. It is the world’s largest pro-
ducer of hazelnuts, apricots, figs, cherries, quinces, raisins and poppy seeds. It 
is also the second largest producer of melons, watermelons, strawberries and 
leeks and the third largest of lentils, apples, cucumbers, green beans, green 
peppers, chestnuts and pistachios (usda, 2014c). Similarly, Morocco, Tunisia 
and Egypt are significant exporters of fruit and vegetables—to the European 
Union—while importing the majority of their staple foods (López et al., 2013).
Woertz 150
<UN>
Reform pressures on Egypt and Syria have been particularly pronounced. 
Both countries have faced declining oil production and became net import-
ers of oil and petroleum products by the first decade of the new millennium. 
Reform measures have deeply affected rural populations. Syria embarked on 
an aggressive liberalisation drive in the 1990s that aimed at cutting domestic 
spending and mobilising international private capital (Hinnebusch, 2012). 
These policies accelerated by 2000, benefits accrued to accomplices, urban cli-
ents of the business community and military–security networks, while rural 
areas were neglected (Haddad, 2012). Small-scale farmers suffered from the 
withdrawal of agricultural support schemes, and—as a result—were highly 
vulnerable to the epic drought that wreaked havoc in Syria between 2006 
and 2010. The resulting food insecurity and migration movements to cities in 
the west of Syria caused severe stress to the socio-economic fabric. The Syr-
ian uprising of 2011 has been blamed on climate change in crude Malthusian 
terms; yet, for a fuller understanding, one needs to consider that—prior to the 
drought—increasing social polarisation took place, and that the regime’s reac-
tion to it was inadequate (de Chatel, 2014; Woertz, 2014).
Structural adjustment policies also affected agriculture in Egypt and con-
tributed to increased inequality. Law 96 was fully implemented in 1997 and 
pushed back the land reforms of the Nasser era (Bush, 2002; Bush, 2014). The 
Egyptian Minister of Agriculture, Yousef Wali, was a driving force for the policy 
of economic liberalisation under Mubarak and a large landowner himself. The 
process of rolling back land reform was fraught with influence trading. Wali 
was stripped of his official positions following corruption charges in 2004—a 
remarkable feat in a regime that was not known for its excellence in gover-
nance. Thus these examples from Syria and Egypt illustrate how mena food 
security has been affected by social inequalities, rural neglect, and exposure to 
volatile global markets for food imports.
4 The State of Food Security in mena
Food self-sufficiency is not food security, although the two are often wrongly 
equated in mena. Hardly any country in the world is not reliant on other coun-
tries for at least some food items, while net export capacities are concentrated 
in a few countries (fao, 2012; MacDonald, 2013). Such food imports can pro-
vide security, but also constitute vulnerability. Food importing countries like 
Singapore and Kuwait can be perfectly food secure if they have the foreign 
exchange to pay for food imports and world food markets are not disrupted by 
export restrictions or political crises. The lower the share of food imports as 
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a share of total exports and net remittances, the more food secure a country 
is on a macro level (see Table 8.2). Yet this does not preclude the existence of 
food insecurity in vulnerable households on a micro level.
Food security can be measured on different levels: globally, nationally, and 
locally. Furthermore, different approaches to measurement exist. The catego-
ries of the Global Hunger Index (ghi) of the International Food Policy Research 
Institute (ifpri), Concern Worldwide, and Welthungerhilfe mainly indicate 
calorie deficiency (percentage of the undernourished among the general 
Table 8.2 Status of food security (fs) in mena countries





lence of stunted 
children  
(% of total)







Morocco 8.2 21.6 Serious 49.4 <5
Algeria 7.3 15.6 Serious 45.2 < 5
Tunisia 6.5 9 Moderate 58 < 5
Libya 3.4 21 Moderate N/A N/A
Egypt 8.7 30.7 Serious 51.7 < 5
West Bank 
and Gaza
31.9 11.8 Serious N/A N/A
Jordan 13.9 8.3 Serious 52.3 < 5
Syria 9.7 28.6 Serious 36.7 N/A
Lebanon 16.5 15 Serious N/A < 5
Turkey 2 13.9 Moderate 62.9 < 5
Iraq 0 27.5 Serious N/A 23.5
Iran 2.4 16.6 Moderate N/A < 5
Saudi Arabia 4 9.1 Low 65.7 < 5
Kuwait 2.4 3.8 Low N/A < 5
Bahrain 2.9 9 Low N/A N/A
Qatar 2 4 Low N/A N/A
uae 3.4 N/A Low N/A < 5
Oman 6.2 9.6 Low N/A N/A
Yemen 15.4 59.6 Ex. Alarming 29.6 25.7
Sudan 8.4 37.9 Alarming 25.2 24.3 (2009–11)
Mauretania 20.6 24.2 Alarming N/A 6.5
Source: Breisinger et al., 2012; eiu, 2013; fao et al., 2014.
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population, prevalence of the underweight, and mortality among children 
younger than five). Here the mena region does not score badly on average, 
with low food security risk. Only Syria (moderate), Iraq and Mauritania (seri-
ous) and Yemen and Sudan (alarming) have more serious food security risks 
and issues with calorie deficiencies, according to the ghi (ifpri et al., 2014). 
This is also reflected in the low proportion of undernourished people in most 
mena countries as per the State of Food Insecurity report, issued by the Food 
and Agriculture Organization (fao), the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (ifad), and the World Food Programme (wfp) (see Table 8.2).
Yet food security has an important micro-nutritional dimension. One can 
have enough calories, even too many of them, and yet be food insecure. In all, 
30 per cent of the Egyptian population are obese, many of them poor, and all 
the while they face food insecurity due to a lack of micronutrients such as iron 
and vitamins. Besides poverty, uninformed dietary choices and increased con-
sumption of junk food are contributing to a growing intake of calorie rich food.
A lack of micronutrients affects pregnant women and children in particular. 
This can have a lasting impact. Nutritional deficiency in the womb and during 
the first 1,000 days after birth can lead to stunting. It can affect the cognitive abil-
ities and educational achievements of children for the rest of their lives. When 
poor people cannot afford a balanced and varied diet they have to resort to ba-
sic, calorie-rich food, either permanently or as a temporary stopgap solution in 
the case of sudden price spikes. Hence, the cost of food price volatility and in-
flation are only insufficiently measured by their short-term impact on financial 
indicators and nutrition. By compromising the physical and mental abilities of 
children for life, both factors can have severe long-term developmental effects.
To address these shortcomings, the Beyond the Arab Awakening report issued 
by Washington-based ifpri uses stunting (insufficient height for age) as an in-
dicator of food insecurity on the micro level, and captures micro- nutritional 
shortcomings and other important development aspects such as clean drink-
ing water and access to health care better than the ghi (Breisinger et al., 2012). 
The findings of the report are less positive for mena countries. While only 5 to 
15 per cent of children under five in the Arab world are underweight, between 
15 and 25 per cent are too short for their age (Woertz, 2013b, 17).
On a macro level many mena countries face challenges, as they spend more 
than 5 per cent of their export earnings and net remittances on food imports. 
Only Libya, Turkey, Iran and the oil-exporting Gulf countries spend less. For 
Jordan and Lebanon the figure is above 10 per cent. Despite these constraints 
on a macro level, Jordan has managed to achieve one of the best levels of food 
security among mena countries on a micro level. Libya, on the other hand, 
had one of the worst levels of micro-level food security even before its current 
internal turmoil began. And this occurred despite a very comfortable position 
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on a macro level. The West Bank and Gaza face the worst food security situa-
tion on a macro level, as 31.9 per cent of their export earnings and remittances 
are spent on food imports; but they are relatively food secure on a micro level 
compared to other mena countries.
Micro-nutritional deficiencies and high occurrences of stunting lead mainly 
to the classification of mena countries’ food security risk as ‘serious’ in the ifpri 
report. Only the Gulf countries have a ‘low’ risk, and Turkey, Tunisia and Libya a 
‘moderate’ one. At the other end of the spectrum the food security risk in Sudan 
and Mauritania is deemed ‘alarming’, and in Yemen even ‘extremely alarming’.
Like Egypt, Syria has a very high proportion of stunted children. The ifpri 
report was written before the outbreak of fully fledged civil war in the country. 
Even at that time, Syria’s food security risk was regarded as ‘serious’. By now, 
it has presumably moved beyond being ‘serious’ and might have become 
‘alarming’ or even ‘extremely alarming’. Food security has massively deterio-
rated and the Assad regime has used food embargoes to starve rebel-held areas 
into submission. This is also reflected in a relatively low ranking in the Global 
Food Safety Initiative (gfsi) and in Maplecroft’s Food Security Risk Index, both 
of which comprise a broad-based average of indicators (eiu, 2013; Maplecroft, 
2013). Similar food security deterioration might apply to Libya. In sum, mena 
countries do relatively well in terms of calorie provision and indices that 
measure undernourishment. They do less well when broader issues—such as 
nutritional value, stability of supply, food accessibility and food safety—are 
taken into consideration.
5 Domestic Food Prices and the Politics of Subsidies
Global food prices are different from local food prices, which are moderated 
by subsidies and local costs of food processing and distribution. The latter 
partly depend on the quality of logistics infrastructure and on domestic fuel 
costs and might show different price dynamics than those of agricultural raw 
 materials. In developed countries like the us people spend a relatively low 
proportion of their overall budget on food, and packaged foods constitute a 
large proportion of spending on food items (see Figure 8.1). Hence, inflation 
with regard to crops only affects a fraction of overall spending on food, and the 
impact on overall consumer price inflation is more limited than in developing 
countries where people spend a larger share of their income on food and rely 
less on processed and packaged foods.
People in many mena countries, including Egypt, Algeria and Morocco, 
spend more than a third of their disposable income on food. This is close to the 
figures for developing countries like Kenya, and considerably above other 
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middle-income countries such as China or Russia. Hence, these mena coun-
tries are particularly vulnerable to food price inflation. Only the smaller Gulf 
countries with their higher incomes have allocation profiles that resemble 
those of developed countries, with food accounting for less than 20 per cent of 
overall household spending (see Figure 8.1).
Food, and fuel subsidies for food distribution networks, can cushion the im-
pact of global food price shocks for local consumers and place the burden of 
adjustment on the shoulders of respective governments. Subsidy regimes have 
absorbed some of the global price hikes for consumers in mena countries, but 
there has been pass-through of global food price rises by a factor of 0.2–0.4, 
in line with a global average of 0.3. With the exception of the United Arab 
Emirates (uae) and Yemen, food prices in mena countries are also downward-
sticky—meaning that they adjust on the way up, but do not fall back to the 
same extent when price corrections occur on global markets (Ianchovichina 
et al., 2012).
Food prices in mena countries outpaced overall inflation rates from late 
2005 to mid-2008. Overall consumer price inflation rose from 3.4 per cent in July 
2007 to 10 per cent in July 2008, driven to a large extent by food price inflation, 
which jumped from 5.8 per cent to 14.8 per cent over this 12-month period 
(Albers and Peeters, 2011, 10). It has been argued that such food price rises were 
a contributing factor to the Arab-Spring protests. Jane Harrigan points out that 
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Figure 8.1  Percentage of income spent on food, 2013
Source: usda, 2014a.
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this impact did not occur as a quasi-mechanical transmission, but should be 
seen in the broader context of socio-economic deterioration and a lack of po-
litical freedoms, both of which were in place prior to the protests. The impact 
was also uneven: while there was a significant correlation between food prices 
and unrest in the poorer mena states, this was not the case in the oil-rich Gulf 
monarchies, and food prices did not play a role in the Libyan protest that led 
to the fall of the Gaddafi regime (Harrigan, 2014b). Domestic price increases 
in mena have been considerably below international averages. Rather than 
causing outright depravation they led to a reorientation of household budgets 
towards basic food needs. Thus they compromised purchasing power for non-
food items, which contributed to widespread grievances about stagnating or 
declining living standards that have been associated with economic liberalisa-
tion, corruption, and inequalities of wealth and opportunities (Cammett et al., 
2015; Verme et al., 2014).
Food and fuel subsidies in mena countries as a proportion of gdp vary, 
especially in the case of fuels. In 2008 at the time of the global food crisis, 
they stood at around 2 per cent for food in many mena countries and—for 
fuel—reached more than 6 and 12 per cent, respectively, in Egypt and Syria. 
Fuel subsidies have usually been considerably higher than food subsides: only 
Tunisia and Jordan spend more on food subsidies (Albers and Peeters, 2011). 
These expenditures on subsidies have been a substantial fiscal burden. In the 
cases of Morocco and Egypt, that burden accounted for 20 and 31 per cent, re-
spectively, of total budgetary expenditure. This has raised questions about the 
sustainability of such spending. International organisations such as the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (imf) have called for indiscrimi-
nate food and energy subsidies to be replaced with targeted aid for the poor.
General subsidies applied to basic food items are self-targeting, as poor 
people spend a larger share of their disposable income on these items. They 
are less distorting than subsidies on energy, which disproportionately benefit 
the middle and upper classes with their higher ownership ratios of cars and 
energy-using appliances (air conditioning, washing machines, etc.). For this 
reason, and because they are much higher, energy subsidies are more likely 
candidates for further subsidy reforms than are food subsidies. Kuwait and 
Egypt both cut fuel subsidies in 2014, but maintained food subsidies, although 
Egypt introduced a smart-card system to better target bread subsidies. Food 
subsidies have great significance with regard to political legitimacy. This could 
be seen during the Arab Spring when Egyptian protesters strapped loaves of 
bread to their heads. It is unthinkable that they would have done the same with 
gallons of gasoline. Food clearly commands a greater emotional appeal and—
because of their self-targeting nature—the abolition of subsidies on staple 
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foods would disproportionately hurt the poor. Moving to targeted financial aid 
is easier said than done, as it requires considerable monitoring capacity. Finan-
cial aid can also be subject to considerable erosion via inflation, as the recent 
experience of Iran with subsidy reform has shown (the Guardian, 2014).
6 Macro Food Security, Import Dependence and Self-sufficiency 
Agendas
Even if food security in mena countries should not be confused with self- 
sufficiency and depends to a large extent on broader economic development 
and food imports, it does not mean that domestic agriculture does not play a 
role. It provides for a significant proportion of food consumption and helps 
create livelihoods for a still substantial part of the population, even though its 
contribution to value added in gdp terms lags behind and the water consump-
tion it requires is unsustainable in many cases (Babar and Mirgani, 2014).
Table 8.3 shows how much of their own food Arab countries produce on av-
erage. Import dependence is most pronounced for cereals, sugar, and fats and 
oils, which are strategically crucial. Dairy products are also imported to a large 
degree, while meat, fish and eggs show higher self-sufficiency ratios. Some 
countries, such as Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia, even have ex-
port capacities for fruit and vegetables. Self-sufficiency ratios are lowest in the 
Gulf countries, Libya, Jordan, Lebanon, and the West Bank and Gaza.
Low self-sufficiency ratios are a concern in mena countries, as they are a 
strategic vulnerability in times of geopolitical crisis. In the past, food imports 
have been threatened. During World War i a naval blockade of the Ottoman 
Empire by the Entente Forces caused starvation in Greater Syria, although 
mena as a whole had been self-sufficient before the war. During World War 
ii food imports were disrupted because of combat operations and lower ship-
ping capacities; famines in the region were only averted by domestic produc-
tion and the rationing and distribution system of the Allied Middle East Supply 
Center (mesc) in Cairo. More recently the us contemplated food embargoes 
in the 1970s in retaliation for the Arab oil boycott and the Iranian hostage crisis. 
In the 1990s Iraq saw its food imports and oil exports cut off by a unilateral un 
embargo (Woertz, 2013b).
Apart from clientelism and the politics of rent distribution, strategic con-
cerns about macro food security have motivated programmes that have sought 
to increase domestic self-sufficiency, for example in Syria in the 1990s and Sau-
di Arabia in the 1970s and 1980s. Even Jordan, with its limited natural assets and 
low self-sufficiency ratio, maintains production incentives for cereals (Harri-
gan, 2014a). Egypt increased its self-sufficiency ratio with regards to wheat from 
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Egypt Jordan West Bank 
and Gaza
Syria Lebanon
Cereals, total 51 57 4 10 58 11
Wheat and flour 50 47 2 11 78 17
Corn 38 46 3 25 14 2
Rice 66 99 0 0 0 0
Barley 34 91 6 7 86 22
Potatoes 100 113 81 100 110 107
Pulses 60 43 7 8 111 25
Vegetables 102 105 177 126 158 91
Fruit 97 112 78 115 109 150
Sugar 30 70 0 0 10 2
Fats and oils 32 24 21 87 56 18
Meat, total 81 87 70 78 99 84
Red meat 87 79 30 71 96 47
Poultry 73 96 85 82 105 99
Fish 103 104 3 30 20 24
Eggs 93 101 107 92 128 107
Milk and dairy 
products
71 84 46 94 107 33
Source: aoad, 2012.
21 per cent in 1986 to 46 per cent in 1998, mainly by abandoning wheat taxation 
and introducing improved seed varieties (Kherallah et al., 2003). By 2011, self-
sufficiency had reached 60 per cent and Egypt announced a plan to reach com-
plete self-sufficiency. Yet this aim has not yielded tangible results thus far and 
may prove impossible given resource constraints. Growing reliance on food 
imports is not going away. As it cannot be avoided it has to be managed.
7 World Market Dependence and Trade-based Food Security
Given population growth, limited agricultural potential and changing diets, 
mena economies will continue to rely heavily on food imports. Sourcing these 
imports has become more expensive since the food price spikes of 2007/08 
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and 2011. There have been subsequent corrections, but—overall—food pric-
es are currently at structurally higher levels than their long-term averages of 
the preceding two decades. Various supply- and demand-side factors support 
these more elevated price levels, among them slowing productivity growth, en-
vironmental backlash and climate change on the supply side, and population 
growth, changing diets in emerging markets, and biofuels on the demand side 
(oecd-fao, 2014).
Wheat and rice account for about 40 per cent of caloric intake globally and 
mena is the largest importer of cereals in the world. At 92 million tons, its net 
imports are higher than the 66 million tons of East Asia, which has a much larg-
er population. The most important net exporter countries for such food trade 
are North America and the former Soviet Union states, followed by Oceania/ 
Australia, Europe, South Asia, and South America (see Figure 8.2).
Net food imports constitute more than half the caloric intake in Arab coun-
tries; only in Syria was the share lower (before full-blown eruption of civil war) 
(fao, 2012). A few strategically important net exporters satisfy this demand—
namely Canada, the usa, Brazil, Argentina, France, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Rus-
sia, Thailand, Vietnam, Australia and New Zealand. Over the last decade 70 
per cent of global cereal exports were provided by only eight countries that 
comprised a mere 11 per cent of the global population. This global food trade is 
expected to rise in many countries—among them, the mena countries—until 
2050, given prevalent trends of population growth, demand patterns, and agri-
cultural productivity and production (MacDonald, 2013).
All this food trade constitutes ‘virtual water’ that can be imported by mena 
countries (Allan, 2001; Allan, 2011). The term virtual water describes the water 
that is needed to produce a particular commodity. Agriculture is by far the 
largest ‘blue water’ consumer worldwide. Globally it accounts for 70 per cent 
of blue water withdrawal; in mena countries the figure is even higher, around 
North America
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Figure 8.2 Global net trade in cereals 2013–2014 (millions of metric tons)
Source: usda, 2014b.
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80 per cent. As water used in agriculture evaporates and cannot be reused or 
recycled, the sector’s global share of blue water use even reaches 92 per cent if 
consumptive water use is considered (Allan et al., 2015). More important still, 
around 70 per cent of global crops are not produced by irrigation agriculture 
that uses blue water, but by rain-fed agriculture. The latter uses ‘green wa-
ter’ that is contained in the soil. Such green or soil water cannot be metered, 
bottled or shipped by pipeline. Thus it does not figure in the global statistics 
regarding total renewable water reserves, which only comprise surface and 
groundwater. Yet green water is extremely important for global food security 
and for the import needs of mena countries. By importing rain-fed cereals 
from Brazil, Canada or Australia, mena countries are effectively importing the 
rainfalls of these locations, and can benefit from them.
Between 70 and 90 per cent of the global trade in staple food commodities 
is carried out by just a few food-trading houses; mainly the ‘abcds’: Archer 
Daniels Midland (adm), Bunge, Cargill, and Dreyfus, plus Glencore as a fifth 
company (Sojamo et al., 2012). The trade in crops and derived products con-
stitutes 76 per cent of global virtual water trade and 68 per cent of this figure 
comes from green water. Blue and ‘grey’ (waste) water contribute only 13 per 
cent and 19 per cent, respectively (Mekonnen and Hoekstra, 2011, 20). Current-
ly global virtual water net exports are focussed on North America (40 per cent), 
Australia and New Zealand (40 per cent) and South America (20 per cent). 
Given available water reserves, Australia’s share will likely decrease while that 
of Brazil is expected to rise (Allan, 2011).
Oil-rich Gulf countries have announced land investments abroad in the 
wake of the global food crisis, often in food-insecure countries like Sudan, Ethi-
opia and Pakistan. Contrary to widespread media perceptions there has been 
a huge implementation gap and none of these investments have provided any 
meaningful contribution to the region’s food imports thus far. Much more im-
portant is the growing interest of mena countries in strategic storage, food 
trade logistics and trade initiatives. Like Asian food importers, mena countries 
are poised to engage with the global food system more extensively and more 
proactively (Woertz, 2013a; Keulertz and Woertz, 2015b). At the same time do-
mestic agriculture and rural constituencies continue to play an important role 
in political development considerations.
8 Challenges of Agriculture, Food Security, and Development  
in mena
Arable land and water resources in particular are scarce in mena countries 
and form an impediment to any expansion of agriculture. In some countries 
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agricultural production has actually had to be reduced in order to ensure water 
security (Alterman and Dziuban, 2010). Agricultural productivity gains might 
be achieved in some cases, but countries like Egypt already have some of the 
highest wheat productivity rates in the world. In such cases there are no mean-
ingful yield gaps to be closed (Fischer et al., 2005).
Rather than increasing agricultural production, the focus should be on 
more efficient water management in order to stabilise that production. Other 
measures that could lead to more sustainable agriculture in mena countries 
include improved extension services, fighting desertification, climate change 
adaptation, better distribution networks and market access, waste reduction 
along the value chain, broader rural development programmes, and new ap-
proaches to the governance of collective range land (ciheam, 2008 and 2009). 
The eu tries to support such reforms with its European Neighbourhood Pro-
gramme for Agriculture and Rural Development (enpard), which runs from 
2014 to 2020.
Other issues include market access to the European Union and the sys-
tem of eu producer subsidies that grants considerable advantages to Eu-
ropean farmers. One goal of the Barcelona Process or ‘Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership’ is the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area. 
Manufactured goods of Partnership member countries from the southern 
Mediterranean shore currently enjoy duty-free access to the eu and there is 
preferential treatment for exports of about 80 per cent of agricultural prod-
ucts. Yet quantitative restrictions for some items remain and eu food safety 
standards can be a difficult hurdle for mena producers to negotiate. The eu 
has become more competitive and runs an increasing agricultural trade sur-
plus with mena as a whole. Its agricultural exports almost doubled between 
2006 and 2011 from eur 4.9 to eur 9.6 billion, while its imports from mena 
only increased slightly from eur 3.1 to eur 3.5 billion. Turkey and Morocco are 
the only mena countries that run an agricultural trade surplus with the eu, 
but their levels have been decreasing. Further trade liberalisation would entail 
winners and losers on both sides. eu producers of fruit and vegetables are 
concerned about competition from the south; mena producers have similar 
fears with regards to cereal and livestock products from the north. Compensa-
tion payments could make such changes more palatable, but family farms are 
likely to face pressures and mena governments are concerned about macro 
food security being compromised as a result of declining domestic cereal pro-
duction (López et al., 2013).
Climate change and increased climate variability will likely exacerbate 
existing scarcities of water. The first changes are already visible in the east-
ern Mediterranean, which has witnessed an increased occurrence of drought 
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(noaa, 2011; Breisinger et al., 2011). This calls for adaptation measures from 
mena countries and for their increased participation in global mitigation ef-
forts (Luomi, 2012).
mena governments have shown an inclination to look for supply side 
solutions to address water scarcity. Large-scale projects like dams, desalina-
tion, inter-basin water transfers, and tapping fossil groundwater aquifers have 
been the most prominent of these. One reason for this approach is that the 
provision of water and other public services carries great weight in terms of 
political legitimacy in these states, especially those that are under authoritar-
ian rule. Directly or indirectly financed by rents from resource extraction, they 
try to buy the consent of a general public that is excluded from political par-
ticipation. Subsidies applied to water, food and energy are part and parcel of 
this social contract, alongside public sector jobs and health care services. In 
the future, mena governments will need to modify their focus on technical 
fixes and supply-side solutions and address the demand-side issues of wasteful 
consumption, which is encouraged by untargeted subsidies. Such an approach 
would require a greater integration of civil society into the processes of politi-
cal decision-making (Sowers et al., 2011).
While attention of politicians and experts has focused on blue water and 
improved irrigation efficiency, dry land farming has been neglected. Yet blue 
water resources are over-utilised in mena, whereas green water resources and 
dry land farming offer considerable potential to improve productivity and live-
lihoods (Chatterton and Chatterton, 1996; Doukkali and Lejars, 2015).
The water–energy–food nexus is eminently political and not just a tech-
nocratic construct. Concessionary finance from Gulf funds could provide an 
impetus, in capital-scarce mena countries, for its improved management, 
particularly as climate funds, domestic capital markets, national development 
funds, and traditional concessionary finance from international organisations 
such as the World Bank are limited and entail specific trade-offs (Keulertz and 
Woertz, 2015a).
The political economy of food and agriculture was also highlighted by de-
velopments in the wake of the Arab Spring. Neo-liberal adjustment polices 
implemented by bureaucratic-authoritarian reform coalitions favoured urban 
clients and the economic interests of military–security networks. They disen-
franchised rural constituencies and rolled back land reforms that had been 
enacted during the populist mobilisations of the 1950s and 1960s. The result-
ing impoverishment and rural flight was a contributory factor to the unrest, 
which started in disadvantaged rural towns in the case of Tunisia and Syria 
and not in the major urban agglomerations. The inability of regimes to imple-
ment more efficient water management policies while cutting back support 
Woertz 162
<UN>
services for farmers also made the latter vulnerable to natural hazards such as 
the drought that ravaged Syria and some neighbouring countries from 2006 to 
2011 (de Chatel, 2014).
The rural population and food producers who have no access to other sourc-
es of income than those generated by agriculture are often the most affected 
by food insecurity in mena (Zurayk, 2011; Hamadeh et al., 2014). The economic 
empowerment of rural populations and their eased transition and integration 
into urban sectors is a major challenge. It carries implications for political sta-
bility and entails trade-offs between rural producers and urban consumers. It 
is unclear whether a more democratic polity in the Arab world could mus-
ter the capacity to moderate these conflicts better and implement necessary 
 policies. Frustration with the neo-liberal clientelism of the recent past and 
unrealistic idealisations of the dissolved populism of yesteryear are both wide-
spread. Meanwhile mena seems to oscillate between unreformed authoritar-
ian backlash and chaotic decline.
Beyond agriculture per se, inclusive economic development that keeps 
(imported) food affordable and accessible to mena countries’ citizens is argu-
ably the most important long-term measure for ensuring food security. mena 
countries could have fared better in this regard. With the exception of Israel 
and Turkey their manufacturing bases are small. Their service sectors do not 
have the same degree of sophistication as present in India, which is outward- 
oriented and geared towards provision of higher-value-added services. The 
tourism sectors of mena countries have been badly hit by the ongoing wave of 
conflict. Innovation is hampered and barriers to entry are high. It is difficult for 
small and medium-sized enterprises (smes) to secure financing. The financial 
sector in mena is dominated by bank lending (63 per cent), followed by stock 
markets (29 per cent). Bond markets are underdeveloped (7 per cent) (imf, 
2014). Bank financing leans heavily towards large companies that are owned 
either by influential business families or the state. smes that lack the necessary 
connections find access to funding difficult (World Bank, 2006).
Rent seeking and reliance on direct or indirect resource rents via remittanc-
es are both widespread. Military expenditure in mena is among the highest in 
the world and constitutes a drain on scarce resources. In terms of gdp it stands 
at 4.9 per cent as compared to the global average of 2.4 per cent. It is particu-
larly high in the Gulf States, and in Jordan, Yemen, and Syria (Harrigan, 2014b). 
Resource allocation has also been fraught with cronyism. Inequalities have in-
creased globally over recent decades, harming social equitability and growth 
perspectives (Piketty, 2014). mena countries are no exception to this trend. 
Ordinary households have hardly participated in economic development.
A focus on economic growth alone is insufficient, as the example of Egypt 
shows. Child malnutrition spiked in the country between 2003 and 2008, right 
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at a time when gdp per capita continued to rise and the country implemented 
a reform agenda that was regarded favourably by international donor insti-
tutions (Breisinger et al., 2012). In 2008, in its Ease of Doing Business Index 
(edbi), the World Bank referred to Egypt as the world’s leading reformer. By 
2010, the country had been among the top ten reformers cited in the edbi for 
four years in a row (Springborg, 2012).
Yet appealing real gdp growth rates of 5–7 per cent did not trickle down 
to the general population. The simple averages of gdp per capita figures are 
misleading, as benefits only accrued to a minority. Real incomes declined for 
most Egyptian households throughout the first decade of the new millennium. 
Surprisingly, at the same time income inequality—as measured by the Gini 
coefficient—decreased slightly, from levels that were already relatively low 
compared to other developing countries with similar income per capita levels 
on a purchasing power basis.3 The World Bank explains this conundrum by the 
fact that most of the gdp growth went to private enterprises that retained or 
exported it; the rest of the population was worse off, despite formally decreas-
ing income inequality (Verme et al., 2014).
It should also be kept in mind that data sources in Egypt are insufficient for 
reliably estimating those top incomes that have increased dramatically over the 
past decade. Furthermore, income inequality on a regional level is extremely 
high in the mena region because of disparities between oil exporting and non-
oil exporting countries (Alvaredo and Piketty, 2014). Against the backdrop of 
these increasing wealth inequalities and the lack of democratic institutions 
to address grievances, households perceived their decline in welfare terms 
to be even more significant than it actually already was—a combustible mix 
that arguably played a role in the downfall of the Mubarak regime (Harrigan, 
2014b). Currently, Egypt relies on politically motivated transfer payments from 
the Gulf countries to pay a substantial part of its foreign bills—hardly a sus-
tainable scenario. The elusive search for inclusive growth and the provision of 
social safety nets will be a crucial challenge for mena food security.
9 Conclusion
Micro-nutritional deficiencies are the most pressing food security issue in the 
Arab world. They are more important than the lack of self-sufficiency or lack 
3 Gini coefficients in the Arab world range between 33 and 40. With 34 in 2009, Egypt was at 
the lower end of that range, comparable to many countries in Western Europe and below the 
us (40). Most countries with similar gdp per capita (ppp), such as Guatemala (57), China 
(47) or Georgia (39), were above that level.
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of calories, although these are often wrongly portrayed as the most salient of 
food security challenges. The food import dependence of mena is here to stay 
and will likely grow. Inclusive economic growth is the single most important 
measure for safeguarding food accessibility for vulnerable people; whether 
that food is imported or comes from domestic production. mena governments 
have fared badly in this regard during the era of economic liberalisation that 
began in the 1990s.
Food producers without supplementary sources of income are among the 
most food insecure people in mena. In a region with already low democratic 
participation, their lack of access to political decision-making is pronounced. 
More sustainable land management policies and alternative sources of income 
outside agriculture would be needed to improve their livelihoods. Better ex-
tension services and distribution networks and access to credit and markets 
are an urgent imperative in mena. Agricultural development will also need to 
move away from an overt focus on water-intensive crops like cotton and wheat 
towards more value-added crops like fruit and vegetables. The promulgation of 
water-saving technologies like drip irrigation can provide important benefits, 
but these technologies will not be a ‘silver bullet’ if efficiency gains are used 
to increase production and hence water consumption. Compared to irrigated 
agriculture, sustainable, dry-land farming has only received limited attention 
in mena; but it offers considerable potential. Given the still substantial rural 
populations in some mena countries and the limited absorption capacities of 
cities, rural livelihoods clearly have a role to play in development plans and in 
processes of political participation.
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Is there a relationship between political movements and population movements in the 
Arab world? More specifically, are the uprisings that spread throughout Arab countries 
starting at the end of 2010 linked in any way with the international migration of their 
citizens? This paper first reviews the common determinants of revolt and emigration 
and addresses the question of how the two phenomena are partly rooted in the deep 
demographic changes Arab populations are currently going through. The paper then 
reviews the migratory outcomes of revolt both in terms of voluntary and forced migra-
tion. It finally explores diasporas’ impact on homeland politics, or—more precisely—
the role played by national expatriates in the revolts unfolding in their homelands, in 
particular through political remittances.
1 Introduction
Is there any relationship between political movements and population move-
ments in the Arab world? More specifically, are the uprisings that, from the 
end of 2010, spread through Arab countries, linked in any way with the interna-
tional migration of their citizens?
It should be noted, here from the outset, that the links between revolt and 
migration, if they exist, can neither be unidirectional nor necessary. Indeed, 
while major uprisings happened in countries with strong emigration traditions 
(Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Yemen…), others took place in countries where immi-
gration outweighs emigration (Libya and Bahrain). Moreover, some countries 
that are major migrant senders did not experience any large-scale uprisings 
(Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Algeria…) and the same applies to countries that 
are major receivers (the gcc states apart from Bahrain).
The two phenomena can, however, be linked in many ways (Figure  9.1). 
Indirect links may be found by which popular revolts and mass migration 
can be shown to share certain determinants. Direct links also exist in both 
directions. Indeed, revolts have generated massive flows of, mostly forced, 
















Figure 9.� Framework of interaction between emigration and revolt
Source: Author
migration and more must be expected; and migration is, likewise, capable of 
affecting revolts.
The first section of this chapter will review the common determinants of 
emigration and revolt and show that both exit and voice respond to the deep 
demographic changes Arab populations are currently experiencing. The sec-
ond section will describe the migratory outcomes of revolt both in terms of 
voluntary and forced migration. The third section will explore the impact of 
diasporas on homeland politics, and more precisely the role played by national 
expatriates with regard to the revolts unfolding in their homelands.
2 Exit or Voice Trade-off
Photographs taken in large Arab cities suggest that two crowds, demonstrators 
gathering for mass protests and visa applicants lining up at foreign  consulates, 
have at least one thing in common: both are comprised predominantly of 
young men. Would then some of the factors that pull young men on to the 
streets for demonstrations be the same as those that push them into interna-
tional migration? Certainly—as we shall see—‘relative deprivation’ has been 
used to explain revolt and migration and the two phenomena are tied to a sin-
gle model of ‘exit or voice’. After reviewing this evidence, we will advance the 
claim that demographic change is a key factor linking revolt and migration.
Relative deprivation is the feeling experienced by people who discover that 
their lot is not as good as that of their peers. Comparing themselves to their 
‘reference group’, they have the sentiment that they are deprived of a material 
or a symbolic object they believe they have a right to have, or they expect more 
than they can actually achieve (Merton, 1938). Transposed from the individual 
to the social level of groups and social classes, relative deprivation becomes a 
driver of collective violence (Gurr, 1970). Revolution is most likely to take place 
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when ‘men become angered because they acquire new or intensified expecta-
tions which cannot be satisfied by means at their disposal’ (Gurr, 1973, 365). 
And certainly much of what has happened in Arab countries since the end of 
2010 can be understood as discontent generated by ‘the perceived gap between 
expectations and capability’ (Gurr, 1973, 365).
Not only can relative deprivation trigger collective violence, it can also mo-
tivate individuals’ international migration. People who judge that they do not, 
at home, receive rewards commensurate with their capacities may consider 
leaving their own country to find a country where they think these rewards 
are available. Emigration is influenced by ‘how individuals evaluate what they 
have (satisfaction) and what they do not have (deprivation) […] the decision 
by households to send migrants to foreign labour markets is influenced by 
their initial perceived relative deprivation within the reference group’ (Stark 
and Taylor, 1989, 3–4). Typically, transnational networks spanning origin and 
destination countries are, at the same time, the reference group that make 
 migration desirable, and the source of information on distant labour markets 
and the social capital that make it possible.
Both revolt and migration respond to the same sentiment of relative depri-
vation and take place when frustration rises and resignation ceases to be an 
option. They are a perfect illustration of Hirschman’s model of exit or voice 
as opposed to loyalty (Hirschman, 1970). A relevant question in the present 
case will be to ask whether revolt and migration are substitutes or possible 
complements, whether there is a trade-off by which people who exit lose their 
voice, or whether they keep ‘voicing’ but through other channels and in anoth-
er fashion; put in other terms—do emigrants remain political actors in their 
homelands?
What creates relative deprivation in contemporary Arab societies leading to 
exit or voice among the young? Many reasons residing in the social and political 
systems of Arab countries have been put forward in the lavish literature on the 
Arab Spring. In what follows, we confine ourselves to recalling what has been 
developed elsewhere. Demographic change is a key contextual—or ‘predispos-
ing’, to borrow from epidemiology—factor that created fertile ground for both 
migration and revolt. More precisely, we argue that a lack of opportunities 
combined with a demographic bulge among the young accounts for many mi-
gratory and political processes at play in the Arab world today  (Fargues, 2012).
In a nutshell, our argument is based on the fact that the decline of birth 
rates in Arab populations came late (with a few exceptions, it did not occur 
significantly before the mid-1980s) but steady (more so in the Maghreb than 
in the Mashreq). In the early 2010s, the largest generations ever born in these 
countries were aged between 20 and 35, a phenomenon commonly described 
as a ‘youth bulge’ (Figure 9.2). In the case of Arab populations, not only is 
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intra-group  competition more acute than ever before, it is also exacerbated by 
a radical change in the status of young adults.
Indeed, with now low birth rates and dominant patterns of late marriage, 
family responsibilities—that until recently were the common lot of young 
Arab adults—have been lifted: at 30, a typical citizen of an Arab country is 
not yet married and has no children. We have described this phenomenon 
elsewhere as the birth of the individual (Fargues, 2000). Such a change is 
 particularly meaningful in societies comprised of families and clans with an 
immemorial tradition of negating the individual. It provides unprecedented 
personal freedom of movement and opens the way to mobility and risk-taking.
Moreover, the demographic transition has been paralleled by a steady in-
crease in the level of education, with the gross enrolment ratio at tertiary level 
reaching 33 per cent after 2010, a level typical of upper-middle-income coun-
tries (World Bank, 2015). Rising education levels naturally translate to rising 
expectations. But due to governance failures (among other factors) young Arab 
adults’ expectations are cruelly frustrated, making them a generation kept in 
waiting (Dhillon et al., 2009). Economically, expectations are barred by unem-
ployment, underemployment and low rewards for those skills that characterise 
local labour markets. On the eve of the Arab revolts, the rate of unemployment 
amongst Arab youth was close to 30 per cent—that is, more than twice the 











Figure 9.� The youth bulge in Arab countries
Note: Western Asian countries include Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Palestine, 
Syria, Yemen. Northern African countries include Algeria, Egypt, Mauritania, Mo-
rocco, Sudan, Tunisia.
Source: Author’s calculation from United Nations, Population 




which until the 1980s was limited and confined to illiterate segments of the 
population, has now become the lot of a large proportion of young, educated 
people and university graduates. Politically, young Arab adults’ expectations 
are negated by authoritarian regimes.
Frustration calls for a response. In the non-democratic, repressive context 
of Arab countries, exit came before voice. Emigration from Arab countries 
(except from the large oil and gas exporters of the Gulf and Libya) has been 
intense over the last two to three decades. Stocks of current emigrants rep-
resent 8.7 per cent of the aggregate population of Arab Mediterranean states 
(table 9.1), which is almost three times the world average. Comparable levels 












Arab states Rest of the 
world
Total
Mauritania 3,796,141 28,807 24,000 169,500 222,307 5.9% 13%
Morocco 32,521,143 3,056,109 214,438 101,432 3,371,979 10.4% 91%
Algeria 38,481,705 877,398 11,209 73,243 961,850 2.5% 91%
Tunisia 10,874,915 911,400 154,900 31,900 1,098,200 10.1% 83%
Libya 6,154,623 66,344 9,824 24,397 100,565 1.6% 66%
Egyptb 80,721,874 224,122 4,783,800 404,945 5,412,867 6.7% 4%
Lebanon 4,647,079 148,717 162,663 290,900 602,280 13.0% 25%
Syriac 21,889,682 247,880 2,191,313 1,823,305 4,262,498 19.5% 6%
Jordan 7,009,444 33,066 218,149 88,540 339,755 4.8% 10%
Palestined 4,218,771 14,627 844,063 13,234 871,924 20.7% 2%
Total 210,315,377 5,608,470 8,614,359 3,021,396 17,244,225 8.2% 33%
Sources: For the eu—Eurostat, except for Moroccans (consular records); 
Arab states and other regions—estimates provided by origin countries.
a Origin defined as country of birth (preferred) or country of nationality (second best).
b Egyptian temporary migrants in the Gulf States (2,283,800) and Libya (2,000,000 as estimated 
by the Egyptian government—the number of Egyptian migrants still in Libya in early 2015 is 
believed to have been less than 100,000).
c Syrian residents by region + refugees (in the Arab states and Turkey) and new asylum seekers 
(eu) from March 2011 until March 2015.
d Palestinian unwra refugees in Jordan (1,979,580) who have Jordanian citizenship are not 
included.
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must be expected for non-Mediterranean Arab states (Yemen, Sudan…) for 
which reliable data are not available.
Just as importantly, the desire to emigrate is now peaking. In Tunisia, the 
country where the Arab revolts started in 2010, a large, national, representative 
survey of young people (15–29 years old), repeated at three points in time, re-
vealed an unexpectedly high (and increasing) wish to emigrate: in 1996, 22 per 
cent of the young people interviewed expressed such a desire; in 2000 the fig-
ure was 45 per cent, and in 2005, 76 per cent (Fourati, 2008). These ‘desires’ are 
not a predictor of actual mobility (after all, a wish does not necessarily become 
reality), but they do constitute a revelation of remarkable discontent among 
the young.
3 Migratory Outcomes of Revolt
Revolts have already brought about considerable movements of mostly forced 
migration, but also some fresh outbreaks of voluntary, economic migration.
There have been two cases of mass displacements: Libya and Syria. They 
differ greatly in terms of nature and magnitude. The Libyan revolution that 
overturned the Gaddafi dictatorship in 2011 displaced more than 1.1 million per-
sons, including 422,000 Libyans seeking temporary refuge abroad and 706,000 
migrant workers, who left the country; 43 per cent of these reached Tunisia and 
32 per cent Egypt (iom, 2012). While it is believed that most Libyan refugees 
returned to Libya once the regime had been overthrown, not much is known 
about the migrant workers who left the country in 2011. Many will have either 
returned to Libya or have been replaced by new migrants, in particular from 
Tunisia and Egypt. At the time of writing, the numbers of migrant workers in 
Libya and of refugees waiting to be smuggled to Europe are unknown. One can 
assume that, with the collapse of the Libyan government and the development 
of rival militias, the exploitation, abuse, detention and killings orchestrated by 
the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (isil) will encourage departures from 
Libya among newly arrived migrants (Grange and Flynn, 2015; Government of 
the Netherlands, 2014).
In Syria, the protests that soon turned into civil conflict triggered an im-
placable spiral of repression and protest. At the time of writing (April 2015) 
7–10 million people have been forcibly removed from their homes, including 
more than 4 million refugees and perhaps a larger number of internally dis-
placed persons (unhcr, 2015). To these Syrian refugees, one must add all the 
non-Syrians (Iraqis and Palestinians) who were refugees in Syria and who fled 
to become second order refugees in other countries, in particular Lebanon. 
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At the time of writing large numbers in need of protection continue to pour 
out of Syria.
The bulk of Syria’s refugees are sheltered among four of its five neighbours: 
Lebanon (1.2 million), Turkey (1.8 million), Jordan (630,000) and Iraq (220,000). 
Israel, which is at war with Syria, has kept its borders closed. Not only do massive 
waves of refugees exert unbearable pressure on the economy of the host na-
tion, they also bring with them the risk of political destabilisation. This is par-
ticularly the case in Lebanon where Syrian refugees, almost all belonging to the 
Sunni branch of Islam, risk setting alight dormant tensions between Lebanese 
religious communities. In a country where history has shown that refugees 
may wait a lifetime and still never return home, there is a fear that not all the 
refugees will return to Syria when the conflict ends. The fragile equilibrium 
between communities would then be threatened.
Other Syrian refugees have reached more distant destinations in the Arab 
world (135,000 in Egypt) and in the European Union (ca 220,000). Many of 
those who eventually reached Europe were unable to get a visa to travel regu-
larly and safely to their destination. Instead, they undertook a long journey 
through Jordan, Egypt and then Libya from where they were smuggled across 
the Mediterranean at the risk of their lives. Among the 250,000 migrants smug-
gled by sea to Italy from January 2012 until April 2015, more than 55,000 were 
Syrians (Fargues and Di Bartolomeo, 2015).
Less spectacular than mass flight induced by war and civil conflict is the 
modest increase in labour migration that has been observed in the wake of 
revolts, in particular from Tunisia. In the first half of 2011 an upsurge of ir-
regular migration to Italy was recorded, with some 25,000 unauthorised mi-
grants from Tunisia reaching Italy and Malta by sea. This sudden, short-lived 
movement can be explained by a conjunction of facts: Tunisian border police 
operations broke down during the revolution and—as control over departures 
was relaxed—a large pool of would-be migrants were stranded, waiting for an 
opportunity to leave the country; and migratory pressure increased as Tunisia 
had to accommodate hundreds of thousands of migrant workers fleeing Libya, 
including many Tunisians (Boubakri, 2013).
One might expect that revolts will affect migration in the medium term, 
but it is not clear how. There might be an increase in the emigration of citi-
zens or the return of expatriates, depending upon the achievements of govern-
ments put in place after the revolts. At the time of writing, it seems likely that 
 emigration will continue for some time. Indeed, revolts may have so far created 
more incentives than deterrents to emigration.
A survey conducted amongst young Egyptians in 2013 (during the short 
presidency of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohamed Morsi) helps to identify 
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the main drivers of the intention to emigrate, as shown in Figure 9.3 (Amer 
and Fargues, 2014; see also Pitea and Abdel Mohsen, 2011). A case-control was 
adopted and characteristics that were found to be significantly more frequent 
among cases (those who wished to emigrate) than controls (those who did not 
wish to emigrate) were considered drivers of emigration. A number of driv-
ers are not directly linked to the revolution, including having a university edu-
cation, being unmarried, seeking (better) employment and being exposed to 
others’ migration through friends or relatives living abroad. Other drivers are 
more susceptible to be linked to the post-revolutionary situation, in particular 
religion and the lack of confidence in Egypt’s stability. Being a Christian was 
found to be a key driver of the intention to emigrate. Are Egyptian Christians 
more inclined than Muslims to emigrate because they share more of the fea-
tures of those young people who wish to emigrate, such as a higher education 
or friends and relatives abroad? Or is it that Christians feel more insecure at 
home than do Muslims? The survey does not help to disentangle the two.
4 Diaspora Impact on Homeland Politics
As the same factors explain both emigration and revolt could it be that 
emigrants, or some of them, played a direct role in revolts and the process of 
political change that followed? Put in other terms, was exit, sometimes, trans-





























Figure 9.3 Drivers of the intention to emigrate among young Egyptians in 2013
Source: Amer and Fargues, �0�4.
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of migrants or exiles to take part in the revolution, their participation in elec-
tions in their homeland, or their contribution to disseminating ideas that, in 
turn, affect political developments, often referred to as political remittances.
4.1 Return of Exiles
From the outset it must be said that the revolts in Arab countries were con-
ducted from within by local people and owe very little to the direct involve-
ment of diasporas. It is true that several high-profile figures of the Arab Spring 
have a history of migration or exile. This is the case in Tunisia. There, the win-
ner of the first post-revolution presidential election, Moncef Marzouki, and 
the leader of the Islamist party Ennahda, which won the 2011 parliamentary 
elections, Rached Ghannouchi, both returned from a long exile in Europe just 
days after former President Ben Ali was ousted.
In Egypt several popular figures of the Revolution were at the time es-
tablished abroad. Take Mohamed Elbaradei, the former Director General of 
the International Atomic Energy Agency and overt opponent to President 
Mubarak; or Wael Ghonim, the internet activist, whose Facebook page—run 
from Dubai—provided, in real time, key information on developments during 
the Midan Tahrir demonstrations in Cairo. In the case of Syria, the main oppo-
sition institution, the Syrian National Council, was created abroad (in Istanbul 
in 2011) by exiles of the Muslim Brotherhood and other political movements.
In the other countries of the Arab Spring—in particular Libya, Yemen and 
Bahrain—no eminent figure of the uprisings seems to have come from the di-
aspora and such figures’ experience abroad was at best a few years spent over-
seas as students or civil servants.
4.2 External Voting
The emigration from Arab countries started more than a hundred years ago 
and gained momentum in the last quarter of the twentieth century, result-
ing in the formation of Arab diasporas in Europe, the Americas, Africa and 
Oceania. For decades, Arab states paid little or no attention to those who had 
left the country and to their descendants. In post-independence years several 
states even showed distrust towards communities they suspected as serving as 
hotbeds of plotters and political opponents.
In roughly the late 1980s and early 1990s, Arab states relinquished state-
centred, planned economies for market economies and adopted International 
Monetary Fund inspired policies of ‘structural adjustment’: at this point dia-
sporas started to be regarded in a different way. While governments contin-
ued to see destination countries (the West as well as the Gulf) as havens for 
their opponents, they had become sufficiently strong not to feel threatened by 
their émigrés and exiles. On the contrary, they began to see these émigrés as a 
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 potential resource for the nation: first as a source of income; then, of cultural 
pride; and finally, of political support.
Specific institutions were established by each Arab state with a mandate 
to fostering transnational links with their diasporas. These institutions were 
concerned with economic links in the first instance. Draining money from 
Arab expatriates (workers’ remittances sent to families left behind, entrepre-
neurs’ investments in the national economy, etc.), making use of their skills 
and tapping their business networks could make a substantial contribution to 
development efforts in origin countries. Cultural links came later. Reviving a 
sense of belonging to the homeland among migrants and especially their sons 
and daughters born in the diaspora was cultural diplomacy. But perhaps more 
importantly, it could sustain such individuals’ motivation to remit and invest 
money in the homeland.
Eventually, political links were sought. Arrangements enabling expatriate 
nationals to exercise their voting rights from abroad were made by a number 
of Arab states, including Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia (Collyer, 2014; Jaulin, 
2014). Morocco went a step further with its constitution of 2011, granting eli-
gibility rights in the kingdom to expatriate nationals. Another significant step 
towards the political integration of the descendants of migrants has been the 
recognition of dual citizenship by a number of countries and the granting of 
the right to transmit nationality to children born of a native woman and a for-
eign father (Tunisia, 1963; Egypt, 2004; Algeria, 2005; and Morocco, 2007).
4.3 Political Remittances
In a variety of locations, from the neighbourhood to the workplace, migrants 
mix with natives. They are, often unconsciously, exposed to the ideas and mod-
els of their host societies, which are new to them. With the passing of time, 
they adopt some of these values and models, which they unwittingly transfer 
to their home society. Direct communication with relatives and friends estab-
lished abroad, as well as mass communication through media paying special 
interest to countries where the diaspora lives, will—therefore—expose non-
migrants in origin countries to ideas and models typical of societies that they 
have never lived in. This mechanism, described as ‘social remittances’ (Levitt, 
2001), is thought to apply to a wide range of domains, including political values 
(Docquier et al., 2011; Tabar, 2014).
What political values migrants convey will depend upon the political envi-
ronment of their destination country. Arab migrants have two main destina-
tions, the Gulf States and the West. The polity migrants find when they reach 
their destination is either more conservative than that of their country of ori-
gin, or more liberal, according to whether they go to the Gulf or to the West. 
Schematically, one might hypothesise that a dominant pattern of emigration to 
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the Gulf will translate into conservatism spreading in the origin communities 
of migrants; while a dominant pattern of emigration to the West will dissemi-
nate progressivism and democratic values in these same communities.
Do the contrasting post-revolution developments in Egypt and Tunisia 
bring any credit to this argument? In both countries popular uprisings oc-
curred in 2011, but they ended very differently. In Tunisia, Islamist and secular 
parties engaged in a democratic process resulting in a peaceful changeover of 
political power and the adoption of a resolutely progressive constitution. In 
Egypt the first free election of a president soon led to an Islamist dictatorship, 
which did not last long and which was replaced by authoritarian rule. This new 
 authoritarian rule is in many regards comparable to the regime overthrown in 
the revolution, except that the new authoritarian ruler was freely elected by an 
overwhelming majority.
The political remittances hypothesis sheds light on differences, not only 
between countries, but also within a given country. For example, in Tunisia 
there is Ennahda, the ‘Renaissance’ party influenced by the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood, which had been banned for more than two decades under the 
Ben Ali dictatorship. It was reinstated in the early days of the revolution. In 
both the constituent assembly election of 2011 and the parliamentary election 
of 2014, a strong positive space-correlation is observed between the score of 
Ennahda and the rate of emigration, at governorate level (figure 9.4). It might 
be that voting for Ennahda and emigrating are responses to the same factors, 
from poverty to unemployment. It might also be that emigration has fostered 
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Figure 9.4 Rates of emigration and voting for Ennahda in the Tunisian elections of 2011 and 
2014, at governorate level
Source: Author’s calculations.
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migrants are mostly destined for France and Italy—two countries with an es-
tablished tradition of protest. Because the party had been banned by the oust-
ed dictator, voting for Ennahda became a natural form of protest.
5 Conclusion
Expatriation and political protest are both rooted in deprivation and discon-
tent and in the notion that life could be better, either in another place or at 
home under another regime. Moreover, they work in synergy, as  expatriation 
can be the result of protest failing to achieve its goals and protest can find 
inspiration in ideas and models gathered abroad by migrants. So, what does 
the future look like? Migration and revolt have an age: both are typical of 
young adults. As a result of long-term demographic trends, young adults in 
Arab countries are now to be counted in greater numbers than ever before (the 
‘youth bulge’), and for the first time they are free of family constraints (‘the 
birth of the individual’). Their availability with regards to mobility and to risk-
taking will not suddenly end.
Voluntary, economic migration, or the reasons behind it, will—indeed—
continue. Unless a miraculous economic upturn keeps the mass of young 
people at home, dreaming of a future fit for their expectations, many will keep 
trying their luck abroad. Where they will go is less clear. Apart from the most 
talented, Arab migrants are likely to find more and more hurdles barring their 
way to traditional destinations. The Gulf States are committed to replacing ex-
patriates with nationals and the West is slowly exiting its worst unemployment 
crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. Exit may no longer fill the role 
of safety valve that it has for decades. Will, then, voice be the only choice left? 
The Arab awakening has not finished speaking. But, at the time of writing, one 
must acknowledge that revolt has produced a surge in departures.
Forced migration has gained unprecedented momentum in the Arab Middle 
East, which is by far the world’s largest producer and receiver of refugees. Refu-
gee movements must be expected to continue, since the restoration of peace 
and security—which would stop the exoduses of families fleeing war and 
persecution—is not in sight at the time of writing. Where they will find shelter 
is unclear. Jordan and Lebanon have now closed their borders to the entry of 
new refugees and put in place more stringent conditions that must be met if 
those already there are to stay. Turkey may follow, while Europe is not keen to 
fling open its doors to refugees. The result might be an increase in the number 
of internally displaced persons. It is doubtful, however, that forced migration 
could rekindle the dynamics of the Arab Spring, for internally displaced per-
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Egypt faces the Herculean task of simultaneously rebuilding its polity and economy 
and doing so in the absence of broad social consensus on either. State institutions 
 underpinning both, ranging from the legislative and judicial branches to executive 
agencies with direct responsibility for economic management require substantial 
if not total overhauls. It is only the bedrock of the deep state that remains firmly in 
place, but that solid foundation is an inappropriate one upon which to construct a 
competitive and inclusive political economy. Any regime, in short, would face pro-
found challenges in either creating a ‘second republic’ or re-invigorating the first, now 
badly discredited one. The military regime that seized power in July 2013, faces par-
ticularly intense ones not only because of the means by which it assumed power, but 
also because of its very nature. Military regimes are out of step with the times. One of 
the reasons they are is that they fail to deliver development, thereby suggesting that 
militaries are inherently incapable of devising and implementing successful economic 
models. Whether the Egyptian one might differ in this regard is the question this paper 
addresses. It does so by providing a brief overview of the broad political and economic 
challenges Egypt faces, followed by more detailed investigations of specific challenges 
in the areas of fiscal management, fostering a capable business elite, improving the 
capabilities and performance of the labor force, and generating growth in particular 
sectors. An effort is then made to foretell the ‘Sisinomic’ model likely to be crafted to 
meet these and other challenges, followed by an evaluation of its prospects for success.
1 Introduction
Egypt faces the Herculean task of simultaneously rebuilding its polity and 
 economy and doing so in the absence of a broad social consensus on either. 
Moreover, the status quo ante has been discredited, as the ‘January 25 Revolu-
tion’ attested, so its economic and political models provide only limited foun-
dations, at best, for erecting new ones. State institutions underpinning both, 
ranging from the legislative and judicial branches to executive agencies with 
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 direct responsibility for economic management, including taxation and regula-
tory bodies, were not particularly robust prior to January 2011. They have been 
so buffeted by events since then that in most cases they require substantial if not 
total overhauls, as the new constitution of 2014 signifies. Only the bedrock of the 
deep state remains firmly in place, but that solid foundation is an inappropriate 
one upon which to construct a competitive and inclusive political economy.
Any regime, in short, would face profound challenges in either creating a 
‘second republic’ or re-invigorating the first, now badly discredited. The mili-
tary regime that seized power in July 2013 faces particularly intense trials not 
only because of the means by which it assumed power—which has created a 
backlash of violent and non-violent dimensions, both of which challenge its 
legitimacy—but also because of its very nature. Military regimes are out of step 
with the times. One of the reasons for this is that, whether in Latin America, 
Africa or Asia, they have failed to deliver development, thereby suggesting 
that militaries may be inherently incapable of devising and implementing 
successful economic models. Whether or not the Egyptian military might be 
the exception to this rule is the question this chapter addresses. It will do so 
by providing a brief overview of the broad political and economic challenges 
Egypt faces, followed by more detailed investigations of specific challenges in 
the areas of fiscal management, fostering a capable business elite, improving 
the capabilities and performance of the labour force and generating growth in 
particular sectors. An effort will then be made to predict the ‘Sisinomic’ model 
likely to be crafted to meet these and other challenges; and this will be fol-
lowed by an evaluation of its prospects for success.
2 President Al-Sisi’s Impoverished Inheritance
President al-Sisi has inherited a state, a market, and relations between them 
that are sorely in need of overhaul. On comparative scales of state performance 
in managing the economy—whether the World Bank’s Governance or Ease of 
Doing Business indices, Transparency International’s Corruption Perception 
Index, the Bertelsmann Foundation’s Transformation Index, The Economist In-
telligence Unit’s Business Environment Ranking or the Arab Reform Initiative’s 
Democracy Index, the last of which contains several dimensions of state eco-
nomic management—Egypt significantly underperforms regional and global 
comparators.1 The much noted, brief, dramatic improvement on the Ease of 
1 On the Arab Reform Initiative’s Democracy Index, see Shikaki et al. (2011). For a review and 
assessment of Egypt’s performance on various governance indices, see Springborg (2013). The 
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Doing Business Index in 2007–08 resulted from strategic legislative changes 
that were intended precisely to improve Egypt’s ranking on that index but 
were never implemented (Springborg, 2013). Indeed, the gap between official 
policy and actual performance in state economic management is, according 
to the Arab Reform Initiative’s Democracy Index, greater in Egypt than in any 
other Arab country included in the assessment (Shikaki et al., 2011, 28). That 
overcoming the legacy of poor state management of the economy will not be 
quick or easy is suggested by the World Bank’s 2015 annual Doing Business re-
port, published some fifteen months after General al-Sisi seized power. Egypt’s 
ranking remained essentially unchanged over that period, ranking 112th out of 
189 countries. Its lowest performance, 152nd place, was on the key indicator of 
‘enforcing contracts’, reflecting—at best—stagnation of the vital legal/judicial 
system and an overall weakness of the rule of law.2
Mubarak’s increasingly decrepit, corrupt state relied ever more heavily on 
rents as the years passed, particularly on those from the hydrocarbon sector, 
which by the global collapse of 2008 had come to provide about half of the coun-
try’s total exports (Springborg, 2012). The surge of foreign direct  investment 
(fdi), which peaked at usd 11.5 billion in 2007, was roughly equally divided 
between investment in the hydrocarbon sector, almost all of which was from 
multinational oil and gas companies, and investment related to real  estate—
whether in commercial or residential building or tourism—almost all of which 
was from Gulf Cooperation Council (gcc) states. While strictly speaking fdi 
is not rent, its concentration in the main rent generating sectors reflects the 
state’s dependence upon and interest in those rents and its concomitant disin-
terest in steering and stimulating broader economic growth.3 Cronyism—the 
Economist Intelligence Unit’s Business Environment Ranking of 2014 ranked Egypt 69th out 
of 82 countries, a deterioration of eight places since the ‘January 25, 2011 Revolution’, at which 
time Egypt was already in the bottom half of the 17 Middle Eastern and African countries 
ranked. Egypt’s performance on this index, which is composed of ten separate criteria in-
cluding taxes, policy with regards to free enterprise and competition, and foreign trade and 
exchange controls as well as measures less directly related to government, is better than on 
the other indexes; probably because Egypt’s size creates substantial market opportunities. 
For a review of Egypt’s scoring, see http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=300997214
&Country=Egypt&topic=Business&subtopic=Business+environment&subsubtopic=Rankin
gs+overview.
2 For an analysis of the World Bank’s 2015 Doing Business report, see Abaza (2014b).
3 That Arab fdi is more likely to be rent seeking than fdi from sources external to the region 
is further supported by evidence with regards to the motivations of Arab investors. According 
to Khalid Sekkat, ‘human capital, quality of institutions, infrastructure and openness don’t 
affect an Arab investor’s decision to locate in a given Arab country while they affect non-Arab 
investors’. (Sekkat, 2014). fdi fell dramatically as a result of the January 25 Revolution, drop-
ping to a net outflow of half a billion dollars in 2011 before recovering to some usd 2.8 billion 
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market’s conjoined twin to a corrupt, rent seeking state—grew in tandem with 
these maladies of governance, as recent research has empirically demonstrat-
ed. Amirah El-Haddad’s careful study of vertical integration in Egypt’s clothing 
industry, for example, found that ‘Those [businessmen] linked to power, pros-
pered, whilst the businesses of others foundered against the wall of bureau-
cracy and red tape’. (El-Haddad, 2013, 1). Hamouda Chekir and Ishac Diwan’s 
investigation of share prices on the Cairo exchange revealed that ‘Connected 
firms have lost more value than others during these events [i.e. the 25 Janu-
ary Revolution] on account of their connections’. (Chekir and Diwan, 2013, 13). 
Egypt’s Lost Power, a documentary on Egypt’s gas industry prepared by al 
Jazeera, alleges that the country lost billions of dollars of potential revenue as 
a result of profits extracted from commercial transactions, most notably with 
Israel, by Mubarak’s cronies, particularly those drawn from the military and 
intelligence services.4
With state–market relations driven by rent seeking, the performance of 
economic sectors varied according to their proximity to those rents. Tourism, 
for example, prospered in part because it is primarily a land-based activity. 
Land transactions provided substantial rents, particularly to the military, the 
largest single owner of land in Egypt.5 The telecom industry flourished behind 
barriers to new entrants to the mobile phone market. Manufacturing industry, 
however, stagnated unless servicing protected local markets. As a consequence 
of this distorted growth the labour market became misshapen, with unem-
ployment and education increasingly positively correlated and the already low 
female participation rate steadily dropping as informal steadily supplanted 
formal employment, accounting for more than two thirds of new jobs by the 
end of the Mubarak era. Although the rate of growth of the civil service slowed, 
it accounted for some seven million jobs by the time of the ‘revolution’, ac-
counting for more than half of all female employment and 30 per cent of total 
employment. A 2005 survey revealed that the single most important source of 
family income even in rural areas was government employment, with agricul-
ture coming second (Mayfield, 2012, 293–297).
in 2012. In the first quarter of 2015 it was almost double that of the previous quarter, rising to 
some usd 4.8 billion. This appears to have been the result of announcements made at the 
March donors’ conference rather than the commencement of a sustained, dramatic rise in 
fdi. See the Egypt Foreign Direct Investment website at http://www.tradingeconomics.com/
egypt/foreign-direct-investment.
4 This documentary can be viewed at http://www.aljazeera.com/investigations/.
5 This was already the case in Mubarak’s Egypt. Under President al-Sisi the military has deep-
ened and broadened its control of land throughout the country. For a description of the ways 
and means by which this has been accomplished, and for estimates of the amount of land the 
military has recently appropriated, see Abul-Magd (2016, forthcoming).
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With little demand for highly qualified graduates, secondary and tertiary 
education continued to deteriorate, with even newly created private universi-
ties producing graduates as underqualified as those graduating from the old, 
decaying public ones (Assaad, Badawy, and Krafft, 2014). Although the birth 
rate declined during the first decade of the Mubarak era, it began to grow again 
after that as a result of female members of the ‘youth bulge’ reaching child 
bearing age and a surprising increase in fertility rates driven by increasing pov-
erty and decreasing female participation in the labour force (Krafft and As-
saad, 2014). In 2013, 2.6 million babies were born, almost 50 per cent more than 
a decade previously. By 2011 almost 800,000 new jobs were required annually 
to stabilise the unemployment rate, whereas only some half a million annually 
had been needed when Mubarak took power in 1981. The rate of economic 
growth required to produce this number of jobs, in excess of 7 per cent, was 
only almost achieved during one year of the Mubarak era. As the private sec-
tor failed to expand sufficiently rapidly to absorb new entrants to the labour 
market, the state continued to act as a labour sponge. In a related effort to 
deter unrest, the government spent steadily more of its budget on consumer 
subsidies, most notably for energy, while not increasing tax revenues suffi-
ciently to absorb those costs, which consumed over one fifth of all government 
expenditures by the end of the Mubarak era. The resultant annual budget defi-
cit bounced along at some 7–8 per cent for Mubarak’s final years, thereby add-
ing to the accumulated public debt, interest payments on which also absorbed 
more than one fifth of the budget. Savings and investment declined in parallel, 
dropping to some 12 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (gdp) by 2010, plac-
ing Egypt in the world’s lowest quartile of countries on this vital measure of 
economic growth (World Bank, 2016).
These interconnected problems of the civilian economy, resulting from a 
rent seeking state nurturing its favoured clients, were exacerbated by the mili-
tary’s increasing interventions in that economy. Military- and officer-owned 
companies benefiting from a host of subsidies and preferential treatments—
of which conscript labour, tax-free status and preferential treatment in gov-
ernment contracting were key—to say nothing of immunity from official 
oversight and regulation, increasingly shouldered aside civilian competitors.6 
Competition over rents between officers and cronies intensified, becoming a 
major cause of the military refusing to stand by Mubarak. The military was 
particularly sensitive to any efforts to encroach on its economic autonomy 
and the tax-exempt status of its enterprises. The two civilian cabinet members 
6 For illustrative examples, see Abul-Magd (2016, forthcoming).
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who were brave enough to advocate a change to the latter arrangement—
Minister of Finance Yusuf Butrus Ghali and Minister of Trade and Investment 
Rashid Muhammad Rashid—were the only high profile ministers not related 
to the Mubaraks subsequently tried, convicted and then pursued abroad by 
the military- dominated government.7 In sum then, President al-Sisi inherited 
a misshapen political economy distorted by rent seeking and the overween-
ing role of his very own military. The challenges—resulting from this state of 
affairs—that he now faces include managing a deep fiscal crisis, empowering a 
new business elite, creating jobs and a labour force able to fill them and stimu-
lating growth in various sectors.
3 Fiscal Problems and Solutions
Coterminous with Field Marshal al-Sisi’s election as president was the an-
nouncement by Russell’s Annual Index that after a three year review it was 
downgrading Egypt’s status from emerging to ‘frontier’ market, a term coined 
in 1992 by the International Finance Corporation to refer to equity markets 
riskier and less developed than emerging ones (Zaazaa, 2014b). Among the rea-
sons cited by Russell’s were currency controls imposed by the central bank—a 
step taken to slow the rate of devaluation and preserve scarce foreign currency 
reserves, which at some usd 15–17 billion were not enough to cover more than 
three months of imports. But saving the Egyptian pound by restricting access 
to foreign exchange resulted in collateral damage to the market, to confidence, 
and to business in general; damage that intensified in 2015 in tandem with 
the central bank’s further tightening as foreign reserves slipped further. For 
example, Egypt’s largest steel producer, Ezz Steel, reported its first-quarter net 
loss had increased to usd 19.5 million from usd 2.7 million (egp 136 million 
from egp 19 million) in the same period in 2014. The company’s chairman at-
tributed the downturn to Ezz’s inability to ‘source sufficient foreign currency, 
due to a major change in the regulations of the banking sector’. He noted that, 
‘as a consequence we had to limit imports of raw materials and to reduce the 
volume of our production and sales’. (Ahram Online, 2015b). Russell’s reclas-
sification followed a series of downgrades, since 2011, of Egypt’s sovereign debt 
by Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s, taking it to junk bond status. Unable to 
float an international bond issue for more than a year because of anticipated 
7 As reported to the author by eyewitnesses, in cabinet meetings on this issue both men 
clashed with Minister of Defense Muhammad Husayn Tantawi.
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negative market reactions, Egypt—by the summer of 2014—was facing a se-
vere fiscal crisis. Its sovereign debt, attracting interest of up to 17 per cent, was 
predicted by the Minister of Finance to require a full quarter of the country’s 
budget to service in the coming financial year, up from 22 per cent in 2013–14. 
The stimulus package financed by Saudi Arabia and the uae launched a year 
previously in the wake of the military’s takeover had consumed several billion 
dollars, but not resulted in more rapid economic growth. Indeed, gdp growth, 
estimated in early 2013 to be 3 to 3.5 per cent, dropped in the first half of 2014 to 
1.2 per cent, its lowest level since the war years of the Nasser and Sadat eras. In-
flation reached more than 9 per cent in April 2014, while the currency, despite 
central bank efforts to prop it up, had fallen 15 per cent against the dollar and 
euro over the previous twelve months. National savings collapsed in 2013–14 
to some 7 per cent, from over 13 per cent the previous year. Unemployment, 
climbing steadily—according to official figures, which systematically and sub-
stantially understate it—from 8.9 per cent in 2010, reached almost 14 per cent 
in the first quarter of 2014. All that seemed to stand between Egypt and the 
fiscal calamity of runaway inflation coupled with a collapsing currency and 
economic stagnation were cash infusions from the Gulf. Small wonder that the 
Saudi and Emirati governments were both seeking to draw the International 
Monetary Fund (imf) into the Egyptian rescue effort, lest they have to pay for 
it all themselves, with the estimated bill being in the tens of billions of dol-
lars. Left with virtually no alternative, the new al-Sisi government moved in 
the summer of 2014 to reduce the government deficit by lowering subsidies 
and increasing taxes, moves which caused Moody’s to upgrade its assessment 
of Egypt’s outlook from negative to stable, although not to raise its low (Caa1) 
government bond rating.
The outlines of the stabilisation plan had long been clear. By 2015, over 
three-quarters of the annual budget was consumed by a combination of sub-
sidies (27 per cent), government wages (25 per cent) and interest payments 
(28 per cent), with repayment of loan capital requiring a further 15 per cent. 
This leaves only some 5 per cent of the budget for all other expenditures, capi-
tal and recurring. If the savings and investment rate is to be driven from its 
present 7 per cent of gdp to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (oecd) average of around 20 per cent—with any thoughts of 
reaching Chinese and East Asian figures of over 40 per cent being consigned 
to the realm of dreams—then subsidies, wages and interest payments have to 
be dramatically reduced. Of these three, only subsidies and interest payments 
can be reduced absolutely, assuming that government workers cannot be dis-
missed, which would be a revolutionary step in Egypt in both the meanings of 
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the word.8 So, the immediate tasks at hand were to cut subsidies and resched-
ule loans while hopefully obtaining further debt forgiveness.
Of the two, attacking the debt burden is easier because it involves foreign 
support, some of which will be forthcoming. But generous as foreigners might 
prove to be, because Egypt’s foreign debt, now approaching usd 50 billion, is 
only about 20 per cent of its gdp, whereas its domestic debt is more than 90 per 
cent of gdp, and because less than 20 per cent of the foreign debt is short term, 
even substantial relief of the foreign debt would not be a miracle cure. The 
government’s domestic debt is owed overwhelmingly to public and private sec-
tor banks. Attracted by the secure, high spreads between interest for deposits 
and that paid on government paper, and smarting from large portfolios of non-
performing loans they had unwisely extended to Mubarak cronies, these banks 
have for several years now essentially turned their backs on private borrowers. 
World Bank and other surveys reveal that the single largest obstacle faced by 
most Egyptian entrepreneurs is obtaining finance. In this sense, Egypt’s banks 
are zombies, netting profits by collecting deposits on behalf of the govern-
ment, but contributing almost nothing to the private sector’s financial needs.
The government has the usual leverage a debtor has over a creditor and it 
could be tempted to use it. But since the public sector banks still account di-
rectly for about half the loans and deposits of the entire banking sector, and 
indirectly—as a result of cross ownership—for considerably more, the govern-
ment would be taking money out of one of its pockets to put it in another, in 
the process rendering much of the banking sector even more irrelevant to the 
country’s private economy. But given the magnitude of debt servicing this may 
be the path that is chosen, with concomitant, negative consequences for eco-
nomic growth as neither the government nor the private sector would retain 
much access to credit. To the extent Sisinomics depends upon private sector-
led growth, the benefits of achieving better fiscal balance at the expense of do-
mestic creditors would come at a substantial cost. Assuming the government 
8 As the fiscal imbalance continued to worsen, the government decreed a new civil service law 
in March, 2015, intended primarily to contain that sector’s wage bill, which had risen to 25.2 
per cent of the 2015/16 budget’s expenditures from 23.9 per cent three years previously. Civil 
servants’ fears that this decree would seriously erode their total remuneration packages, of 
which the greatest share for many is in the form of ‘bonuses’ rather than base salaries, led to 
a series of strikes in the summer of 2015, the most intense of which were staged by tax col-
lectors. In response, President al-Sisi announced on 17 August that the intent of the law was 
to restructure the civil service, not to reduce salaries, thereby reflecting his fear that labour 
unrest would spread (Ali and Ahmed, 2015).
Springborg192
<UN>
does not want to shoot itself in the foot in this way, the progress it can make on 
debt reduction can only be gradual, even with foreign support.
Subsidies are another matter. They are a better test of the government’s polit-
ical self-confidence and coherence because, unlike debt renegotiations, which 
do not directly and visibly impact the public or private sectors of the economy, 
subsidy reduction would. It thus becomes a question of which constituencies 
will suffer more. Because food subsidies benefit the poor proportionately more 
than energy subsidies, and because poverty has steadily increased since 2011, 
now affecting almost half the population, food subsidies can be better targeted 
but not substantially reduced; or at least not without a potential popular ex-
plosion that no government would want to face. Indeed, in 2014 the govern-
ment moved to slightly increase the price of bread and to expand the use of 
smart cards for purchases of subsidised food commodities, but since food sub-
sidies other than bread comprise a small fraction of total subsidies, their more 
precise targeting had relatively little overall budgetary impact.
This left cutting energy subsidies as the only major, immediate, potential 
source of government savings. Indeed this, more than any other economic is-
sue divides not only the beneficiaries, but also members of the cabinet and 
the broader decision-making elite who represent them. Cheap electricity and 
gas disproportionately benefit the heaviest users, who are the wealthiest 10 per 
cent of the population. Within that group, owners of energy-intensive compa-
nies in the cement, steel, ceramic, fertiliser, petrochemical and related indus-
tries benefit most. While electricity prices have risen only slightly in the past 
decade, the price of natural gas delivered to factory gates was raised in 2014 to 
some usd 8 per million British thermal units (btu), compared to a global aver-
age of usd 10; the proportionate price differential having dropped substantially 
since the gas-fired boom of the late Mubarak years when Egyptian industries 
were paying only some usd 2 per million btu. It was indeed this cheap energy 
that resulted in foreign takeovers in several of these industries, most notably 
cement, about four-fifths of the production of which is now carried out by 
foreign-owned companies.9 That fact alone, combined with the global decline 
in oil and gas prices from June 2014, makes it easier for the government to raise 
prices, as indeed it did for some grades of transport fuels in 2014. But even if 
there is less political resistance to price hikes now, the cabinet remains divided 
between advocates and opponents of electricity and gas price increases. The 
ministers of Finance and National Planning, for example, strongly favour price 
increases, whereas those representing industry and charged with attracting 
9 In October 2014, Suez Cement—one of the country’s largest producers—reported a 14 per 
cent decline in net profits for the first nine months of the year, blaming fuel shortages and 
the new, higher price of usd 8 per million btu for the decline (Abaza, 2014a).
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foreign investment, led by the ministers of Trade and Investment, want to hold 
the line against significant price rises (Zaazaa, 2014a ). This choice not only im-
plies relative rewards and costs for different Egyptian constituencies, but future 
industrial policy and whether it will continue to rely on cheap energy inputs or 
seek to shift to a broader base, in which the benefits to manufacturing of cheap 
labour would be key. Precisely because decisions on energy subsidies are of 
such political and economic significance they require coherent, confident gov-
ernmental leadership, which has been lacking since the January 25 Revolution. 
Whether the new government formed under President al-Sisi can provide it in 
this key area will thus be a crucial test of its preferences, its base, and its coher-
ence. As of early 2015 its potential reform of energy subsidies had primarily tar-
geted transport fuels and electricity and gas for domestic consumption, leaving 
open the issue of long-term energy prices and potential new sources of supply, 
both vital for industry. In the last quarter of 2014 the government granted per-
mission to two private sector consortia—one of which brings together Egypt’s 
richest man, Nassif Sawiris, and his company Orascom Construction, and the 
Abu Dhabi Government’s International Petroleum Investment Corporation—
to construct two coal-fired power plants, one in South Sinai and the other on 
the Red Sea coast; their very location suggesting that the electricity generated 
would be used primarily by the cement industry.10
On the revenue side of the fiscal imbalance there is also substantial need for 
reforms that require political will. As on the expenditure side, therefore, they 
serve as a test of leadership. Privatisation of public sector enterprises would 
provide little in the way of windfalls as the jewels from that crown were plucked 
during the Mubarak era. Privatisation would, however, staunch the flow of 
public monies into them, which remains sizeable even though it has tapered 
off over the past three years. Clearing these public sector companies’ bad debts 
from the books of their sister public sector banks is in any case a necessary step 
on the road to restoring effective financial intermediation. Worker remittances 
remain a substantial source of foreign exchange, if not directly of government 
revenue. But after rising steadily from 2010 on to reach some usd 19 billion in 
2012, they fell significantly in the second half of 2013 as around 300,000 Egyp-
tians were forced to leave Saudi Arabia as a result of its crackdown on foreign 
labour, while others still fled the growing conflict in Libya. Saudi Arabia alone 
accounts for about one half of all remittances to Egypt and if it and other gcc 
states step up expulsions of foreign workers, as they pledge to do, the flow of re-
mittances to Egypt could yet be more negatively affected. Suez Canal revenues 
have remained relatively flat at usd 5–6 billion and are projected to increase 
10 For further information on, and analysis of, Egypt’s energy policy under the military gov-
ernment, see Springborg (2016, forthcoming).
Springborg194
<UN>
by less than 5 per cent annually despite the usd 8.5 billion spent on the canal’s 
upgrade, completed by the military in August, 2015. Egypt is now a net importer 
of fuels, and so does not profit on balance from the export of oil and gas.
Meaningful revenue increases, in sum, will not come from windfalls or from 
the traditional sources of government revenue. They will have to come from 
increased taxation. Therein lies the problem, as no one—of course—wants 
to bear that burden. Indeed, Egyptians have been steadily shirking it since the 
late 1980s when tax revenue constituted about 30 per cent of gdp, falling to 
20 per cent in 2000 and now to about 15 per cent, well below the average for 
comparator countries. During the Mubarak era finance minister Yusuf Butrus 
Ghali, a strong advocate of tax reform, pushed through a new vat tax and addi-
tional sales and real estate taxes. They were, however, never fully implemented, 
although the legislation and enabling administrative decrees have remained 
on the books. In the second half of 2014 as the economic crisis intensified the 
government dusted them off and reintroduced them, along with new taxes on 
stock market gains, on individual’s and company’s earnings abroad, and—on 
a temporary basis—a tax on annual incomes in excess of egp 1 million. These 
new taxes, combined with reductions in subsidies, appeared to be intended 
primarily to send a message to Egypt’s present and future creditors that the 
government was intent on reducing the fiscal imbalance, which by the end 
of the year was still hovering at around 12 per cent of gdp, thus imperilling 
Egypt’s credit rating and further complicating its desperate need to raise new 
loans, signalled to be a new issue of a eur 1 billion bond following the March 
2015 donors’ conference. The issue of whether the government was intent on 
real, permanent fiscal reform, or was just seeking to appease its creditors due 
to its present, desperate need, remained unanswered in 2015, for the promised 
raises in value added, real estate, and capital gains taxes were postponed yet 
again in the budget announced in July of that year.
In sum, Egypt’s daunting fiscal problems cannot be resolved at a techno-
cratic level. They are too deep and pressing and involve such sensitive political 
questions of who gets what, when and how that their effective resolution 
requires direct engagement by the political elite. Since President al-Sisi now 
towers over that elite, he will have to become personally involved in this 
decision- making process and identify himself publicly with policy choices if 
real progress is to be made. Whether he can come to understand the technical 
complexities and political trade-offs involved, choose decisively and well from 
among the options, and then sell the policies to those whom they impact will 
be a primary and presumably early test of his leadership. By the autumn of 
2015, his prevarication, vacillation, and cancellation of policy reforms, com-
bined with a fixation on grandiose projects, suggested that he was seeking to 
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substitute the latter for the former, a strategy with limited long-term prospects 
for political or economic success.11
4 A New Business Elite?
Under Mubarak the business community consisted of a private sector domi-
nated by cronies connected to the regime, independent civilian owners of 
large and medium-sized modernised enterprises, retired officers now running 
their own firms, a small but emerging ‘Islamic’ sector composed primarily of 
leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, and literally millions of proprietors of mi-
cro, small, and traditional, medium-sized companies. That community also 
included a public sector in which the officer–managers of military companies 
were steadily growing in importance at the expense of the ‘state bourgeoisie’ 
of civilian managers of state-owned enterprises who had played much more 
important roles in Nasser’s and even Sadat’s era.12 The Mubarak private sector 
has been accurately characterised as having had a ‘missing middle’. Business 
activity, in other words, was clustered in a few large firms and a multitude of 
very small ones, the latter of which could not easily expand because of lack of 
access to capital and a discriminatory regulatory environment. The principal 
tensions within the business community were at its elite levels, most notably 
between the cronies connected to the Mubaraks and the generals, active and 
retired, who managed military enterprises or owned their own companies that 
existed primarily as contractors to the state, especially the Ministry of Defence, 
and agencies—such as the Suez Canal Authority—dominated by it. The de 
facto ceo of this sprawling ‘Military Inc’. was Minister of Defence Muhammad 
Husayn Tantawi, of whom General al-Sisi was a favoured client. In the wake of 
Mubarak’s overthrow, Tantawi, al-Sisi and their fellow officers, acting in con-
cert with anti-Mubarak forces, were able first to bring the cronies to heel; then, 
after ousting the Brothers in July 2013, they dispossessed the Islamist capital-
ists.13 Paradoxically, the July 2013 coup was made possible in part by support 
11 For discussion and analysis of al-Sisi’s policymaking style and fixation on grandiose, ill-
thought-out projects, including those for the Suez Canal, land reclamation, housing con-
struction and the building of a new capital, see Springborg (2015).
12 On the shifting balance between the civilian and the military public sectors, see Abul-
Magd, (2016, forthcoming).
13 The government steadily extended its appropriations of the assets of those it accused of 
being connected to the Brotherhood. In 2015 it seized the travel agency of Egypt’s most fa-
mous soccer player, Abu Treika, and the shares Safwat Thabet held in the sprawling dairy 
conglomerate Juhayna—a company that he had founded and directed.
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from the cronies, who feared the Brothers more than they resented the offi-
cers, and so unleashed their media outlets against the former and opened their 
pockets to the latter. Fully in control, the military then began to selectively re-
habilitate once disgraced cronies, including even the notorious Hussein Salem, 
architect and primary beneficiary of the costly gas deal with Israel (Zaazaa, 
2014c). Presumably they were brought into the new, military-dominated fold 
because of the need for their capital and expertise. Other cronies who rejected 
overtures from the military, such as Rashid Muhammad Rashid, remained in 
exile, typically being subject to carrot and stick strategies intended to extract 
financial commitments to the government from them. New fraud charges were 
brought against Rashid, while those of tax evasion against Nassif Sawiris were 
dropped in return for his ‘donation’ of egp 2.5 billion to the military’s ‘Long 
Live Egypt Fund’, which was followed less than a week later by the announce-
ment that the government had approved Sawiris’ proposal to build a usd 2–3 
billion coal-fired power plant on the Red Sea. One of the Mansour brothers was 
allowed to return to Egypt to sort out the mess surrounding his joint venture 
real estate development with a major Emirati firm, presumably as a result of 
the government’s attentiveness to the Emiratis. The other brother, however, 
remained in his London exile, uncertain of his treatment should he return to 
Egypt.14 During this turmoil, as a new business elite was being configured by 
the military, independent businessmen who operated medium-sized firms 
were left to their own devices to cope with political disorder, macroeconomic 
decay and infrastructural breakdown, including disruption to electricity sup-
plies.15 As for the business minnows in small and micro firms, a host of supply 
and demand problems, including interruptions to the flow of raw materials 
due to hard currency shortages, rendered their existence yet more precarious.
The new business elite is thus a work in progress under military tutelage. 
Mubarak cronies, presumably to be joined by others, are scrambling for whatev-
er patronage officers dole out, enhancing their appeal by bringing more retired 
officers into their companies and forging joint ventures with officer-owned 
companies.16 This fusion notably excludes most of the old state bourgeoisie 
based in the civilian public sector, a component of the economy treated with 
contempt by officers, with the notable exception of Arab Contractors, the 
14 Both brothers have been listed by Forbes as being among the ten richest Africans.
15 For a review of how policy inconsistency has negatively impacted Egypt’s once proud 
textile industry, see Esterman (2015).
16 For examples of these new ‘partnerships’, see Abul-Magd (2016, forthcoming).
Businessmen in Arms: How the Military and Other Armed Groups Profit in the mena 
Region by Elke Grawert (Author), Zeinab Abul-Magd (Author).
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former ceo of which—Ibrahim Mahlab, who had long-standing ties with both 
the presidency and the military—was chosen by President al-Sisi to serve as 
his first prime minister.
The tightly structured decision-making elite emerging under President 
al- Sisi will reinforce the importance of access to him and his confidants, si-
multaneously narrowing it; processes that will impact both the polity and 
the economy. In the cabinet reshuffle following his election as president, for 
example, al-Sisi ejected Foreign Minister Nabil Fahmy, who—like Finance 
Minister Ahmad Galal, who had been dumped in the previous reshuffle—
had been too high profile and independently minded to be trusted by al-Sisi. 
Fahmy’s successor, Sameh Shukri, had been Mubarak’s long-serving head of 
information within the presidency, and thus someone closely connected to 
the military, the primary source of staffing for that department. By contrast, 
Fahmy was a known opponent, when ambassador in Washington, of the fur-
ther expansion of military influence in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Several 
members of the first al-Sisi cabinet were also members of the board of the 
Arab Organization for Industrialization, the most important of the three hold-
ing companies through which the Ministry of Defence manages Military Inc. 
The al-Sisi presidency, in other words, is configuring a political–economic elite 
that depends on the military and those either with well-established ties to it 
or willing to assist it with their resources in return for a share of the action. Ex-
cluded from playing any active role in this emerging political–economic elite 
and presumably from having their concerns and desires taken into consider-
ation, are virtually all other elements of the business community, including the 
few occupying the ‘missing middle’, the remainder of the public sector mana-
gerial elite, and the small and micro enterprise owners—this final category 
paradoxically being the one from which President al-Sisi himself hails. While 
he might have some lingering sympathies for and interests in this last, strug-
gling component of the business community, its needs could only be met by a 
thorough overhaul of the bureaucracy and the financial sector, tasks that the 
new president is unlikely to undertake or achieve.
In sum, the emerging al-Sisi business elite will be more homogenous, small-
er and more military dominated than that of his predecessor. Islamist busi-
nessmen and public sector officials will be denied significant economic roles, 
while the design and operation of the economy will be in the hands of the 
military, assisted by a limited number of recycled cronies with a few new ones 
likely joining the elite in the future. The independent, medium-sized business-
men who struggle in the missing middle will find their struggle harder still, as 
will owners of small and micro enterprises. These businesses do not appeal 
to officers, whose preferred model for the economy is that of major projects 
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designed by themselves and implemented by military or crony managers/
owners, frequently in joint ventures with Egyptian or foreign enterprises. They 
have contempt for the public sector and civilian government more generally, 
so they will privatise whatever state-owned enterprises they can while creat-
ing their own authority structures parallel to the civil administration. Inde-
pendent businesses of any size, in any sector, will find it increasingly difficult 
to compete in an economy of this nature. The political elite will be similarly 
tightly and narrowly structured, thus denying most independent owners of 
capital avenues of participation, influence, or protest.
4.1 Labour Force in Search of Jobs
Even during the period of rapid economic growth from 2002 to 2008, when the 
official unemployment rate fell to a low—in the final year of the period—of 
8.8 per cent, the labour market continued to manifest weakness. The propor-
tion of informal employment provided by small and micro enterprises con-
tinued to grow, accounting for more than two-thirds of new entrants into the 
job market as formal public and private sector employment stagnated. Female 
participation in the labour market receded in tandem with the relative decline 
in size of the civil service, as the majority of women in formal employment 
are employed by the government. The youth unemployment rate continued 
to be at least double the overall rate. The correlation between education and 
unemployment intensified as the private sector was generating an insufficient 
number of skilled jobs, while the public sector was no longer expanding in 
pace with the growing supply of graduates. Official unemployment figures did 
not accurately reflect steadily growing underemployment, in part because the 
definition of employed was anyone working one hour a week or more. Increas-
ingly, the unemployment rate reported primarily the proportion of university 
and higher technical school graduates who had failed to find jobs, as the less 
educated simply dropped off the books. Labour market weakness by the end of 
the Mubarak era could not be attributed in the main to the youth bulge, since 
by 2012 its peak lay in the 25–29 age range, and thus above the average age of 
entry into the job market. In 2006 the peak had been in the market-entering, 
15–24 age group (Krafft and Assaad, 2014, 2).
Since the January 25 Revolution the labour market has further deteriorated. 
Based on the 2012 Egyptian labour market survey and other data, Ragui Assaad 
and Caroline Krafft conclude that even though demographic pressures have 
decreased, ‘Overall, the labor market post-revolution is in a weaker position 
than in 2006’. (Assaad and Krafft, 2013a, 1). They further note that Egypt only 
has a temporary respite from these demographic pressures, as the ‘echo’ ef-
fect of the youth bulge, whereby the leading edge of that bulge come of age 
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and these individuals, themselves, become parents, is beginning to be felt. The 
cohort of 0–9 year olds is much larger than that of 10–19 year olds. In all, 2.1 mil-
lion children were born in 2008, whereas 2.6 million were born in 2012. This in-
crease in births between 2010 and 2012 was ‘the largest two-year increase since 
records began’ (Rivlin, 2014, 4). In the coming decade ‘there will be an unprec-
edented number of labor market entrants’ as Egypt’s population is on course 
to overtake those of Russia and Japan by 2050 (Krafft and Assaad, 2014, 3). 
A source of further concern is that a primary cause of the rebound in the 
fertility rate is a declining rate of employment of women of childbearing age. 
In 1998, 22 per cent of female high school graduates were employed, whereas 
in 2012 only 17 per cent were. The equivalent percentages for female university 
graduates were 56 per cent dropping to 41 per cent. This deterioration of fe-
male employment figures will presumably drive the fertility rate up still higher, 
thereby further exacerbating the challenge of job creation.
Segmentation of the labour market and its consequences have become more 
profound since the January 25 Revolution. The increasingly woeful conditions 
of the informal sector, combined with inadequate job creation in the formal 
private sector and successive governments’ practice of cultivating support from 
the civil service by increasing its numbers and pay has caused job entrants to fo-
cus more and more on government employment (Assaad and Krafft, 2013b). In 
the 2014/15 budget, the salaries of government employees, which now consume 
one quarter of that budget, will increase by 13 per cent over the previous year 
(Esterman, 2014). During the Mubarak era an outspoken Minister of Administra-
tive Reform stated that Egypt’s civil service should not provide more than three 
million posts if it is to be made more efficient; now it employs in excess of 7 mil-
lion people. While both the military-dominated and the Muslim Brotherhood- 
dominated governments formed between 2011 and 2014 curried favour with 
civil servants, President al-Sisi’s recurring emphasis on hard work and sacrifice 
and the need for budgetary austerity, combined with his power now having 
been consolidated, suggests that the civil service will come under substantial 
economic pressure, as signalled by the announcement of a new civil service law 
in March, 2015. If this law and other measures do indeed restrict growth in the 
size and the overall wage bill of the civil service, this will parallel pressure al-
ready being applied to employees of state-owned enterprises, a significant per-
centage of whom have not been awarded promised minimum wage increases. 
The pressure being applied to these workers, and to those in private sector con-
cerns, has taken a political form in the banning of strikes—a step called for by 
the Minister of Manpower, the Prime Minister and various other officials. It was 
incorporated into legislation decreed under President Adly Mansour and has 
been sporadically implemented beginning in 2014, most notably in Alexandria 
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(Charbel, 2014). Strikes in military-owned enterprises are illegal and employ-
ees who have sought to organise them have been prosecuted and imprisoned. 
Shortly after his election President al-Sisi launched a campaign to remove street 
vendors in urban areas, despite the fact that the activity frequently represents 
the last hope for those who have failed to find other employment, as exempli-
fied by the case of Muhammad Bouazizi in 2010 in Tunisia.
The labour force, in sum, faces increasingly bleak employment prospects 
and a government intent on preventing further industrial action while be-
ing simultaneously intent on finding ways and means to limit spending on 
government employment, virtually the only segment of the labour market that 
has prospered since 2011. The temporary respite of reduced numbers of young 
job seekers will soon give way to a renewed surge in those numbers. Prospects 
for migration have dimmed as gcc states move to restrict expatriate labour. 
Other potential foreign labour markets, including Europe and North America, 
are yet more difficult to access. A growing percentage of Mediterranean boat 
people and the human traffickers transporting them are Egyptian nationals, as 
reflected by the country being placed in July 2015 on the us State Department’s 
watch list for global trafficking in persons (Cairo Post, 2015). Nothing has been 
done in recent years to improve the low quality of graduates from secondary 
and tertiary educational institutions. Such an achievement would, in any case, 
take years to have an impact on labour markets. In the absence of a dramatic 
turnaround of the Egyptian economy causing the supply of private sector jobs 
to surge, the prospects for Egypt’s youth, who constitute the lion’s share of 
the unemployed, will continue to deteriorate. The very best that many will be 
able to envision is a job in Military Inc.; but that segment of the economy, 
while more robust than others, is unlikely to grow fast enough to make a quali-
tative difference. In any case the majority of its workers are conscripts, drawn 
from an overflowing pool in excess of 300,000 men.
4.2 Key Sectors and Their Maladies
The two main sectors driving economic growth in Egypt in the first decade of 
the twenty-first century were tourism and energy/energy-intensive industries. 
The former’s contribution to gdp came to account for about 12 per cent, with 
a slightly higher contribution to the share of employment resulting from the 
some 3 million jobs generated by the industry, which rendered Egypt’s labour 
market the world’s thirteenth most dependent upon tourism (World Tourism 
and Travel Council, 2014). The second sector, in the form of gas, steel, cement, 
ceramics, fertiliser and petrochemicals, came to dominate Egypt’s exports of 
goods and, along with real estate and tourism, the country’s ability to attract 
fdi. The January 25 Revolution has been devastating for both sectors. The 
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prospects for their return to the status quo ante, to say nothing of potential 
expansion, are not encouraging. Tourism, already down from 2010 totals, fell 
by two-thirds in 2013 from the preceding year, posting its lowest number of 
visitors in a decade. The comparative magnitude of this impact is illustrated 
by the fact that, in 2014, of 184 countries ranked according to the contribution 
tourism made to gross domestic product (gdp), Egypt was placed 35th, while 
its ranking with regard to prospects for growth in 2014 was 174th (World Tour-
ism and Travel Council, 2014). Gas exports dried up shortly after the January 25 
Revolution as the growth of domestic consumption overtook production. By 
2014, accumulated payment arrears to foreign companies that had developed 
Egypt’s gas resources and that are owed shares of its production reached some 
usd 6 billion before a payment of usd 1.5 billion was made by the government 
prior to the March 2015 donors’ conference in the hopes that new exploration 
and development contracts would then be signed and so address the growing 
gas shortage.17 Cement production fell by 30 per cent in 2013/14 as energy pric-
es escalated. Stopgap measures allowing energy-intensive industries to import 
their own gas and to construct coal-fired power stations were approved, but 
the attractiveness of Egypt as a producer necessarily declined as energy costs 
escalated.
Neither sector will recover quickly. Tourism depends heavily on security 
and the broader political environment, a fact of which jihadis intent on de-
stabilising the government are well aware. Attacks on tourists in Luxor and 
the Sinai in 2015, combined with the beheading of a kidnapped Croatian em-
ployee of a French energy company that year, reflected this intent. The United 
Kingdom’s declaration in August of that year of most of the Sinai and Western 
Desert as unsafe for tourism suggested that the prospects for a renewal of the 
tourist industry had further receded. Egypt’s decline on the Global Peace In-
dex in 2014 was the second largest among all countries ranked (Institute for 
Economics and Peace, 2014). Even if the security and political environments 
in Egypt were somehow to improve, growing instability in the region, includ-
ing in neighbouring Libya, would still deter tourists. Egyptian and Western 
educational, cultural and other institutions based in Cairo or elsewhere in the 
country, including for example the American University in Cairo, have suffered 
sharp drops in foreign enrolments, with students, archaeologists and others 
17 In 2015 contracts were signed with several international oil companies, which presumably 
were enticed by dramatic increases in the price offered for the gas that Egypt would buy 
from them—on average some usd 4.50 per million btu, more than double the amount 
under existing contracts. Since this came at a time of declining global gas prices, it sug-
gested Egypt’s relative desperation to obtain new supplies.
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establishing new institutional relationships elsewhere, such as in Morocco, 
considered a safer Arab location. Stagnating remittances coupled with tour-
ism’s continuing underperformance will dramatically reduce the heretofore 
vital contribution of services and invisibles to the balances of trade and pay-
ments. In the final decade of the Mubarak era annual tourism receipts alone av-
eraged some usd 10 billion, typically offsetting the annual trade deficit in goods. 
Inadequate reserves of foreign exchange resulting from the decline of remit-
tances and tourism will in turn impact on other productive sectors, most 
notably that of manufacturing, which depends heavily on the importation of 
capital goods and raw materials—one of the reasons this sector has declined 
at a steadily growing pace since 2011, as evidenced by the performance of man-
ufacturing in general and the textile industry in particular.
The energy/energy-intensive processing sector is equally, if not more threat-
ened by the drastic deterioration of the environment in which it operates. 
Egypt failed to continue development of its hydrocarbon reserves at a rate suf-
ficient to keep pace with expanding local consumption. It then violated pro-
duction sharing agreements with bg, eni, bp and other international energy 
companies by diverting gas intended for exports to domestic consumption. At 
least two of these companies commenced proceedings against Egypt for con-
tract violations. Given the present availability of hydrocarbon reserves in many 
other markets now awaiting development, most notably in the Americas, 
Egypt’s attractiveness is substantially lower than it was in the Mubarak era.18 
To restore confidence and attract fdi, Egypt has had to pay some of the ar-
rears and commit to paying the balance, while also offering much more favour-
able contract terms, virtually overnight more than doubling its energy costs as 
global prices are declining. In the meantime steadily more energy is required 
to generate electricity for domestic consumption, a decreasing share of which 
can be allocated to industry. The future of these energy-intensive industries, 
which will have to rely ever more heavily on imported energy—whether in 
the form of natural gas, coal, oil or even electricity, which will be at or near 
global prices—is bleak, for they were all built on the basis of subsidised en-
ergy inputs. None require significant labour forces, so Egypt’s potential advan-
tage of cheap labour is minimal. All that remains of comparative advantage is 
location, especially sitting astride the Suez Canal, so that necessarily will be-
come ever more vital to the country’s development strategy. Again, however, 
that is a long-term prospect, payback from which will require many years to 
18 On the impact of the contemporary ‘energy revolution’ on the Arab world and Egypt, see 
Springborg (2014).
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materialise, thus raising the question of opportunity cost.19 The key question 
then is what happens in the intervening years? How is the government going to 
structure the economy to meet these pressing challenges?
5 Sisinomics: A Model to Meet these Challenges?
This brief review of Egypt’s fiscal situation and the state of its labour market 
and key economic sectors suggests that in all three areas the country is in deep 
crisis. The magnitude and entrenched nature of the problems in each area are 
such that they are not susceptible to quick fixes. The new regime, however, 
desperately needs to augment its questionable legitimacy as soon as possi-
ble, lest it face renewed challenges from excluded social and political forces, 
of which there are several, to say nothing of discontented military and security 
forces.20 While it is seeking to substitute ephemeral appeals to nationalism 
for substantive economic accomplishments, that strategy can buy only limited 
time. Real personal income—which stagnated even during the boom years of 
the Mubarak era and which has steadily declined since, with the rate of im-
poverishment dramatically rising since the January 25 Revolution—requires, 
for its improvement, both a rapid increase in national income and steps to 
ensure its more equal distribution.21 Given the rate of population growth, an-
nual increases in gdp now would have to be well in excess of 7 per cent to have 
any real impact on average incomes, a rate which was achieved only briefly 
19 For estimates of the years required to reap financial benefits from the usd 8.5 billion 
invested in the canal upgrade in 2014–15, see Springborg (2015).
20 Reports of attempted coups and protests by security personnel have steadily increased 
since the military seized power. In August 2015, for example, hundreds of police dem-
onstrated in Sharqiya against the Ministry of Interior, which responded by alleging their 
ranks had been infiltrated by members of the Muslim Brotherhood, an allegation also 
made in response to previous police strikes in Alexandria and Kafr al Shaykh in February 
2014 (Ahram Online, 2015a). In May 2015, more than twenty officers suddenly disappeared 
from their army posts. In August it was reported that they had been tried for, and con-
victed of, trying to overthrow President al-Sisi, for which they were sentenced to between 
10 and 25 years in prison. The group included four colonels (Middle East Eye, 2015).
21 It has long been argued that income inequality in Egypt is not particularly pronounced by 
comparison to other lower-middle and middle-income countries. Recent research, how-
ever, calls that proposition into question, presenting evidence to the effect that in the 
Middle East generally and Egypt specifically income inequality ‘is substantially higher 
than in the us or Europe [and] at least as large as in the most unequal emerging or devel-
oping regions (e.g. in Latin America or South Africa)’. (Alvaredo and Piketty, 2014, 2).
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during the gas-fired boom years of the Mubarak era. gdp growth in 2014–15 was 
less than 3 per cent and imf forecasts for growth in the next few years do not 
exceed 5 per cent. Since no windfalls are likely, whether in the form of privati-
sations of state-owned enterprises, confiscation of foreign assets, or a surge of 
hydrocarbon exports, and since broad economic growth across several sectors 
would require a thorough overhaul of both state and market, almost any new 
leadership would find the task of stimulating sustained growth a difficult one.
In the event, Egypt’s new leadership is ill-equipped to forge and then imple-
ment a successful model for economic growth. Its core of military officers is 
made up at best of competent managers of companies, at worst of corrupt, 
rent seeking comrades with a strong sense of entitlement to their privileg-
es. None have substantial experience of broader economic analysis, nor of 
economic policy formation. The rapid turnover of civilian specialists brought 
in by the military since 2011 to oversee economic policy suggests that meshing 
their expertise and recommendations with the preferences and ideas of their 
officer bosses is not easy. The ‘first string’ of economists was sidelined, and a 
second string was then fielded by the al-Sisi government. The present Minister 
of Finance has a degree in accounting, not economics. Many of these newly 
recruited experts have neither the professional reputations nor the indepen-
dent bases of power of their predecessors, suggesting that the officer bosses do 
not want to hear independent advice, especially from those who might claim 
to represent constituencies. As for the business sector, the return of cronies 
indicates that a marriage between them and Military Inc. is being arranged, 
much to the detriment of other businesses and to the labour force as a whole.
The magnitude and immediacy of the economic challenges faced, com-
bined with the limitations of the al-Sisi government, suggest what the likely 
strategy and the process of its formulation will not be. Not being an inclusive, 
representative government, the al-Sisi regime is not going to seek consensus 
on economic policy. Instead, it will operate more as a military command, with 
a small group of senior figures who conceive and direct policy. The delivery of 
goods and services will be conceptualised in a fashion analogous to a military 
campaign, with top-down orders to field units, many of the key elements of 
which will be from Military Inc. The notion that the economic forces of civil 
society can better provide goods and services so long as they operate within 
conducive governance structures is alien to the military officers in control and 
even to the cronies at their sides, whose wealth was accumulated through rents, 
not through market competitiveness. Poverty will be addressed to an extent, 
but through the delivery of rationed goods and services, many of which are al-
ready produced by the military, not through a coherent, unified plan for broad-
based, job creating, economic growth. Alongside the ‘welfare’ component 
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of the economy will be economic activities at which the officers and cronies 
excel. Most if not all of these depend upon strategic relations with the state, 
the most important of which include the provision of goods and services to the 
state, infrastructural development, and other essentially land based activities 
such as housing construction, as well as agency agreements with international 
companies seeking access to local markets or relatively small export platforms 
primarily servicing regional markets. Some of these undertakings will take on 
the character of national prestige projects, similar to those of President al-
Sisi’s predecessors, including Nasser’s Mudiriyya Tahrir (Liberation Province) 
or Mubarak’s Tushka, both ill-fated, large-scale reclamation projects. The ex-
ample of a much-publicised joint venture between the military and an Emi-
rati real estate company to construct low-cost housing is a case in point in the 
welfare sector. In the productive economy the main project will be the devel-
opment of the Suez Canal Zone and surrounding area—the land and mari-
time access to it being controlled by the military, either directly or indirectly 
through the Suez Canal Authority and its subsidiary holding companies. The 
government clearly hopes that this strategic location will provide not just an 
economic, but a geopolitical inducement for potential investors, presumably 
including Chinese, Russians and others wanting to sit astride the canal for both 
political and economic reasons.
Indeed, the mix of economic and political motives is the key to understand-
ing how the al-Sisi government will try to restructure the economy. Just as the 
geopolitical attractiveness of the Suez Canal may generate rents, so can other 
of the country’s assets, a key example of which is political–military power. Sub-
ventions from the gcc states—most of which have gone directly to the mili-
tary as general budgetary support, for specific projects such as the real estate 
development just mentioned, or in the form of supplies of oil or gas—are in-
tended by the donors to harness Egypt’s hard and soft power for various strug-
gles, whether against Iran, Syria, Turkey, Qatar, Libya or elements of their own 
populations, key examples of which are the Muslim Brothers and their fellow 
travellers.22 This manna from heaven provided to the very core of the Egyptian 
military-dominated political–economic elite will have the usual distorting 
effect of rents, as that elite shapes the economy by the very act of pursuing 
those rents. The Gulf economies are themselves lopsided and rent seeking, 
struggling to cope with the progressive decline of the rent/population ratio, 
a decline that accelerated following the collapse of oil and gas prices in the 
second half of 2014. But even if they were veritable paragons of development 
virtue, their motive is not Egypt’s economic well-being, but rather its political 
22 For a review of these subventions provided through the military, see Morsy (2014).
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and military support. Keeping Egypt on an economic lifeline that enables the 
incumbent regime to hold its head above water is, in fact, a better outcome for 
gcc patrons than an economically independent Egypt. So the rent takers and 
rent providers will have common interests, but these interests will not priori-
tise the country’s economic development over benefiting those responsible for 
it. More or less the same can be said of Western support for Egypt, which is in-
creasingly motivated by security concerns rather than by development needs 
or sheer profit motives. fdi is even more concentrated in the energy sector 
under the al-Sisi government than it was previously, in part because tourism 
has lost its investment lure. Integration into global production chains resulting 
from multinational corporate investment has become an even more distant 
hope than it was prior to 2011.
Moreover, a fundamental contradiction exists between Egypt’s rent seeking 
and its economic development. The former, reinforced by the regime’s need 
for domestic legitimacy, drives it to accentuate the issues of terrorism, political 
violence and regional unrest, driven by Islamist fanatics or Shi`a agents of Iran, 
emphasising Egypt’s role as a bulwark against these evils, including—most 
importantly—domestic ones. The primary message then is that Egypt is at 
the very epicentre of an existential struggle against terrorism, a message re-
inforced by the words and deeds of both the Obama Administration and the 
European Union. This message, however, is not one that reassures potential 
global or even regional investors in the Egyptian economy. If Egypt is to be 
integrated into global production chains that would gainfully employ its peo-
ple, then it needs to be perceived by multinational corporations, even those 
based in China, as a stable country at peace with itself and its neighbours. This 
manifestly is not the case, but it should be the government’s stated and actual 
objective if it wants to develop the economy in a meaningful, sustainable way. 
Instead, however, President al-Sisi is crying wolf out of his need for rents from 
external patrons and loyalty from his own, fearful citizens, thereby scaring off 
many potential investors.
The al-Sisi-inspired ideological project of a tough, austere state inspired by 
the moral virtues of Islam will further accentuate the perception of Egypt as 
a risky place to invest.23 One of his first acts upon assuming power—to have 
the cabinet form a committee to ‘fight atheism’—underscored, for observers 
already concerned about violations of human and civil rights, including those 
of international journalists, that this is a government hunkering down against 
many opponents, real and imagined, while emphasising its distinctively 
23 For an assessment of the political uses of Islam by the al-Sisi government, see Hearst 
(2015).
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religious character (Saber, 2014). As Noland and Pack have observed, percep-
tions of this sort are deleterious in numerous ways for a country’s develop-
ment prospects, discouraging—for example—its very own globalised expatri-
ates from committing their skills and capital to their de-globalising homeland 
(Noland and Pack, 2011, 251–260). An emphasis on struggle, conflict and an 
austere, religiously inspired morality, with the military and security services 
playing the key role in combatting evil and doing good, is a message with reso-
nance in Saudi Arabia and possibly Moscow, but not in London, Berlin, Paris, 
Tokyo, New York or probably even Beijing, or with most Egyptian skilled ex-
patriates. Multinational corporations have already expressed concerns about 
reputational costs associated with doing business in Egypt with the military 
and military-owned companies.24
6 Conclusion
Al-Sisi’s Egypt is doubling down on what preceding regimes in that country 
and those elsewhere in the world have demonstrated to be a failed strategy 
for economic development. That strategy is formulated and implemented by a 
military pursuing mixed and contradictory aims of national economic growth, 
enrichment and empowerment of itself and its officers, and enhanced coer-
cive powers, both domestic and regionally. Inevitably these regimes empha-
sise nationalism, conflict and struggle and the central role of those in charge 
in combatting these threats. Economic development is conceptualised as the 
task of those in charge, who arrogate to themselves the country’s resources 
in vain attempts to accelerate growth. Civil society and even civilian govern-
ment are viewed by the officers in charge with suspicion, even contempt, and 
so are not called upon to, and hence do not, contribute effectively to economic 
development.
It is, therefore, only a matter of time before yet more profound economic 
failure, possibly combined with military adventurism, undermines this regime. 
In the meantime and even thereafter, the Egyptian economy is unlikely to re-
turn even to the level of growth achieved under Mubarak, which was inad-
equate for a smaller population. The key question is thus not how to develop 
Egypt, but how to save it from becoming a basket case similar to Yemen or 
Sudan. Sisinomics will not provide the answer.
24 The author has been made aware of these concerns through consulting work with various 
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Oil rent has created a regional dynamic in the Middle East and North Africa (mena) 
whereby major political developments take place at the regional rather than the sin-
gle-state level. The Arab Spring was a regional phenomenon, and the entire region is 
today involved in a regional civil war. The regional dimension of democratic transi-
tions has often been postulated and supported in the literature.
In seeking appropriate economic strategies that may support the democratisation 
process, the regional dimension cannot be forgotten: purely national recipes have little 
chance of success. Ever since the heyday of pan-Arabism, economic integration with-
in the Arab region has been a recurring theme and objective, but accomplishments 
remain profoundly disappointing. This chapter reviews findings and the literature 
concerning the three dimensions of regional integration—merchandise trade, move-
ments of labour and movements of capital—and details the insufficient progress that 
has been made.
It is difficult to envisage a significant improvement in the development prospects of 
individual Arab countries unless greater success is achieved in pursuing regional inte-
gration. At the same time, the implementation of a new regional economic order also 
requires a new political order. The main difficulty in this respect is that those countries 
in the region that have the most economic assets and tools—the major Gulf export-
ers—are ruled by patrimonial monarchies rather than political forces, and their model 
of governance cannot be exported.
1 Introduction
The existing state order in the Middle East and North Africa (mena) has fre-
quently been questioned. Early views, which presented all states in the region 
as being the artificial creation of colonial powers, have progressively given way 
to the perception that Arab states—as came to exist at various times during 
the past century, and in some cases much, much earlier—are here to stay. Thus 
we tend to analyse political developments in their state-specific dimension.
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This chapter argues that the oil rent has created a regional dynamic where-
by major political developments take place at the regional rather than the 
single-state level. Essentially all major political movements in the region have 
a regional, not country-specific, dimension. The Arab Spring was a regional 
phenomenon, and the entire region is today involved in a regional civil war. 
The prospects for democratisation will also be decided at the regional level, 
and will essentially be influenced by the outcome of the civil war underway, 
which cannot be predicted.
The argument is presented in four sections followed by conclusions. The 
first section summarises the regional dimension of democratisation processes, 
and of all politics in the mena region. The second section discusses the dy-
namics of oil prices and oil rent and how these have affected regional relations. 
The third section illustrates how regional economic integration has failed, and 
how conduits for regional circulation of the oil rent have not been operational 
or have benefited only very narrow elites. The fourth section argues that that 
the current regional order is in crisis, and democratic transitions will only be 
successful if they are accommodated at the regional level and accompanied by 
closer regional economic cooperation. A short conclusion closes the chapter.
2 Politics in mena is Regional
The distinguishing feature of the Arab Spring is its regional character. With-
in weeks of the first manifestations of the movement in Tunisia, many other 
countries were engulfed in rapid succession: Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen, Syria and 
Libya. A total of five countries accounting for close to 50 per cent of the to-
tal population of mena were soon fully involved in the phenomenon, while 
others were more marginally touched—notably Oman and Jordan. In North 
Africa, only Algeria, which had experienced its own aborted ‘Spring’ twenty 
years earlier, and subsequently saw a very bloody civil war, was not involved. In 
the Levant, Iraq had been experiencing civil war conditions ever since regime 
change in 2003, and Lebanon has a fragile and very imperfect, yet democratic, 
order. The major Gulf rentier states (a grouping of which Bahrain is not a mem-
ber) were almost untouched.
The regional dimension of democratic transitions has often been pos-
tulated and tested in the literature (Kuru, 2014; Freund and Jaud, 2013; El-
badawi et al., 2011). It is frequently found that the regional environment has 
an important bearing on the outcome of individual countries’ transitions: 
democratisation is facilitated in regions where democracy prevails, and more 
difficult where authoritarian regimes are numerous. There clearly is an imita-
tion effect, and also open support for similar regimes—at least in the case of 
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authoritarian regimes, which tend to fear ‘democratic contagion’ and support 
each other more effectively than democracies do. We have seen the same in 
the Gulf Cooperation Council (gcc—encompassing Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates), a regional body created 
with the objective of ensuring mutual support among patrimonial monar-
chies, which quickly intervened to terminate the popular revolt in Bahrain.
Thus, regional influence is not new, but the speed with which the democ-
ratisation contagion spread during the Arab Spring was unprecedented, and 
justifies the quest for regional, rather than purely national causes and inter-
pretations. Looking forward, it is apparent that the battle between democracy 
and authoritarian rule is also being fought and will be decided at the regional 
level. In mena, all domestic politics have a regional impact, and no country’s 
internal equilibria can be independent of regional developments (Luciani and 
Salamé, 1988). Political permeability inevitably turns the region into an arena 
for conflict rather than compromise and cooperation. It is the very close inter-
dependence of domestic and regional affairs—close to an extent that has no 
parallel in any other region of the world—that makes it inevitable that mena 
states will be involved in each other’s internal affairs.
The region has known ‘democratic exceptions’ in a context of prevailing au-
thoritarian rule. Israel has been the most prominent case, and in the economic 
sphere it has been almost completely alienated from its regional environment 
while pursuing integration with the United States of America (us), Europe and 
other regions. Lebanon has maintained a democracy, while being constantly 
on the brink of civil war, in which constitutional dictates are ignored more 
often than not. Tunisia might possibly also succeed in consolidating a democ-
racy against the regional tide, and pursue a strategy of economic integration 
with Europe rather than its Arab neighbours. But these are exceptions, and 
fragile exceptions at that—Israel apart.
At the regional level, the battle is raging: while civil wars are being fought 
in only four countries (Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Libya) all other countries are 
in fact implicated. The whole region is engaged in a regional civil war whose 
active front is primarily in the four countries mentioned, but new fronts may 
open. And the gcc member states, which have so far succeeded in maintain-
ing substantial control of their territory, are—in any case—active participants, 
contributing funding, providing weapons or, in the case of Yemen, Syria and 
Libya, via military involvement on the ground and from the air.
If and when the regional civil war will be resolved, economic policies will 
also need to be defined at the regional level. The task of providing for the re-
construction of Syria and Yemen will inevitably fall on the shoulders of the 
major Gulf oil exporters, just as the task of maintaining the Egyptian economy 
is already theirs. Iraq and Libya are also major producers and might possibly 
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be able to fund their own reconstruction, but they too will need to define a 
regional economic strategy. The Arab civil war will inevitably define a new re-
gional order, which will be economic as well as political.
In seeking appropriate economic strategies that may support the democ-
ratisation process—assuming democratisation will still be on the agenda at 
the end of the civil war—the regional dimension cannot be forgotten: purely 
national recipes have little chance of success.
3 The Impact of the Oil Rent on Regional Economic Relations
Oil has exerted a fundamental influence on inter-Arab relations, primarily be-
cause of the dialectic between oil-poor and oil-rich states. Interestingly, the 
oil-rich states are also relatively ‘new’ in terms of history, having been formed 
in the first half of the twentieth century, and having gained independence 
even later; while the oil-poor states have deeper historical roots, in the case of 
Egypt and Iraq even having existed for millennia (Harik, 1987). Furthermore, 
the oil-rich states are rentier, meaning that the state is supported by revenues 
accruing from abroad and independent of domestic taxation; while the oil-
poor states became rentier only for a short period, as recipients of unilateral 
transfers from the oil-rich states in the 1970s and 80s (Luciani, 1987).
The dichotomy between oil-rich and oil-poor states (Kerr and Yassin, 1982) 
is certainly not the only factor in the extraordinary divisiveness of Arab re-
gional relations, but it has been significant. Although the pan-Arab ideology, 
which dominated the region at least until 1967, is not directly related to oil—it 
is rather a reaction to the Balkanisation of the Arab region, which, in turn, is 
certainly also related to oil—it quickly became entangled with it, hardening 
the conflict between the historically longer established, progressive, more de-
veloped, but oil-poor Arab states and the newly formed, traditional, conserva-
tive, oil-rich states of the Gulf and North Africa.
In regional relations the oil-poor states implicitly or explicitly articulated 
a claim to a share of the oil rent that the oil-rich states never truly accepted 
as legitimate. Nasser’s ideology was not primarily conceived of as a tool with 
which to destroy the oil monarchies and assert control over their oil riches, but 
it was soon perceived by these monarchs as aiming precisely at this outcome. 
Nasser was defeated not only by his inability to deliver progress with respect 
to the Palestine–Israel issue, but also, and perhaps even more so, by his in-
ability to come to terms with the oil monarchies—or, to be precise, with all 
oil-exporting countries in the region—even when some (like Iraq in 1958 and 
Libya in 1969) shed their monarchies and followed the ‘revolutionary’ path. He 
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lost his battle when he could not prevail in the civil war in Yemen; nor was he 
able to overcome persistent rivalry with Iraq (even before 1967). The advent of 
a regime, in Libya, with strong Nasserite and pan-Arab inclinations received 
little more than an opportunistic and profiteering response from Egypt.
In the 1970s, the increase of the oil rent was so sudden, and its concentration 
so extreme, that the rentier states felt it was prudent to be generous outside, as 
well as inside, their borders. They therefore created institutions to redistribute 
a share of the rent internationally and engaged in granting direct subsidies to 
neighbouring governments. Jordan, Syria, the Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion, and—until it made peace with Israel—Egypt were major beneficiaries 
of these direct grants. Later, Iraq became a recipient during its protracted war 
with Iran.
However, the effectiveness of such generosity in purchasing lasting goodwill 
was dubious, to say the least. Iraq’s decision to invade Kuwait, and the atti-
tude that Jordan, Yemen, or the Palestinians adopted on that occasion, proves 
that generosity sometimes breeds resentment. More recently, the fact that al-
Qaeda turned against the Saudi regime is another demonstration of a client 
turning against its patron.
So, after a short period of time during which the tide of the rent rose so high 
that it covered the entire region and almost every government became rentier 
(in the sense of being primarily occupied with capturing oil or strategic rents 
in the form of direct grants), the region went back to a condition that was com-
mon before 1973—that is, being dominated by the dynamics between rentier 
and non-rentier, or oil-rich and oil-poor, states, and the seeming impossibility 
of integration between them.
The Arab Gulf States reacted to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the posi-
tions taken by several neighbouring countries by radically revising their previ-
ously generous attitude, expelling massive numbers of immigrants from the 
other Arab countries and establishing the gcc as a club of rentier monarchs 
pursuing an integration project separate and independent from the rest of the 
region.
The decade of low prices from 1990 to 2000 marked a shift in the attitudes 
and economic policies of rentier and non-rentier governments alike. The rent-
iers became more aware of the urgent need for economic diversification, and 
increased reliance on private sector initiatives, which entailed, among other 
things, promoting regional trade and investment opportunities. The non-
rentiers progressively yielded to international pressure to open up their econo-
mies and espouse orthodox fiscal and monetary policies. By the end of the de-
cade, the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (gafta) was launched (1997) to pursue 
an increase in intra-regional trade, which was historically abnormally low. Yet 
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the scar of the mass expulsion of Arab immigrants was only minimally healed: 
an emphasis on reducing costs increased the attractiveness of importing 
especially South Asian labour, and limiting the role of Arab immigrants to 
those occupations where knowledge of the language was necessary or at least 
a very significant advantage.
But the US-led coalition’s intervention in Iraq in 2003 again changed the 
region’s economic environment. There is a close connection between regime 
change in Iraq and the onset of the oil price cycle that began in 2004 and 
came to a dramatic end in the latter part of 2014. At the turn of the century 
oil prices were recovering from the abysmally low levels reached in 1998–99, 
and the dominant narrative was that of peak oil. Following the terrorist at-
tacks of September 2011 some tension emerged on the markets due to a fear 
for oil supplies—Saudi Arabia at that time being portrayed as part of the 
problem rather than part of the solution. However, in the run-up to the al-
lied intervention in Iraq the expectation was that the demise of the Saddam 
regime would bring an end to the sanctions then in place against the coun-
try, lead to the opening of Iraq to investment from international oil compa-
nies, and trigger a rapid increase in oil production. As it became apparent 
that the outcome of the Iraqi adventure was very much different from what 
had been expected, oil prices started increasing gradually. The upward trend 
found little immediate resistance: demand for oil showed no sign of decreas-
ing, indeed China’s appetite for imported oil exploded; industrial countries 
were not plunged into recession; and alternative sources of oil were not im-
mediately forthcoming. The market became convinced that prices could rise 
much higher, and eventually created a bubble. The financial crisis subsequent 
to the collapse of Lehmann Brothers suddenly drained liquidity from the oil 
futures market, leading to a collapse in prices in the latter part of 2008—but 
this proved temporary. Prices recovered quite rapidly and kept climbing until 
2011. The outbreak of the Arab Spring contributed to again creating a fear that 
oil supplies from the Middle East might be seriously disrupted, although this 
was in fact not the case.
We can therefore identify a clear oil price cycle, which began approximately 
in 2004 and came to an abrupt end in 2014. This price cycle had momentous 
consequences in the Middle East region: it further emphasised the distance 
between the oil exporters of the Gulf and the rest of the region, and created the 
underlying conditions for the regional upheaval of the Arab Spring.
It is clear that the period of very high prices led to greater regional instabil-
ity rather than having the opposite effect. It enhanced the distance between 
the major oil exporters and the rest of the region, and the income concentra-
tion within rentier oil exporters non-rentiers alike. In the major oil exporting 
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countries, governments relied again on old and ineffective redistribution poli-
cies, which by and large further benefited the haves without offering a signifi-
cant improvement in the lot of the have-nots. As discussed elsewhere in this 
volume,1 low prices for energy products have a regressive impact on income 
distribution. Infrastructure expenditure benefits local contractors; increased 
spending leads to higher prices for housing, benefiting real estate investors and 
damaging the poorer nationals for whom cheap housing is not provided; even 
the very generous schemes to support nationals studying abroad only benefit 
a minority, while the majority of adolescents get only mediocre education and 
are not ready for gainful employment; youth unemployment worsened, as na-
tionals were squeezed out of the market by excessively low wages paid to un-
qualified expatriates from South Asian countries.
In the non-rentier states, the development model of Dubai and the other 
Gulf countries became hegemonic: political elites nurtured cronies whose role 
was to attract investment from the Gulf, offering opportunities to invest in real 
estate and luxury tourism, and to engage in financial speculation. The econo-
mies of the non-rentier countries experienced very satisfactory growth, but 
the quality of increased investment and value added did not allow for trickle-
down to occur.
As I have argued elsewhere (Luciani, 2016) the Arab Spring’s eruption and 
regional dimension cannot be easily explained unless we take into account 
the dynamics of income distribution at the regional level, not just within each 
country in the region. National statistics do not show any appreciable worsen-
ing of income distribution, but Alvaredo and Piketty (2014) convincingly argue 
that the data sources that are currently available at the national level in Egypt 
or other mena countries are insufficient to derive reliable estimates of top in-
come shares, and that income inequality is extremely large at the level of the 
Middle East taken as whole. It is the perception of such growing inequality, 
further fuelled by the growing role of regional media and the constant image 
of Dubai-style success that they project, that ignited resentment and revolt 
against the incumbent authoritarian regimes.
Now that the tide of oil prices has turned, will tensions decrease? Reduced 
financial means may possibly encourage a relatively speedier resolution of the 
regional civil war, but political stabilisation will require a regional economic 
order that promises opportunities for all and allows for reducing economic 
disparities.
1 El-Katiri and Fattouh, this volume; Hertog, this volume.
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4 Main Trends and Opportunities in Regional Economic Relations: 
Labour, Capital and Merchandise Trade
Ever since the heyday of pan-Arabism, economic integration within the Arab 
region has been a recurring theme and objective, but accomplishments remain 
profoundly disappointing. It is difficult to envisage a significant improvement 
in the development prospects of individual Arab countries unless greater suc-
cess is achieved in pursuing regional integration.
In theory, the Arab region should be expected to provide a model of success-
ful regional economic integration. This is because resources are so unevenly 
distributed: individual countries within the region face obvious difficulties due 
to the lack of one or other ingredient in the development recipe, and are thus 
clearly complementary with each other. Indeed, we have countries with oil re-
sources, but that are mostly thinly populated and largely desert; countries with 
large populations but limited agricultural potential and little or no mineral re-
sources; and countries with significant agricultural potential, which cannot be 
fully exploited because of a lack of capital or adequate market access. Greater 
integration along the axes of movements of capital, labour and merchandise 
trade is an obvious opportunity.
Yet, little effort has gone into actually pursuing regional economic integra-
tion. Endemic political conflict and rivalry, in particular between immediate 
neighbours, has led to a subordination of economic to political considerations, 
and systematic reticence towards greater interdependence. The nature of oil as 
an essentially global commodity trivialises the importance of stable bilateral 
trade relations, and creates the illusion that a global trade orientation in the 
absence of regional trade may be sufficient to deliver development. Although 
Israel has effectively succeeded in developing a modern economy with signifi-
cant points of excellence while being almost completely isolated from trade 
with its neighbours, the same experience cannot be replicated elsewhere in 
the region. The major oil exporters have pursued an industrialisation strategy 
based on adding value to crude oil and developing refining, petrochemical and 
other energy-intensive industries that also are structurally global and indepen-
dent of trade relations with neighbours—but there are evident limits to this 
model. These same countries also prefer to seek close bilateral trade ties with 
distant countries—be they in the Americas, in Europe or in the Far East—but 
are notably reserved about increasing imports from neighbours.
4.1 Merchandise Trade
Currently the region is covered by a complex array of trade agreements, many 
of which have never been implemented and are effectively dead, but continue 
to exist on paper. The region-wide agreement currently in force and still being 
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implemented—where security and political conditions allow—is the gafta, 
which was established in 1997 and progressively led to some reduction of tariffs 
on bilateral trade. Among sub-regional agreements, one should of course men-
tion the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Agadir Agreement (encompassing 
Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia). The former group decided, already when 
it was formed in 1981, to establish a common market, but has not yet succeeded 
in doing so;2 the latter is an example of deep integration but as the four coun-
tries involved are not contiguous, trade between them is hindered by logistical 
difficulties.
In addition, there have been attempts to establish trade liberalisation agree-
ments in the context of the Barcelona Process between the eu and the ‘South-
ern Neighbours’3 (a set that does not include all Arab countries, but only those 
with a shore on the Mediterranean, plus Jordan; notably excluding member 
countries of the gcc); and between the us and a select number of Arab coun-
tries (Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco and Oman). The latter, dubbed Middle East 
Free Trade Area (mefta), was launched in 2003 by the Bush Administration 
in the context of other initiatives aimed at reshaping the Middle East (regime 
change in Iraq being the first and foremost of these), but appears to have been 
largely abandoned by the Obama Administration. In addition, the eu has of-
ficially been pursuing a free trade area with the gcc (separate from the Barce-
lona Process), but has never succeeded in finding sufficient common ground 
with the intended partners.
It is, in the literature, well established that trade agreements between the 
eu and the Southern neighbourhood countries have led to an increase in eu 
exports towards these partner countries, but not of partner countries’ exports 
to the eu (Parra et al., 2016; Gylfason et al., 2015). Empirical analysis shows 
that this result might change if trade in agricultural products were liberalised 
alongside trade in industrial products, but this is not something that the eu 
has been ready to contemplate.
Notwithstanding its slow implementation, the literature has also found that 
gafta has had a moderately positive impact on South–South trade, at least 
until the eruption of the Arab Spring and the political disarray that followed. In 
contrast, the findings on the effect of the Agadir Agreement are not unanimous: 
2 A customs union was announced in 2003 and the common market was officially launched in 
2007 and should have started the following year, but in practice the member countries have 
not surrendered sovereignty for all external trade matters to a central authority such as the 
gcc secretariat.
3 The Barcelona Process or Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was launched in 1995. In 2008 the 
Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) was created to inject new life into the process, but this 
objective can hardly be said to have been achieved.
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Gylfason et al. (2015) find that the agreement has stimulated horizontal trade, 
notwithstanding the fact that signatories are not contiguous countries, and 
conclude that ‘deep and comprehensive free trade agreements between con-
tiguous and economically large countries could increase trade flows signifi-
cantly’. The limited importance of horizontal trade between Arab countries is 
therefore attributable to conflicts between immediate neighbours, which stifle 
proximate trade liberalisation. The authors therefore propose to reverse the 
tide by aiming at a deep and comprehensive trade agreement between Egypt, 
Israel and Jordan, which they deem politically feasible because these three 
countries have signed peace treaties with each other—a proposal that is op-
timistic at best. In contrast, Parra et al. (2016) do not find a beneficial effect of 
the Agadir Agreement.
Following the Arab Spring and the drift towards a full-scale regional civil 
war, attention to trade liberalisation is no longer a priority. Yet it is difficult to 
imagine that a virtuous circle of democratisation can be supported in the ab-
sence of a convincing project for trade liberalisation. Is it conceivable that this 
might be sponsored by outside actors, such as the European Union (eu) or the 
us? Both attempted to do so in the past, the eu through the Barcelona Process 
and the us through mefta. In each case, the respective projects suffered from 
their partial nature, being addressed to subsets of the membership of the Arab 
League and therefore being viewed as having a divisive rather than an inte-
grative impact on the region. Such schemes have justifiably been accused of 
aiming to impose a hub-and-spoke style trade pattern that would cement the 
dependence of Arab countries on either the eu or the us, and their isolation 
from each other. It is possible that a joint EU–US initiative encompassing all 
Arab countries and aiming at creating serious opportunities for regional inte-
gration might, in a context of regional pacification, succeed in finally putting 
in place adequate agreements, including the necessary supranational institu-
tions and enforcement mechanisms. The conditions for such an initiative do 
not exist today and have not existed for the past half-century (since at least 
1967); they may not be reunited in the future either. Yet, the recurrent tempta-
tion to cut corners and launch partial initiatives will, in all likelihood, doom 
such initiatives to failure.
4.2 Movements of Labour
Frustrations with trade liberalisation have in the past led to the conclusion 
that in the case of the Arab countries economic integration should rather start 
with movements of factors of production—labour and capital—than with 
merchandise trade. This view appeared to have empirical support in the 1970s 
and 1980s, when inter-Arab migrations reached their maximum intensity. At 
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that time, migration was viewed as bringing about a new Arab social order 
(Ibrahim, 1982) through its impact on family structures and its opening the 
possibility of capital accumulation for the middle and lower income classes of 
the sending countries. But this vision was soon aborted: Iraq, a major receiv-
ing country, became embroiled in an extended and bloody conflict with Iran, 
while oil prices collapsed in 1985 precipitating expenditure cuts in all major 
oil-exporting countries. Then, in 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait, and some of the 
major senders of migrant labour—notably Jordan, the Palestinian Territories 
and Yemen—aligned themselves in support of Saddam Hussein. The reac-
tion was immediate and radical: Saudi Arabia expelled approximately 800,000 
Yemeni workers before the end of the year, having cancelled the rule that al-
lowed Yemeni nationals to enter the kingdom without a visa and work without 
a sponsor (Ayalon, 1990, 725).4 In addition, 200,000 Jordanians, 150,000 Pales-
tinians, and nearly all Sudanese were effectively expelled from the kingdom 
(Richards and Waterbury, 2007). In Kuwait, half of the Palestinian population, 
estimated at 400,000 before the invasion, either fled or was expelled. The rest 
were also gradually pushed out, and by 2012 the Palestinian population of Ku-
wait was estimated to be barely 80,000.
In fact, the relative importance of other Arabs in the total expatriate popu-
lation in the Gulf had been declining systematically even before 1990 as shown 
in Tables 11.1, 11.2 and 11.3.
4 In later years Yemenis continued to move to the kingdom in many cases illegally (without a 
visa) and this led to large-scale expulsions as recently as in 2013 and 2015.
Table 11.1 Arab share in foreign populations 1975–2015
1975 1985 1996 2002/4 2010/15
Bahrain 22 15 12 15 8.4
Kuwait 80 69 33 30 26.5
Oman 16 16 11 6 2.6
Qatar 33 33 21 19 30.2
Saudi Arabia 91 79 30 33 46
uae 26 19 10 13 18.4
gcc 72 56 31 32 30
Sources: For 1975 to 2004: Kapiszewski, 2006; for 2010/15: European University 




Table 11.2 Estimates of the number of foreign nationals (Arab nationalities), by country of 
residence in gcc member countries (2010–2014)
Destination Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia uae gcc
Year 2014 end 2012 2010 2013–2014 2013 2013–2014
Origin
Algeria n.a. 845 n.a. n.d. n.a. 10,000 (e) 10845
Egypt 20,000 482,692 29,877 18,0000 (b) 1,370,000 (d) 400,000 (e) 2,482,569
Iraq n.a. 15,262 4,159 8,976 20,000 52,000 (e) 100,397
Jordan 7,000 55,081 7,403 40,000 (b) 250,000 200,000(e) 559,484
Lebanon 2,300 (a) 42,586 n.a. 25,000 (b) 160,000 100,000 (e) 329,886
Mauritania n.a. 142 n.a. n.d. n.a. 5,000 (e) 5,142
Morocco 800(a) 3,495 n.a. 9,000(b) 20,000(a) 14,000 47,295
Palestine 5,000(a) 8,072 n.a. 20,500(b) 500,000 150,000(e) 683,572
Sudan 14,000(a) 4,551 6,867 42,000(b) 500,000 75,000(e) 642,418
Syria 3,000 135,554 n.a. 60,000(c) 1,000,000(c) 242,000(c) 1,440,554
Tunisia 500(a) 2,863 n.a. 15,000(b) 12,000(a) 4,500 34,863
Yemen 4,700 10,762 n.a. 40,000(a) 800,000 90,000(e) 945,462
TOTAL 57,300 761,905 48,306 440,476 4,632,000 1,342,500 7,282,487
Figures for migrants in the gcc may be overestimated due to the inclusion of a large share of 
Gulf-born (second and third generation) non-nationals.
Palestinians are holders of travel documents.
Some of the figures quoted are unverifiable estimates. Therefore, they should be taken as 
indicative only and should not be used for statistical purposes.
Unless stated otherwise, receiving countries’ estimates are from relevant tables in the pop  
section of the eui Migration Policy Centre, glmm database.
(a) United Nations (2013), revision total migrants’ stocks by origin and destination countries.
(b) Snoj, J. (2013)‘Population of Qatar by nationality’ (Doha: bq Magazine) December, 
http://www.bqdoha.com/2013/12/population-qatar (accessed on 8 April 2016) and http://
gulfmigration.eu/qatar-estimates-of-foreign-nationals-residing-in-qatar-by-country-of-
citizenship-selected-countries-2014/ (accessed on 8 April 2016).
(c) Latest figures available as of October 2015, in: De Bel-Air, F. (2015)‘A Note on Syrian Refugees in the 
Gulf: Attempting to Assess Data and Policies’, glmm Explanatory Note, glmm—en—No. 11/2015. 
http://gulfmigration.eu/media/pubs/exno/GLMM_EN_2015_11.pdf (accessed on 8 April 2016).
(d) Official estimate: Egyptian workers in Saudi Arabia number 968,000 (end of 2013). https://
www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/africa/14187-egyptians-represent-40-per-cent-o--saudi-
arabias-total-expatriate-workforce (accessed on 8 April 2016).
Estimates of family dependents: in the absence of any indication of the ratio of worker to family 
dependents in the uae, we use data available for Kuwait in 2012: 2.4 workers per family dependent.
Estimates of Egyptians (total): 968,000 + (968,000/2.4) = 1,371,000.
(e) Snoj, J. (2015)‘uae’s population by nationality’ (Doha: bq Magazine) April 12.
Table as of December 15, 2015.
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Table 11.3 Total population and percentage of nationals and non-nationals in gcc countries 
(2010–2015)




% in total population
Nationals Non-nationals
Bahrain(1) mid-2014 1,314,562 630,744 683,818 48.0 52.0
Kuwait(2) 31 March 2015 4,161,404 1,283,726 2,877,678 30.8 69.2
Oman(3) 25 March 2015 4,149,917 2,324,327 1,825,590 56.0 44.0
Qatar(4) April 2010 1,699,435 243,019 1,456,416 14.3 85.7
Saudi Arabia(5) mid-2014 30,770,375 20,702,536 10,067,839 67.3 32.7
United Arab  
Emirates(6)
mid-2010 8,264,070 947,997 7,316,073 11.5 88.5
Total* 50,359,763 26,132,349 24,227,414 51.9 48.1
* Total provides the sum of population numbers at different dates between April 2010 and 
March 2015. It is not exactly the total population at any of these dates.
1—Definition
Non-nationals are:
1.1—Persons of the nationality of a foreign state other than the gcc state of residence, or 
bearing no proof of nationality from any given state (stateless persons and holders of refugee 
status and travel document in a third country);
1.2—Holders of residence permits residing in the given gcc country at the date of census, as 
per the definition of residence used in each of the countries. Figures for Bahrain, Saudi Arabia 
and the uae are estimates.
2—Sources of data:
Unless stated otherwise, the source is eui Migration Policy Centre, glmm database.
(1) Bahrain Central Informatics Organisation (cio), cio’s website, ‘Statistics’ and ‘Population’ 
sections http://www.data.gov.bh/en/ResourceCenter.
(2) Kuwait Public Authority for Civil Information (paci), http://www.paci.gov.kw/en/ (accessed 
on 31 March 2015).
(3) Sultanate of Oman National Centre for Statistical Information (ncsi), http://www.ncsi 
.gov.om/ (accessed on 5 March 2015).
(4) Qatar Statistics Authority (qsa), Census 2010 http://gulfmigration.eu/population-by 
-nationality-qatari-non-qatari-census-1970-2010/ (accessed on 8 April 2016).
(5) Saudi Arabia Central Department for Statistics and Information (cdsi), estimates.  
http://www.cdsi.gov.sa/ (accessed on 8 April 2016).
(6) uae National Bureau of Statistics (nbs), estimates http://www.uaestatistics.gov.ae/ 
(accessed on 8 April 2016).
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Kapiszewski has pointed to the political activism of early Arab migrants and to 
the pan-Arab beliefs that they entertained:
Many young Arabs regarded borders in the Middle East as artificial lines 
imposed by Western imperialists, and, consequently, expected them to 
be eliminated. Another popular pan-Arab view, that of a single Arab 
nation in which labor “circulates” freely, was also rejected by the Gulf 
governments for security reasons. Yet another problem was related to 
the regional distribution of the oil-generated wealth. Whereas the oil-
producing countries which preferred to retain that wealth began to link 
the entitlement of oil revenues to state sovereignty, poorer states increas-
ingly stressed their Arab identity as a good reason to demand their share 
in the revenues: Iraq even used the oil-related arguments as a justifica-
tion to invade Kuwait in 1990.
kapiszewski, 2006, 6–7
Such sentiment has not dissipated to this date and is very central to the Arab 
civil war.
The declining importance of Arab migrants is even more striking when 
viewed in the context of growing total expatriate numbers. From the point of 
view of the composition of their populations, cities like Dubai, Abu Dhabi or 
Doha have effectively become South Asian. The lack of a preference for other 
Arabs—or even positive discrimination against them—has been a huge lost 
opportunity for regional economic integration, including from the point of view 
of trade ties and capital movements (which migration would have facilitated).
But the attitude of the Gulf countries has, if anything, shifted in the opposite 
direction: increasingly some of the Gulf States have tended to deprive even 
large groups of citizens of their nationality, in order to punish dissidents.
4.3 Movements of Capital
With little progress on the trade front and the declining relative importance 
of inter-Arab migration, the only dimension of regional integration remain-
ing is capital movements. These did intensify progressively as non-oil Arab 
countries adopted orthodox fiscal and monetary policies, and the major oil 
exporters were flush with liquidity thanks to rapidly growing oil prices. Inter-
Arab investment grew significantly until 2008 (with an exceptional peak in 
2005, Figure 11.1), then collapsed in conjunction with the global financial crisis. 
Investment picked up again beginning in 2010, but then the effects of regional 
political turmoil began to be felt.
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Data on the accumulated stock of inter-Arab investment to the end of 2011 
( Table  11.4) point to a prevalence of cross investment within gcc member 
states, with Saudi Arabia being the main recipient country, due to its larger 
internal market. Outside the gcc, Sudan, Egypt, Lebanon and Algeria have 
been major recipients, while Jordan, Syria, Yemen, Tunisia and Morocco have 
remained at the margins.
Much of this distribution can be explained on the basis of the size of the 
respective economies, the attractiveness of investment conditions, political/
security considerations, or proximity. In this respect the figure for Algeria is a 
little surprising, because the country has neither a friendly investment envi-
ronment nor proximity to the Gulf.
With respect to sectors, it is found that inter-Arab investment concentrates 
heavily in services (tourism, banking, telecommunications…), which absorb 
close to 70 per cent of the total, while industry absorbs about a quarter.
The ‘push factor’ of high oil prices generating large surpluses and abundant 
liquidity is confirmed by data for 2012 (Table 11.5), showing the large invest-
ment from Qatar in Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia. The contrast between Qatar 
and the United Arab Emirates (uae) is interesting; the latter being evidently 
more reserved about investing in the region.
It is clear from these figures that inter-Arab investment remains highly con-
centrated on a few large-scale projects, frequently initiated by state-owned 
entities. As such, it remains an unstable and occasional source of funding, 












Figure 11.1 Inter-Arab foreign direct investments (fdi) inflows (usd 
billion, 1995–2011)




 enterprises is minor, and the employment effects on the receiving countries, 
effects about which very little is known, are likely to be minor.
In short, so far inter-Arab investment has failed to be the engine of regional 
growth that many expected and hoped that it might become. In particular, the 
idea of ‘triangulation’ (allying finance from the Gulf and other major oil ex-
porters with industrial know-how from Europe, the us or elsewhere and an 
abundant labour supply in oil-poor Arab countries) has not made any progress 
at all in practice.
5 Conclusion: The Unresolved Regional Political Order
As we look forward to a potential end to the Arab civil war the need for a new 
regional political and economic order seems inescapable. In a recent report 





















Source: Arab Investment and Export 
Credit Guarantee Corporation, 2011.
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proposing three scenarios for the future of the Arab region in 2025, the opti-
mistic scenario is introduced as follows:
The implementation of a Greater Arab Free Trade Area (gafta), coupled 
with a reduction of 5% in transport costs and the replacement of 20% of 
foreign labour in the Gulf by Arab workers led to an important U-turn in 
Arab economies. In Egypt, unemployment rates among skilled workers 
dropped by 8%; in Morocco, by 7.2%, in Tunisia by 6.9%. gdp rates grew 
in all Arab countries, but particularly in Egypt (whose gdp grew by 6.2%) 
and Tunisia (4.2%).
gaub and laban, 2015, 37
Such emphasis on the regional dimension of economic growth and the impor-
tance of integration through trade and migration is fully justified. Individual 
Arab countries can move towards democracy and implement economic re-
forms to support such a transition, but in the absence of a convincing and bold 
regional integration strategy Arab youth will still focus primarily on moving 
out of the region.
At the same time, the implementation of a new regional economic order 
also requires a new political order. The main difficulty in this respect is that 
those countries in the region that have the most economic assets and tools—
the major Gulf exporters—are ruled by patrimonial monarchies rather than 
political forces, and their model of governance cannot be exported. Indeed, 
Table 11.5 Inter-Arab investment, 2012 (in eur millions)
Destination Origin of fdi flows




Egypt 196 640 160 738
Jordan 59 18 237 50
Lebanon 1 11 38 132
Libya 21 129 15
Morocco 65 15 105 73
Syria 83 63 36 60
Tunisia 17 457
Source: Noutary and Tabet, 2013.
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patrimonial monarchies find it difficult to engage in regional cooperation that 
requires any kind of devolution of sovereignty to regional institutions, as dem-
onstrated by the lacklustre progress of the gcc.
In the wake of the Arab Spring, in 2011 Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah called 
for the transformation of the gcc into a union—a project whose exact impli-
cations were never spelled out precisely, although it meant some form of tran-
sition from interstate cooperation to at least partial devolution of sovereignty. 
The call was not met with enthusiasm by fellow gcc member monarchs, and 
has failed to make any progress. The idea of Gulf integration has significant 
support in gcc member countries, primarily in business circles—although 
many would not want to see the Saudi brand of Wahhabism and mores im-
posed on the rest of the region.
Again in 2011, the gcc invited Jordan and Morocco to become members, 
much to the surprise of the latter. This too was an attempt at strengthening the 
gcc and showing that it had regional power of attraction beyond the Arabian 
peninsula: both Jordan and Morocco are monarchies, of course, but in both 
countries power is not exclusively centralised in the hands of the monarch and 
elections are regularly held. Not much progress in this direction has been made.
Finally, Yemen applied for membership of the gcc in 2015, following the 
launch of the Saudi military intervention in the country.5 Yemen is obviously 
seeking free access for its citizens to gcc labour markets, and an opportunity 
to attract financial support and private direct investment. By the same token, 
the idea of Yemeni membership constitutes a big problem for the gcc, which 
has been accused of having many times missed opportunities to integrate their 
southern neighbour. The political obstacles to the country’s membership of 
the gcc are only too obvious, as Yemen’s political reality is totally incongruous 
with that of the gcc; nevertheless, refusing to offer to its people a reasonable 
opportunity for development is tantamount to allowing a security time bomb 
to grow increasingly dangerous, situated at the door of the gcc.
With respect to other countries in the region, the gcc and its members aim 
to support ‘friends’ that reproduce authoritarian styles of governance. That 
such friends are not always well chosen is unfortunately a reality, President al-
Sisi being the foremost example. In recent years, Qatar has tended to support 
its own ‘friends’, which are not the same as those that the uae or Saudi Arabia 
support—a rift that has been superficially but not substantially overcome.
5 ‘Rather than scoffing at the idea of Yemeni membership in the gcc, the Gulf Arab nations 
should realize that closer integration of the states of the Arabian Peninsula is a historic 
opportunity—one that they have failed to seize, time after time’. Farea al-Muslimi (2016)‘A 
History of Missed Opportunities: Yemen and the gcc’, Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=62405 (accessed on 5 February 2016).
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And yet, neither the perspective of a ‘fortress gcc’ nor that of Arab integra-
tion without the gcc has much potential. Kuwait, Qatar or the uae may aim 
at isolating themselves from the regional security environment, positioning 
themselves as political free zones between a troubled region and the global 
environment; but Bahrain, Oman and Saudi Arabia are inevitably exposed and 
impacted by regional politics. Conversely, an Arab regional project that does 
not include the major oil exporters would lack the main growth engine that the 
financial, labour and consumer markets of the gcc can offer.
It is, then, difficult today to share the vision of the optimistic scenario ref-
erenced at the beginning of this section, just as it is difficult to foresee the end 
of the Arab civil war any time soon. Yet civil wars eventually do end, and the 
future of the region depends entirely on the political order that will follow.
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